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ABSTRACT
This is a study of a series of negotiations between the 
British and the Siamese Governments in the first nine years 
of the twentieth century. The prolonged dispute between the 
two countries was stirred up in 1902 by the wish of the 
Siamese Government, under the leadership of King 
Chulalongkorn, to achieve the abolition of the extraterrit­
orial system which had been initiated in Siam by the Bowring 
Treaty of 1855* -he talks, though simple at the start, 
became more complex as they progressed. By 1905, when the 
negotiations reached deadlock and were suspended, two other 
issues had already been brought into the discussions. These 
were the abrogation of the Anglo-Siamese Secret Convention 
of 1897  ^ which required Siam to obtain British sanction for 
the grant of a prospecting licence over land in the Malay 
peninsula, and the question of the exact status of Siam in 
relation to the four Northern Malay States of Kedah, Kelantan, 
Trengganu and Perlis. The strenuous efforts of Siam would 
have achieved little if the discussion regarding the con­
struction of the Malay Peninsula Railway had not intervened 
in 1906. The likely benefits from the new Railway lines 
influenced the diplomatic talks and they entered a more 
promising phase. A year later negotiated settlements on the 
various issues were given a fresh impetus by the Pranco- 
Siamese Treaty by which France agreed to submit all her
Asian subjects to Siamese tribunal. Following closely 
France*s example, the pending negotiations were continued 
without delay. After a twelve-month interval in 1908, 
following the death of Mr. E.H. Strobel., the General Adviser 
to the Siamese Government, who was the architect of the 
foreign policy of Siam from 1904 onwards, a compromise was 
reached on March 10, 1909. Under the stipulations of the 
Treaty Siam agreed to transfer all her rights and suzerainty 
over Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis to England. In 
return England relinquished her extraterritorial rights over 
her subjects, European and Asian alike, in Siam. The Secret 
Convention of 1897 was abrogated. And Britain gave Siam a 
loan of B4 million at 4 per cent interest for the construction 
of the Malay Peninsula Railway.
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES.
G.O......  Colonial Office.
F.M......  Foreign Ministry, Bangkok, Thailand.
F.O......  Foreign Office, London.
1.0......  India Office.
N.A......  National Archives Division, Department of
Fine Arts, Ministry of Education, Bangkok,
Thailand.
PRO .... Public Record Office.
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CHAPTER I
EXISTING ISSUES IN ANGLO-SIAMESE RELATIONS IN 1900.
... I am most certain that as long as I 
breathe I will not see Siam without her 
independence ... O )
This statement, reflecting a strong determination mixed 
with pain and sorrow, came from King Chulalongkorn of Siam.
It was uttered in 1893 when, at the height of the great 
European imperialist scramble and the commercial assault on 
the Par East, the 'gun-boat policy1 of France, Siam's
colonising territorial neighbour, was threatening his
(o')
country.v ' Fortunately the above promise was fulfilled by 
King Chulalongkorn1s brilliant statesmanship and sense of 
opportunity during his long and eventful forty-two year reign 
(1868-1910). Siam has never experienced colonisation and her
(1) NA, R5, File I, Vol.I., King Chulalongkorn - Krom Luang 
Pichitprichakorn, (Aug-Dee.) 1893*
(2) The difficulties between France and Siam arising out of 
claims to territory on the left bank of the Mekong founded 
on the supposed rights of Cambodia and Vietnam culminated 
during the year 1893 in a rupture of relations. The French 
carried out a blockade of the Siamese coast and informed 
the British warships, one anchored opposite the SFPtl'sh 
Legation in the Chao Phraya river and others outside the 
bar at Paknam, to leave Bangkok. The Siamese had to yield 
and accepted an ultimatum presented to them. A treaty
was made. Under its stipulations Siam suffered a heavy 
loss of her territory and funds. One provision of the 
Treaty was that French troops should remain in occupation 
of Chantaboon pending the other provisions being complied 
with. Luang Vichitr Vadakarn, Kan Sia Dindaen Thai 
Hai Gkae Farangset. (The loss of Territory to France), 
(Bangkok', 1962), pp. 157-162.
people are proud to call themselves the "Thai”, a word which 
literarily signifies ‘freedom*.
In 1868 King Mongkut, an architect of the * Open-door* 
policy (the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce 
of 1855 was a landmark in Siamese international relations) 
and a pioneer of administrative reforms, was succeeded by 
Chulalongkorn, his illustrious son. The well-prepared new 
King, though being a youth of fifteen years of age, showed a 
keen interest in consolidating and enlarging the pioneering 
work handed to him. Internal reforms started from the 
beginning of his reign and at the approach of the new century 
every aspect of a national life was in the midst of radical 
change. But ahead of him lay a major problem:- the maintenance 
of Siam’s independence. Without independence, all attempts 
at internal change would become meaningless.
Siam*s independence was more threatened at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. She found herself hemmed in between 
two strong colonising Powers, England and France. The Franco- 
Siamese crisis of 1895 convinced the King and his ministers 
that their country could easily be paralysed: a blow at
Bangkok meant Siam at some more powerful nation’s feet.
Though the Anglo-French Declaration of 1896 guaranteed the 
integrity of the heart of the Kingdom,v J this Declaration,
(1) This Declaration was to the effect that neither England 
nor France should advance their armed forces, nor acquire 
any special privilege or advantage within the region which 
roughly speaking might be termed the valley of the Menam.
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however, was not assuring since Siam took no part in it.
This serious situation called attention to the safeguarding
of Siam’s independence. In a letter to the Interior Minister
in 1895 King Chulalongkorn wrote,
... Our country is surrounded by countries 
which are strictly ruled by more powerful 
nations. We must have relations along the 
frontier. One cannot remain aloof as before.
There are three ways to safeguard our country 
internally and externally; to negotiate 
settlements, to maintain strength to keep 
peace, and to reform the administrative 
system.. . )
The last policy was successfully accomplished when King 
Chulalongkorn started a reform of administrative centralization 
in the Kingdom in 1892. But the threat against national 
independence still lingered. With regard to maintaining 
strength the King and his ministers had to accept that they 
were perfectly aware of the utter weakness of Siam as a power. 
They knew that they were unable to preserve independence by 
armaments or by strength of popular patriotism alone. In 
practice the King had to live by his wits. Fortunately, 
through his foresight, His Majesty chose the first means - to 
be friendly with his colonial neighbours and to draw advan­
tages from the rivalry existing between them and from his 
country’s position in order to reach more favourable negotiated
(1) King Chulalongkorn-Prince Damrong, 14-3/4-54, January 18, 
1895* The King wrote to Prince Damrong on an occasion 
of the first annual meeting of the High Commissioners
(Kaluang Tesapiban).
The Bulletin of the Ministry of Interior, (Bangkok, 1952) 
pp. 14-7-14-8.
settlements — . Such ’survival policy* proved to be a miracle. 
True, to some extent the Jealousy and rivalry of England and 
France played a part to maintain Siam’s independence. But 
could such coincidence alone work magic without King 
Chulalongkorn's command of the situation?
In dealing with the general foreign policy of Siam, two 
Powers alone - England and France - played a prominent part.
It is true that in the late nineteenth century there were 
indications of Germany trying to establish a footing by 
various means, and that Denmark strenuously pushed her com­
mercial interests, but these Powers did not possess political 
influence in the same sense as England and France, Siam's 
neighbours respectively on the west and on the east.
While the word 'influence' was alike used to describe 
the authority in Siam exercised by both England and France, 
this influence in each case sprang from very different sources 
British influence in Siam was due to the confidence of the 
Siamese Government in the British Government, the substantial 
British education, and long-term commercial and political 
relations. French influence, on the other hand, was due to 
fear of French aggression alone.
Consequently the sympathies of the Siamese Government 
were inclined towards the British Government as against the 
French. At the same time England responded well to Siam's 
friendly overtures. Diplomatic negotiations between them
during the nineteenth century were usually in the form of 
amicable discussions. In 1868 a Convention was concluded 
between the Governor-General of India and the King of Siam 
defining the boundary on the mainland between Siam and the 
British Province of Tenasserim, and this was followed in 1869 
by a Treaty defining the boundaries of the British possessions 
on the mainland of the Malay Peninsula. Some thirty years 
later, in 1899, the frontier between Perak and Pahang and 
Kedah and Kelantan, Trengganu and Rahman was also laid down 
in an Agreement.
However, there remained some burning questions such as 
the problems of extraterritoriality, the existence of the 
Anglo-Siamese Secret Convention of 1897 and the question of 
Siamese suzerainty over the northern Malay States of Kedah, 
Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis. By the twentieth century the 
Siamese had begun to realise the necessity of coming to a 
better understanding with England in order to arouse curiosity 
among the French authorities, to soften the incessantly 
aggressive policy of France and to bring them to a more 
agreeable contact. Painfully and slowly the new century began 
with Siamese attempts to resolve all existing difficulties 
with the British Government.
Extraterritoriality.
In the mid-nineteenth century when western colonisation 
was penetrating into the Far East, Siam’s independence was
6inevitably shaken. By the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce,
known as the 'Bov/ring Treaty1 which Siam concluded with
England in 1855? she lost a measure of sovereignty. This
treaty together with its supplementary Convention of 1856,
provided for the appointment of a British Consul to reside in
Bangkok, under whose regulation, control and jurisdiction all
British subjects were placed. Thus extraterritoriality in
Siam was initiated. Article II stipulated that
The interest of all British subjects coming to 
Siam shall be placed under the regulation and 
control of a Consul, who will be appointed to 
reside at Bangkok. ... any dispute arising 
between British and Siamese subjects shall be 
heard and determined by the Consul in ✓
conjunction with the proper Siamese officers. J
In spite of a disadvantage in judicial matters the
Siamese negotiators conducted the Treaty negotiations with
their eyes open. They knew full well that if they wanted to
maintain Siam's independence they had to yield to all demands.
Even before his arrival, Sir John Bov/ring, the British
negotiator, alarmed the Siamese Government with an unnecessary
explanation:
At present there are many British warships in 
the China Sea ... But Sir John Bowring will come 
with few ships. The ministers should not get the 
wrong impression ... Sir John Bowring does not 
like the idea of using force ...(2)
(1) F.O. 97/568, The Bowring Treaty of 1855-
(2) Chao Phraya Tipakorawong, Pharatchaphongsawadan Krung 
Rattanakosin Ratchakan Thi~45 /Royal Chronicles of the 
Fourth Reign of the Bangkok Period), (2 Vols. Bangkok, 
1961), Vol. I, p.114.
More threatening words came when Bov/ring summed up the purpose
of his mission:
If I can get a treaty, well; if not, I will 
not consent to delay, but shall simply state that 
I cannot give more time to the object, but will 
return to Siam when I have consulted with my 
colleagues of France and the United States, and 
the British Admiral.(^)
To prevent the arrival of many 'British warships' in
Siamese waters, King Mongkut had to listen obediently to the
explanation of Bowring that the standard of Siamese law and
(o')
justice was inferior to that of the Britishv ' and to accept
without demu the proposal to place British subjects under
the sole jurisdiction and control of the Consul. The King
(1) Sir John Bov/ring, The Kingdom and People of Siam, (London, 
1857) Vol.II, pp.212-215. The same alarming tone was 
repeated by Townsend Harris, an American envoy, after his 
exhausting negotiations with the Siamese Government in 
1856: "The proper way to negotiate with the Siamese is to 
send two or three men-of-war of not more than sixteen foot 
draft of water. Let them arrive in October and at once 
proceed up to Bangkok and fire their salutes. In such 
case the treaty would not require more days than I have 
consumed weeks." cf.. James V. Martin, A History of the 
Diplomatic Relations between Siam and the United States. 
1855-192^*1 Microfilmed by the Library of Congress 
Photo-duplication service, p.86.
(2) Bowring commented:
... In a country where the authority of the sovereign is 
absolute, it is obvious that the organisation of tribunals 
and the protecting power of legislation can afford but 
very inadequate security. To a great extent, also, the 
power of interfering with the action of the tribunals is 
possessed and exercised by the high nobles, according to 
their rank and influence. Bowring, op.cit, Vol.I, p.150
8was satisfied that what he had done was right and timely•
In explaining how his timing was right the King told the 
following story:
Two travellers, carrying home-grown jute, 
started their journey. Both arrived at a place 
where they found more valuable material such as 
cotton. The fool still carried that unprofitable 
jute while his thoughtful companion exchanged his 
jute for cotton. Both walked on and reached the 
silk area. The fool stuck to his jute but the 
clever one exchanged his cotton for silk. On 
reaching their destination the foolish one 
suffered from carrying heavy and valueless 
goods while his friend easily got a handsome 
profit. O)
The King also made a sharp comment on an attack made by some 
of his councillors regarding his 'open-door* policy. He 
addressed the Council of Ministers as follows:
I have heard that some Court officials said 
that since the First King, the Second King and 
some ministers made friends with the Englishmen 
and studied English, the Englishmen have begun 
to take advantages and have caused trouble and 
irritation. I would like to ask all of you to 
look back ... Fifty years ago, Penang belonged 
to us. When it came under British possession 
in the reign of King Rama I, who made friends 
with the British then? Singapore, formerly 
being under Johore, came under British control 
in 1819: was it because of Siamese associations
with the British? Tavoy, Marid, Tenasserim, 
formerly the Burmese territories, became British 
states in 1825: whQ made friends with the
British then? . ..^'
(1) Prince Narathip Phongpraphan, Prawat Kan Tud Thai 
(History of Siamese Diplomacy), (Bangkok, 1958")"," p. 68,
(2) Manuscript Section, National Library, Bangkok, R4-,
No.4*73? King Mongkut*s speech, undated.
9Though their judicial status was hampered by extra­
territorial privileges granted to the British subjects, the 
Siamese had some consolation,, First, British subjects in 
Siam in 1855 consisted of no more than a handful of Britons 
residing in Bangkok, and of some Asians who occasionally 
visited Siam in the course of trade.' J Second, one precious 
precaution - the disabilities of British subjects in respect
of right to hold land, and of travelling or residing beyond
(2)somewhat narrow limits was inserted in Article IV of the 
Treaty. Of course, it could not have entered the minds of the 
negotiators that persons whose religions, laws and customs 
were similar to those of Siam, such as the British Asian 
subjects, should be exempt from the Siamese jurisdiction and 
liable to alien laws. It was also never contemplated that 
foreign subjects might be established and engaged in trade in 
large numbers all over the country at a distance of days' - 
if not months' - journey from the nearest Consular Court.
The arrangement thus entered into might, no doubt, have 
remained suitable for all time if no changes took place. But
(1) F.O. 422/64, Paget's Memorandum respecting Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty Negotiations, April 15, 1909.
(2) Article IV read: British subjects are permitted to 
trade freely in all the seaports of Siam, but may 
reside permanently only at Bangkok ... British subjects 
coming to reside at Bangkok may rent land and buy or 
build homes, but cannot purchase lands within a 
circuit of 200 sen (not more than 4 miles English) 
from the city walls...
' the absorption of countries neighbouring Siam on the east and
KB
west by Great Britain and France respectively before and after 
the Bowring Treaty created a wholly new situation,^^ Shans, 
Vietnamese, Cambodians, Chinese, Malays, etc., claiming foreign 
protection entered into Siam in increasing numbers. The nat­
ional status of those who were already in the country automati-
(2)cally changed from Siamese to foreign. ' For years and in some
cases for generations Siamese subjects, they now suddenly found
themselves invested with all the privileges of Europeans. Of
these foreign subjects, the British Asians formed the majority.
(3)These included Shans, Indians, Chinese, Malays and Eurasians. '
The exact number of these persons was not easy to calculate, 
In 1892 the British Asian subjects numbered about 10,000 
including 5*750 in the north, and approximately 1,500 were
(1) From 1856 to 1899 Siam signed treaties granting judicial 
privileges to subjects of the following countries; France, 
the United States, Denmark, Portugal, Netherlands, Germany, 
Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Austria-Hungary, Spain and Japan.
(2) Luang Nathabanja, Extraterritoriality in Siam, (Bangkok,
1924), pp. 247-250.
(5) C.O. 273/515? Report on the Condition of British Asiatic 
Subjects in Siam, March 18, 1891. The Shans were spread 
over the whole area of the country. For example, the 
majority of the labour force of the gem-miners at failin 
^  in eastern Siam were Shans and so were all the pedlers," 
itinerant traders, and elephant and cattle dealers. Some
1 Shans became agriculturists and shopkeepers. In the north 
a large proportion of Shans from Lower Burma were settled 
in as teak foresters as well as traders. F.O. 69/162, 
British subjects in Siam. Extract from Mr. Black's report. 
Enclosure in de Bunsen's letter of August 7* 1895*
—11
(1}
from the Siamese Malay States. J Within three years the
(2)figure rose by 1,800. ' The second largest group were the
French subjects. They were the Lao, Vietnamese, and 
Cambodians pouring into Siam from the East. By the 1890's 
they were estimated at 6,000. ' Apart from these, there
existed Portuguese, Italian, American, Japanese and Dutch 
subjects.
The presence of a large alien Asian community constituted
a real grievance on the part of Siam. Th6se subjects were
✓A
spread far beyond the original limits assigned by Treaties,
(1) F.O. 69/168, English Population in Siam, July 2, 1892.
In 1884 Mr. Holt Hallett, an Englishman, who travelled 
throughout Siam wrote that the population of the Siamese 
territory did not exceed 4,000,000. Bangkok itself 
contained from 400,000 to 560,000. PRO 56/29/278 Report 
of Mr. Holt Hallett upon the present State and Political 
Aspect of Indo-China, for the information of the Foreign 
Office, 1880-1884.
(2) F.O. 69/162. British subjects in Siam, Extract from 
Mr. Black's report. Enclosure in de Bunsen's letter of 
August 7> 1895* They were as follows:
In South Eastern Siam 2,560
North Eastern Siam 800
Nan 400
Phre 400
Chiengmai, Lakhon and up to North frontier 5> 000
Lower Mee Ping and Menam Valley 800
Bangkok 1,906
Total 11,800
With regard to the European British subjects its number 
in the Chiengmai Consular district rose from some two or
three in 1884 to over 56 in 1902.
F.O. 69/246, Beckett's Memorandum, December 17, 1903.
(3) H.Warington Smith, Five Years in Siam 1891-1896, 
2 Vols, (London, 189S) Vol.II, p.242.
and enjoyed, with the tacit approval of the Siamese Government, 
judicial rights practically free from all restriction. In 
1884 the Siamese themselves issued a Royal Proclamation 
providing that a person charged with an offence should, if he 
claimed to be under foreign jurisdiction, be conducted to his 
Consulate for trial in accordance with Treaty stipulations. ' 
By enjoying access to their Consulate the Asian subjects were 
placed in a much more favourable position than the Siamese.
For example, if they were living in places distant from their 
Consul, they were released from Siamese administrative control 
but were not directly controlled by the Consul and could make 
themselves very objectionable to the local authorities. If 
they wanted redress through the Consular Courts, they had to 
lay their complaints in Bangkok or a representative had to 
come out from Bangkok which was exceedingly inconvenient.' ^  
However, Chinese, Shans, Cambodians and Lao, often indis­
tinguishable from Siamese could pose as Siamese subjects as 
long as they were plaintiffs, but when they were sued as 
defendants they could produce their certificates as foreign 
subjects and refer the local authorities to their Consul.
When a case arose at a place far from a Consular Court, none 
but the most serious offences or important civil cases could 
be settled by law, and even in these, justice was likely to
(1) F.O. 69/262, Minutes respecting Registration in Siam:
Burden of Proof as to the right to hold a British 
Certificate, Morrison, October 1, 1897.
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be hampered by the expense and difficulty of getting 
witnesses to the Court. '
Worse still, it was the practice of the foreign Legations 
in Siam, whatever the rights or the wrongs of a case might be, 
to support these protected persons against the Siamese authori­
ties, and if possible to thwart the administration of justice
(?)8gainst them. ' It was a common saying in Bangkok that a
criminal was quite safe in Siam so long as he had a claim to
C7))foreign protection. Most of the trouble came from the 
French authorities who usually used “only one ear to listen
(4)
to cases”. ' At times French missionaries intervened and
interrupted the course of justice. To take some cases: in
1899 Mr. Feron, the French Vice-Consul, wrote to Prince
Devawongse, the Siamese Foreign Minister, accusing the Governor
of Nakornchaisi of invading with armed soldiers into the
house of Bishop Ferdivel, arresting Jean U Haw (A Chinese
( 5)named U Haw), and using threatening and bad language.
After investigation it appeared that Jean Hui (a Chinese
___________________________________
(1) F.O. 628/29, Ministry of Justice, Report for the Year 
125, (1906/07), Siam.
(2) C.O. 273/323, Paget-Grey, February, 1906.
(3) Ibid.
(4) NA, R5, T.13, 7/13, King Chulalongkorn-Prince Devawongse,
January 15, 1900.
(5) NA, R5, T.13, 7/13, Feron-Prince Devawongse, December
23, 1899.
14-
named Hui) had cultivated the land of U Haw while the latter 
was serving imprisonment. On his being released Haw asked 
for a share of his land but Hui refused. Haw then accused 
Hui of appropriating his property. Bishop Ferdivel authori­
sed Haw to punish Hui. First, Hawfs men arrested Am Dang Ya, 
Hui's wife, and later on the Bishop asked Hui to come to him. 
Instead Hui found himself being tethered with chains soon 
after his arrival at the Bishop’s house. When Hui and his 
wife were released he put the case to court. The court 
issued an arrest warrant but the Bishop claimed that Hui had 
to come to him instead of seeking the court judgement. He 
was told, however, that the Bishop had no judicial power.
Finally, the Government in Bangkok had to send a foreign
Cl')lawyer to try the case. '
In 1904- Mr. Ponsot, the French Consul, reported to the 
Foreign Ministry in Bangkok that Nai Ploy (Mister Ploy) was 
attacked while sticking frogs at the rear of his own home and 
later on was arrested by the local authorities. The Consul 
demanded his release, but the Siamese argued that Ploy was 
accused of causing Nai Yim (Mister Yim) bodily harm. 
Initially, Ploy stated that he was in the Navy, but during 
cross-examination he claimed to be a French-Cambodian subject 
by producing a Certificat D 1 Inscription. However, subsequent
(1) NA, R5, T.13, 7/13? Prince Devawongse-Prince Sommot, 
January 14-, 1900.
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investigation revealed that both Ploy and his father were 
Siamese and had been in the Navy for more than ten years.
Ploy had a rose tattoo on the wrist indicating a condition
(y\)
of soldier.v ' Though the Siamese Government had full
authority over Ploy, and though a flare-up was due to careless
investigation of the French Consul, the Siamese had to
yield to the French Government's persistence. Ploy was
handed over to the French Consul.
In addition, the following ere illustrations of some
extraordinary abuses that occurred in the French and some
other foreign courts.
In the French Court, a case arose in 1898 concerning a
certain French subject who had brutally assaulted a man in
the street, causing grievous bodily harm. He was found guilty
by Mr. Reau, the French Consul, and sentenced to imprisonment
until the Court rose. The extraordinary inadequacy of this
sentence led the Siamese Inspector-General of Police to
inquire whether any new facts had come to light at the trial
justifying so light a sentence. The reason given by the
(2)Consul was that he did not believe the man guilty. J
In the British Court, the case arose in 1885 of Ali Baa, 
a British subject who was charged with the murder of a
(1) NA, R5, T.15, 22/13, Prince Devawongse-Prince Sommot,
February 24, 1904.
(2) NA, K5, T.13, 7/15> The Memorandum of the Inspector-
General of Police.
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Siamese policeman. He was handed over to the British Consul 
and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The Siamese 
Government took exception to the sentence as a wholly 
inadequate one, considering the nature of the offence. In 
reply, W.H. Palgrave, the British Consul-General, informed 
that the case was confused, and the truth could not be
obtained from the evidence. Three years' imprisonment was
fair enough because if he had been sent to Singapore for
(']') (o')
trialv J he would have been acquitted. J
In the Portuguese Court, in 1899, a Portuguese subject, 
a notorious receiver of stolen property, forged a large 
number of bank-notes. One of his servants was detected in the 
act of passing one of these notes and was arrested. The 
servant implicated his master who was brought to the Court 
for trial. The result of the case was that the accused was 
at once liberated on bail. For a time no notice was taken of 
the frequent requests from the Siamese police to produce the 
evidence with the case, but finally after some months' delay,
the Consul-General wrote to the police saying they had to
produce eight new witnesses. The police inquired under what
(1) By Order-in-Council of 1876 the maximum punishment 
which a Consular Court could inflict was three years' 
imprisonment, but by Article 22 of the Order-in-Council
of 1856 the defendant might be sent for trial to
Singapore.
(2) F.O. 69/86, Officers of the Crown - Granville,
February 7, 1883.
j^ r
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section of what codes it was necessary to produce them. The 
Consul-General replied that the rule was not to be found in 
any code but it was a new rule of the Portuguese Court in 
Siam that eight witnesses, entirely unconnected with the 
prosecution, had to testify to the truth of the charge. Delay 
followed delay, and eventually it was stated that the case
had been transferred to the court at Macao, and the accused
(1)was acquitted.v '
In the Italian Court, in 1900, two Italians were detected 
by the police in connection with burglary. Notwithstanding 
the evidence by the police the Italian Consul-General refused 
to issue a warrant for their arrest or to permit them to be 
prosecuted. The Consul made no attempt to deny the validity 
of the charge, but begged Mr. Lawson, Commissioner of the 
Police, as a “personal favour" not to press the matter,
confessing that he was entirely unacquainted with any procedure
(2)respecting criminal trials. '
Thus the system of extraterritoriality entailed discrimi­
nation against the Siamese in favour of the alien Asians. No 
other country where foreigners were by Treaty excluded from
(1) C.O. 273/323, Paget's Memorandum, February 14*, 1906.
(2) Ibid♦ This excuse is probably not unusual. W.A.R. Wood 
who was in a British Consular service in Siam from 1896 
to 1931 recalled similar incidents which occurred in 
the International Courts of Siam in old days.
See W.A.R. Y/ood, Consul in Paradise, (London, 1965),
pp. 67-68.
the Jurisdiction of the local Courts experienced such condi­
tions. Even in Egypt the main distinction was between the 
native population and the Europeans. The same was true of
Japan, Turkey, Persia - in fact, in all other countries where
(1)the system of extraterritoriality was in force. ' In these 
countries, the distinction was always between the native and 
the foreigner of an entirely different race and an entirely 
different religion.
The opening up of Siam in the latter half of the nine­
teenth century under the leadership of King Chulalongkorn 
raised a nation-wide feeling among the Siamese that these 
unequal Treaties unduly restricted the freedom of their country 
Siam had treaties with some fifteen countries, each giving its 
Consul the right to try its own subjects. Moreover, there was 
no time limit for the duration of the treaties. While Siam 
was embarking on the road of Judicial reform in the 1890fs, 
efforts were made to end the special legal position of 
foreigners.
England took the lead in helping to emancipate Siam from 
some of the problems of extraterritoriality. A mark of 
promise appeared first in the Treaty of 1874- between Siam and
(1) C.O. 273/315? Memorandum on Extraterritoriality in Siam 
by Strobel. Mr. Edward Strobel, a General Adviser to 
the Siamese Government who took his office in 1903 
bitterly voiced an outcry against the whole system of 
extraterritoriality. To him the system was contrary to 
the original intention which was based upon difference 
in race, customs and religion.
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the British Government of India, By this treaty the Judges 
appointed by the King of Siam we re empowered, amongst other 
things, to hear civil cases against British Asian subjects in 
Ghiengmai, Lampang and Lampun provided such British subjects 
consented to the Jurisdiction of the Court, The ordinary 
local Courts were empowered to investigate and decide cases 
against British subjects who entered the Chiengmai district 
without passports from Burma, It was also laid down that 
due protection should be afforded to merchants of either 
contracting State in the territory of the other.K '
But the operation of this treaty was unsatisfactory, 
partly on account of the ignorance and incompetence of the 
Siamese officials, and partly because of the absence of 
resident British supervision on the spot. The object of 
Siamese Judges appeared to be to weary suitors into a
^compromise in order to obtain a percentage on the value of
(2)suits A  J Mr. M'Carthy, a student interpreter in Bangkok, 
who toured the north in 1882 described the court situation
(1) Vide, F.O. 628/29, Ministry of Justice's Report for 
the year 125 (1906/07).
(2) F.O. 69/65A. The Commissioner of the Tenasserim 
Division - the Officiating Secretary to the Chief 
Commissioner, British Burma, May 51, 1875-
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there:
International Court! I was astonished that the 
first place I should go to was what has dubbed 
itself the 'International Court'. My natural 
question was, "What is that?" In all haste I 
started to make further inquiries of these rare 
birds. International as how? Siam seems to 
have constituted itself the arbiter for disputes 
between British and Laos subjects, with a 
result that not a single case has ever been 
settled.(1)
The passport system which was intended to secure some control 
over British Burmese subjects, operated to encourage the 
holders of those passports to put forward very high pre­
tensions on the ground of their nationality, and in other
(2)ways to annoy and intimidate the Siamese authorities. y 
Crimes were still widespread. Not only were the Siamese 
guards unable to protect the British traders from robbery, 
but they refused co-operation in following up the dacoits 
or endeavouring to recover the plundered property.
The Government of India, the Department immediately 
concerned, held that there was no certain remedy for the 
continued troubles and difficulties except the appointment of 
a British officer at a place to watch over the British
(1) PRO JO/35/1/8, M'Carthy-Palgrave, Private, March 29, 1883.
(2) F.O. 69/94, Government of India-Viscount Cranbrook,
January 28, 1880.
(3) F.O. 69/65A, Government of India-Salisbury,
October 26, 1876.
21
interests. In fact this question was raised soon after the 
coining into force of the 1874- Treaty. J But the argument 
over the status and powers which such an officer should 
possess delayed the appointment. The Foreign Office in 
London proposed to give him jurisdiction to try civil suits 
in which British subjects, holding passports, and not consen­
ting to the jurisdiction of the local courts, were defendants, 
and also to try British subjects for offences committed in 
Siamese territory. The India Office raised two objections, 
first, the difficulty of giving the requisite jurisdiction to 
an officer who was not under the Government of India, and who, 
while politically subordinate to the Consul-General in Bangkok, 
would in his judicial capacity be chiefly concerned with the 
interests of British Burmese subjects who were amenable to 
the Acts and orders of the Government of India; and, secondly, 
the difficulty of making adequate arrangements for appeals 
from his decisions and of enforcing the execution of decrees 
and sentences passed by him.
The India Office, instead, suggested two alternatives. 
Firstly, the transfer to the Government of India of the entire 
control of British diplomatic relations with Siam. Under 
existing circumstances in any question in the Chiengmai dis­
tricts involving British interests, the reference was made to
(1) F.O. 69/61, Edwardes-Knox, July 2, 1875*
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the Consul-General in Bangkok, from him through the Foreign 
Secretary in London to the Secretary of State for India, and 
thence through the Government of India to the Chief Commis­
sioner of British Burma, before any direct information on the 
subject could be obtained• The delay involved in this 
circuitous correspondence was doubled by the course which the 
reply had to take in travelling back through the same 
channels of communication to the source from which the com­
plaint originated, with the usual result of an entire failure 
of redress. In the opinion of the India Office, if in sub­
stitution of the consular control in Bangkok through the 
Siamese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the conduct 
of political relations with Siam were entrusted to the Indian 
Government, the difficulties in the way of the appointment 
at Chiengmai of an officer invested with Judicial powers 
would be very considerably modified by the removal of many 
links in the chain of communication with the Siamese 
Government. The officer at Chiengmai would then be appointed 
directly by the Indian Government and invested with powers to 
enable him to exercise Judicial Jurisdiction over British
subjects, and could be placed as a subordinate, in his judicial
(a \
capacity, to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma. J
Secondly, if the maintenance of the direct connection of 
the British Government with Siamese affairs in Bangkok was
(1) F.C. 69/94* India Office-Cranbrook, January 28, 1880.
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indispensable, the British office at Chiengmai should exercise 
no jurisdiction in judicial matters. The Siamese Court might 
be allowed to deal with all cases both civil and criminal, in 
which British subjects were concerned, subject only to the 
right which the British Resident should possess of intervening 
in any case in which British interests might be injuriously 
affected. In the event of refusal of redress by the local 
authorities, the matter could be brought to the notice of the 
Consul-General in Bangkok, and if necessary, to that of the 
Chief Commissioner of British Burma. In this way the 
appointment of a British officer could be made without 
necessarily giving him judicial powers. By the implications 
of 1874 Treaty a British subject in Chiengmai was already 
exempt from the local criminal jurisdiction in regard to all 
offences except dacoity, and British subjects holding a 
passport could also object to the civil jurisdiction of the 
local courts. Also in the opinion of the India Office a 
passport system which guaranteed a British subject almost 
complete immunity from the local Siamese courts was opposed 
to good order and the convenient disposal of cases, for the 
British subject could not be sued or punished before the 
distant court of Salween or Bangkok without considerable cost 
and inconvenience to the parties concerned. It therefore 
appeared necessary to withdraw from British subjects the right 
to object to the jurisdiction of the local courts which they 
possessed and to transfer to the British representative at
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Chiengmai the right to decide both in civil and criminal 
matters whether any case should be tried by the local 
authorities or not. The natural sequel of this compromise 
would be a few alterations in the existing provision of the 
18?4 Treaty.
The Foreign Office agreed to open negotiations with the
Siamese Government on the second basis above described and
Nr. Thomas George Knox, the British Consul-General in Bangkok,
(2)was instructed to approach them, y The latter welcomed this 
favourable proposal, so much did they appreciate even a partial 
surrender of Jurisdiction over British subjects. The scheme 
of abolition of extraterritoriality was always one of the 
fondly-cherished hopes of the Siamese Government. At the 
early stage, however, the Siamese Government rejected certain 
articles and proposed instead, firstly, to refuse to the 
appointed Consular officer all power of granting passports; 
secondly, to limit his cognisance of civil or criminal cases 
to those between British subjects or when the British subject 
was defendant only; and thirdly, to insist that extradition 
should be regulated not by the law in force in British India, 
but (tp the demands of the Siamese Government. All these 
propositions were considered distinctly conducive to British
(1) Ibid.
(2) F.O. 69/94, Oakes1 Memorandum, March 27, 1878.
(3) F.O. 69/95, Palgrave-Granville, November 11, 1882.
interests by the Foreign Office and Palgrave, the new 
British Consul-General in Bangkok.v '
In 1883 therefore the Treaty of 1874 was abrogated in 
favour of a fresh one. The latter contained the same provi­
sions regarding the maintenance of the rights of the British 
subjects to work the forests and the protection of the Chiefs 
from the unlawful working of the forests. But the Treaties 
differed very materially in the matter of Jurisdiction.
Article VII of the 1883 Treaty stated that "the interests of 
all British subjects coming to Chiengmai shall be placed under 
the regulation and control of a British Consul or Vice-Consul, 
who will be appointed to reside at Chiengmai with power to 
exercise civil and criminal Jurisdiction." By Article VIII 
the exercise of civil and criminal Jurisdiction according to 
Siamese law over all British subjects, whether holding pass­
ports or not, and whether native Indian subjects or otherwise, 
was placed in the hands of a Siamese Judge. The privilege 
given to British subjects of consenting to the Jurisdiction of 
the Siamese court by the Treaty of 1874 was withdrawn. A 
proviso, however, was made empowering the newly-appointed 
British Vice-Consul to remove any case to the Consular Court 
to be tried by British law, if he thought proper in the 
interests of Justice. Article IX contained a second proviso
(1) F.O. 69/95, Palgrave-Granville, November 15, 1882.
which provided that appeals from the decision of the Siamese 
judge should be heard and disposed of by the Siamese authori­
ties and the British Consul-General in Bangkok in consultation, 
and in cases where the defendants or accused were British
subjects, the final decision on appeal should rest with the
(1)British Consul-General. J
Following immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty 
a court was established in Chiengmai, known as "the Inter­
national Court" or "San Tang Pratet" (Court of Foreign Nations)
(2)in Siamese.v ' It would, however, be moire correct to call it 
the "Anglo-Siamese Court", since the only cases tried in it 
were those arising in the Chiengmai Consular District between 
British subjects or between British and Siamese subjects.
Early in 1884 Hr. E.B. Gould was appointed to be Vice-Consul
(z\
at Chiengmai. ''
The constitution of the Court was practically that of 
a Court *en banc1, the Judge and Vice-Consul taking an equal 
share in the proceedings. In ordinary matters of a more 
trivial nature, where the defendant was a British subject, 
the ultimate decision was practically given by the Vice-Consul;
(1) See Appendix I.
(2) C.O. 273/314, Report on the Working of the International 
Court at Chiengmai for the year ended June 30, 1904.
(3) F.O. 69/166, Gould-Granville, February 8, 1884.
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where the defendant was a Siamese subject, the final order
(1)rested with the Judge. y The power given by the Treaty to
the Vice-Consul to transfer cases to the Consular Court gave
a considerable moral effect. It acted as a check on the
otherwise unlimited powers of the judge in cases involving
British interests. The moral effect alone was really
sufficient, so that, in practice, it was hardly found necessary
(2)
to exercise the power of removal. ' Also Nr. E.N. Satow, the
British Minister in Bangkok, in his instructions to
Nr. W.L. Archer, the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai in 1886, said:
The power given by Article VIII to Her 
Majesty's Vice-Consul of removing to his 
own Court a case in which a British subject 
is the accused or defendant, should be 
sparingly exercised, and then only when 
you are convinced on good grounds that it 
is desirable in the interests of justice.
Whenever you find it necessary to take 
this step, you should at once proceed to 
furnish me with a full report of your 
reasons for its adoption.t5)
(1) F.O. 69/168, Archer's Report, July 25, 1895•
(2) F.O. 69/168, Archer's Report, July 25, 1895.
(3) F.O. 69/166, Satow-Archer, February 1, 1886. The Treaty
of 1883, although in a sense a minor instrument to the 
Treaty of 1856, was nevertheless of the greatest importance 
and probably was one of the main factors in the great 
preponderance of British interests in Siam in the early 
1900's. It supplied the stimulus to bring other nations
to the same conclusion - to raise Siam to a higher plane 
amongst Asian powers. The system of jurisdiction over 
British subjects under this Treaty became the pattern for 
other Powers later, although it was, of course, developed 
and expanded to meet some requirements. The International 
Court system was in 1904 applied in the north by a Treaty
Contd. overleaf
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After the Treaty of 1883 the area affected underwent
great changes. In 1886, the whole of Upper Burma, the Shan
States, and the large province of Kentung came under British
rule. The immigration of Burmese, Shans and Indians into
Northern Siam increased, y In 1884, the few Asian subjects
there lived either in Chiengmai or west of that town. By
1900 they were scattered through every town of the north.
The most important change of all was the establishment
between 1886 and 1896 of three British Teak Companies, and
(2}after 1896 of Danish and French firms. ' Agencies of the
British firms existed at Muang Yuom and Mehongsawn, on the
Salween side, at Chiengmai, Lampang, Phre, Nan, Sawankalok,
and Rahang, and around these agencies congregated large
(*)
communities of British Asian subjects. J The Danish agency
Contd. from overleaf
with the French Government to French subjects, European 
and Asian, and in 1905 by treaties with Denmark and Italy 
to Danish and Italian subjects, all of whom were Europeans, 
with a further modification by which appeals from judge­
ments of that court were brought, not before the joint 
authorities in Bangkok in consultation as by the Treaty 
of 1883, but before the Siamese Court of Appeal in Bangkok.
(1) The number of Burmese British subjects registered at the 
British Consulate at Chiengmai in 1884 which was no more 
than 50, and of Shans, some 20 or 30, amounted to some 400 
Burmese, and of Shans, not less than 2,000 or 3,000 in 
1902. The number of Indians was about 300.
F.O. 69/246, Beckett's Memorandum, December 17, 1903*
(2) There were The Borneo Company, the Bombay Burmah Trading 
Corporation, L.T. Leonowens, Ltd., the Danish East Asiatic
Company and the French East Asiatic Company.
(3) F.O. 69/162, Report on the District Court held at Rahang 
and Nakornsawan (1895) by J.S. Black, July 25, 1895*
was at Phre while the French Company was working near the 
Mekong on the banks of its tributary, the Me Khok, with head- 
quarters at Chiengrai. British managers and assistants 
controlled the various agencies, and had under their control 
a large staff of Burmese and Shan foresters and employees.
To meet the increasing needs of this large community of 
British subjects, the so-called International Court system, 
which was confined to the Provinces of Chiengmai, Lampun and 
Lampang, was extended to Phre, Nan, Pichai, Sswankalok, 
Sukothai, Thurn, and Rahang, the whole of Northern Siam from 
the 17th parallel*v J The Nan Consular establishment took the 
form of an Assistantship snd was placed under the jurisdiction 
of the full Consul at Chiengmai.
(1) F.O. 69/168. Tel., Salisbury-de Bunsen, December 27, 1895*
(2) This appointment was prompted by political rather than by 
consular considerations. In 1893 in consequence of 
territorial changes the Khamus who were engaged as coolies 
in the teak trade in the north of Siam and who came from 
the left bank of the Mekong, became French subjects by
the right set forth in Article VIII of the French-Siamese
Treaty of 1893. Shortly after that date the French 
Government established Consulate at Nan and Korat.
Mr. Hardouin, formerly Chancellor at Bangkok, was in
charge of the French Vice-Consulate at Nan where the
French subjects numbered about 300 or 4-00. The presence 
of a French Consul, the contiguity of that district to 
the territory acquired by the French, the possibility of 
u troublesome questions arising between French and Siamese 
I fl officials, rendered not only desirable but would be in a 
f If position to report impartially upon subjects of differences
I I between Siamese and French officials, and give due warning 
of any movement or policy likely to be prejudicial to 
British interest.
Vide F.O. 69/168, De Bunsen-Salisbury, August 17, 1895- 
F.O. 69/162, General Report (Political) of a journey to 
Korat and Nan, 1895, J.S.Black. F.O.69/24-8, T.H. Lyle’s
Memorandum, June 19, 1903*
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The negotiations of the separate Treaties of 1874- and 
1883 were in themselves a proof that both the Siamese and 
British Governments did not consider the 1855 Treaty suitable 
to the new conditions which grew up. Logically, if such was 
the case with respect to the northern provinces, the provi­
sions of the 1855 Treaty could not be practicable in other 
parts of the country where British subjects formed a great 
number in comparison with the local people. The partial 
surrender of extraterritoriality in the north, while insisting 
upon its maintenance in Bangkok was necessarily an anomaly. 
Thus during the first ten years of the twentieth century 
the Siamese Government was busily engaged in talks with the 
British Government regarding judicial concessions throughout 
the Kingdom.
* The Anglo-Siamese Secret Convention of 1897.
In 1897 England and Siam entered into an agreement by 
which the King of Siam engaged not to cede or alienate to any 
other Power any of his rights over any portion of the terri­
tories or islands lying to the south of Bangtapan. The 
British Government, on the other hand, engaged to support 
Siam in resisting any attempt by a third Power to acquire 
dominion or to establish its influence or protectorate in the 
territories or islands mentioned above. '
(1) See Appendix II.
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The Agreement brought satisfaction to both parties
concerned. The British Government wanted to ensure that no
territory between British India and the Straits Settlements
would be open to foreign encroachment without her knowledge
or permission. The British Foreign Office and Colonial Office
both agreed that:
Whoever holds the Peninsula must to a 
great extent command the route to the 
Far East. Singapore is the turning 
point in the south of Asia, but half 
the value of Singapore would be gone 
if, to the north of it, a neck of the 
Peninsula were held by some other Power.
Although Siam had, ever since the existence of Anglo-Siamese
relations, claimed the greater portion of the Peninsula as a
part of the Siamese dominions, her hold over these regions
comprising the States of Kelsntan, Trengganu, and Kedah was
of the most shadowy and feeble description, and she would
naturally be quite unable to resist any penetration by
foreigners under the pretext of commercial enterprise. In
addition, the Sultans of these States were reluctant to
acknowledge Siamese right but were too weak to do anything
about it. Britain was constantly threatened by the possibility
that at some moment any one of these petty Rulers might be
enticed into relations either directly with some foreign
Government for the cession of a harbour or coaling station
or by the grant of land in their States to permit the
(1) F.O. 422/4-5, C.O.-F.O., February 28, 1896
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establishment of large foreign interests, leading eventually 
to intervention in the Peninsula by a non-British Government. 
As for the Siamese, they were happy since Siamese
(1)sovereignty over the Malay States was no longer questioned.
In the course of negotiations the Foreign Office voiced the
views of the Colonial Office as to whether the British
Government should recognise definitely Siamese sovereignty
and control over Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah. It was the
opinion of Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister and
Foreign Secretary that if the Siamese claim was left vague,
the protection afforded by the Convention should become
equally indefinite. However, before any settlement was
reached, Lord Salisbury wrote another letter to Chamberlain,
the Colonial Secretary, expressing his readiness to forward
to the British Minister in Bangkok a draft of the Convention.
He clearly stipulated his opinion that
The result of the Convention, if concluded, 
will necessarily be to acknowledge the
(1) Before approaching the Siamese Government Lord Salisbury 
sounded M.E.W. de Bunsen, the British Consul-General in 
Bangkok, as to whether the Siamese Government would be 
inclined to enter into an engagement not to part with 
any of the territory which they claimed in the Malay 
Peninsula without the British consent. De Bunsen replied 
that he believed the Siamese Government would willingly 
accept the proposal since it was already alarmed at the 
speeches of Sir Cecil Clement Smith, the ex-Governor of 
the Straits Settlements, hinting at the expansion of the 
Straits Settlements in a northerly direction.
F.O. 17/1293* Tels., Salisbury-de Bunsen, January 24, 
1896. De Bunsen-Salisbury, January 25, 1896.
(2) F.O. 422/45, F.O.-C.O., March 14, 1896
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rights of Siam over Kelantan and 
Trengganu, whatever view may be 
held as to their validity on 
historical grounds.(1)
The satisfaction of both parties, however, was short­
lived. As the twentieth century dawned the Convention began 
to be a constant source of discussion, friction and discontent 
between the two Governments. The clash of opinion sprang
from firstly, the ambiguity of the terms of the third Article
(2)and secondly, the secrecy of the Convention. '
Article III of the Convention read:
His Britannic Majesty having engaged by 
the preceding article to support His Majesty 
the King of Siam in resisting any attempt by 
any third Power to acquire dominion or to 
establish influence or Protectorate in any of 
the territories or islands above mentioned,
His Majesty the King of Siam engages not to 
grant, cede or let any special privilege or 
advantage whether as regards land or trade 
within the above specified limits either to 
the Government or to the subjects of a third 
Power without the written consent of the 
British Government.
(1)lbid, P.O.-C.O., March 26, 1896.
(2) Right from the very outset of the negotiations, the Foreign 
Office, complying with the wish of the Siamese Government, 
took every possible precaution to preserve the secrecy of 
the Convention. The Siamese wanted to keep the Convention 
secret in order to provide against the chance of French 
irritation. Also they were afraid that if it became known 
to the Germans, they might contend that its terms were 
inconsistent with the Treaty engagements of Siam towards 
Germany in regard to concession. Therefore even the 
Straits Settlements Government was merely informed that
the British Government had received from the Siamese 
Government assurances in regard to the Malay States which 
they considered satisfactory.
F.O. 17/1292. F.O. Note on de Bunsen's letter of July 15, 
1896. F.O. 17/1295, Memo. Curzon-Salisbury, July 27, 1896.
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By this article the real issues which the Siamese 
Government were concerned with were: firstly, the Siamese
Government could not grant Concessions involving the alienation 
or cession of any territorial rights, no distinction being 
made between large or small concessions; secondly, the 
words "special privilege or advantage1 were exclusive of 
general rights already conceded to Treaty Powers; and, lastly, 
the terms of the Convention if enforced would deny to other 
powers rights granted to them by the existing Treaties
negotiated in the 1850‘s and 60's. This result would have
been contrary to the Convention.
The freedom of action left to the Siamese Government in 
dealing with foreign applications presented the most compli­
cated problem. The question arose as to whether the text of 
Article III implied the necessity of a written consent of the 
British Government for any sort of concession or whether it 
concerned only some particular category of agreements whose 
objects should be "to grant, cede or let any special privilege 
or advantage as regards land or trade". A private letter 
addressed by Archer, then the British Consul in Bangkok, to 
Prince Devawongse during the course of negotiations, although 
evidently written with the intention to secure, without any 
possibility of misunderstanding, a full execution of Article 
III did not really contradict the construction of the words 
"special advantage or privilege". This letter was written in 
reply to a note of Prince Devawongse whereby His Royal Highness
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informed Archer that he was instructed to make sure before 
definitely adhering to the Convention, that the words "any 
special privilege or advantage" should not be constructed 
as involving any promise or engagement whereby the British 
Government should oblige themselves not to admit the subjects 
of any Treaty Power to the exercise of such rights as we re 
conferred on them by the existing and well-known Treaties 
presently in force between Siam and other Powers. There were 
two points in Archer's reply. First, the British Government 
had to adhere to the words "special privilege or advantage". 
Second, it was not possible to draw a line between large and 
small concessions. J None of these two points had been 
brought into question by Prince Devawongse. Having himself 
proposed the words "special advantage or privilege" he never 
thought of amending them, and he never suggested drawing a 
line between large and small concessions, provided that the 
word "concessions" which was not in the Convention, should be 
considered as equivalent to "special advantage or privilege" 
which was in it and to which Archer wished to adhere. More­
over, there was no time left for exchanging more letters, as 
the wish of both parties was to sign the Convention before
(1) F.O. 69/215, Note about the construction of Article III
of the Secret Convention of 1897, February 28, 1901.
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(1)King Chulalongkorn1s departure for Europe. ' The reservation
of Prince Devawongse as to the Treaty rights of other Powers
remained then unanswered. So it was extremely difficult to
distinguish purely commercial enterprises from concessions
likely to be of political import, since a large agglomeration
of foreign interest might lead a foreign Power into using
large vested interests and rights as a pretext for interventior
The prevailing concession system was open to grave danger
inasmuch as the Malay Sultans still had the power to grant
concessions and then the concessionaires applied to the
(o')
Siamese Government for ratification. J The Siamese Govern­
ment, whose policy was to strengthen control over and to 
raise revenue from all its Malay States, was dead against 
this. Por it was difficult to deal with a fait accompli.
Sir Frank Swettenham, then the Resident-General for the 
Federated Malay States, was right when he said,
Siamese officials will dislike and oppose 
a concession obtained straight from a Malay 
Ruler or Chief; firstly, because they
(1) When the King's European tour of 1897 was planned a 
strong rumour was running round the British Consulate 
that the Siamese Government wished to put off the 
negotiations. Prince Devawongse alluded to the Railway 
Convention between China and Russia and thought that the 
Malay Convention might lead to a British Protectorate. 
This situation caused the Foreign Office no little 
anxiety. Lord Salisbury prompted Archer to press the 
Siamese Government to conclude the Convention before 
the King's departure to Europe. F.O. 69/176, Tel., 
Salisbury-Archer, March 23, 1897•
(2) F.O. 628/294, Paget-Lansdowne, January 25, 1905.
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think it weakens their control, and, 
secondly, because they have no 
opportunity of deriving any benefit 
from the grant of it.(‘)
Worse still, the British Government, with a policy of 
entirely exclusive enterprise, encouraged the Siamese 
Government to grant reasonable concessions to British subjects,
without making any embarrassing concession to Europeans of
(2)other nationalities. ' But the distinction between con­
cessions to British subjects and concessions to the subjects 
of third Powers had not been kept sufficiently in mind. It 
was difficult for the Siamese to discriminate between bona 
fide and bogus British Companies, Syndicates or private 
applicants.
From the British viewpoint the undertaking that the 
British Government would construe the Convention in the 
spirit most friendly to Siam also left it open for them to 
consider in what cases their interests rendered it inadvisable 
to refuse the consent to a concession demanded by the subject 
of a third Power on the strength of his Treaty rights.
As Mr. Ralph Spencer Paget, the British Minister (1903-1909) 
put it,
(1) F.O. 422/53, Swettenham-Archer, July 13, 1900.
(2) F.O. 69/215, Archer-Lansdowne, March 26, 1901.
(3) F.O. 69/215, Archer-Lansdowne, March 5, 1901.
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Whenever an application comes in for a 
prospecting licence or mining concession 
for a foreigner, I am in doubt what to do 
as no regular rule is laid down and there 
are no regular tests to guide one...^ J
The power of the Sultans to grant concessions also revealed 
the danger to British interests. If therefore, foreign 
companies other than British obtained concessions directly 
from the Rulers of these States, they might not consider 
themselves bound to submit their Agreements to the Siamese 
Government for confirmation as so far no other Power had
(2 )recognised the authority of Siam over these Malay States. ' 
Under such a confused system it was obvious that the 
British Government naturally preferred British enterprise to 
be predominant. Sir Prank Swettenham, who became the 
Governor of the Straits Settlements in 1901, expressed his 
view,
There might be objection to granting an 
island or land on the sea coast to 
foreigners if it were possible that the 
land might afterwards be used in any 
sense as a naval station.(3)
Sir John Anderson, Swettenham's successor, even went beyond
this view. He considered it advisable to exclude all foreign
commercial enterprise from that region. To both of them the
(1) P.O. 59/265, Paget-Langley, Private, September, 1905.
(2) P.O. 69/236, Memorandum, January 9, 1902.
(3) P.O. 628/294, Paget-Lansdowne, January 25, 1905.
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Convention should be termed a success because the large 
concessions which the Siamese Government had given during the 
Convention's life were exclusively worked by British companies 
or British capital. J
This policy of wholesale discrimination against foreigners 
in favour of British subjects, the Siamese Government com­
plained, utilised the Convention as a commercial arrangement 
instead of being interpreted as having a purely political 
object, and its presentation virtually meant the closing of 
the door to foreigners in the Malay Peninsula.
The British Government, on the other hand, said that 
whatever the other interpretation of Article III might prove 
in other ways, it was difficult to assume that it was indeed 
its purpose, whose policy in other parts of the world was 
that of the 'open door', to reverse this policy in Siamese 
Malaya alone. The minute of Lord Salisbury on which the 
Convention was drafted showed that its object was to protect 
certain portions of Siam from foreign aggression, and it was 
clear that the idea of inserting Article III was not so much 
to secure trade advantages for Britain as an object in them­
selves, but rather to prevent foreigners from obtaining 
special leases of land and special trading rights as a means
(1) By 1905 there had been 11 mining leases held within 
this territory by British subjects, and only 2 mining 
leases were held by foreign subjects other than British.
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to an end, in other words, gradually thereby to establish 
political control in those regions. That it was so was 
confirmed by the correspondence that subsequently passed 
dealing with the difficulties interposed by Siam before 
accepting the Article. '
The other trouble of the Convention was its secrecy, 
because it placed the Siamese officials in an extremely 
embarrassing situation by obliging them to find all kinds of 
pretexts for delaying a reply to applications for concessions, 
and ending, perhaps, by their having to refuse the concession 
when no plausible ground existed for doing so. They simul­
taneously laid themselves open to remonstrance and the 
accusation of non-compliance with Treaty rights from other 
Powers. To take one example, the delay experienced in dealing 
with the Cerruti and Kaulfuss concessions in the early 1900fs, 
though neither of these could be of any political importance, 
caused the Siamese Government no little embarrassment.(2)
(1) P.O. 69/265, Nicholas Ball’s Memorandum, October 30, 1905.
(2) The application of Mr. Kaulfuss, a German subject, for a 
mining concession in Kedah reached Bangkok in September, 
1904. It was soon learned that the application was not 
acceptable to the British Government, and Kaulfuss was 
then informed by the Siamese Government that his appli­
cation was far too large an extent of territory. He 
therefore modified his application by reducing the area. 
The objection then raised to Kaulfuss that he was a photo­
grapher and was disposed to drink. These, the Siamese 
said, were scarcely reasons which could be alleged by the 
Siamese Government for the refusal of the concession.
In order to satisfy the British Government the Siamese 
Government had to refuse the concession absolutely without 
giving any reason.
Contd. overleaf
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The British Government was in no better position, since
the secrecy of the Convention prevented it from claiming its
rights to predominance in the Malayan territory as assigned
by the Agreement. In spite of the troubles regarding the
concessions, the British Government had to fall back on
generalities or old treaties with unsatisfactory results.
Its own advisers on Malayan affairs were not even formally
told about the Secret Convention. To quote the Colonial
Office's minutes:
There remains the difficulty as to how we are 
to inform Sir Frank Swettenham of all this.
We cannot, under the existing understanding 
with the Foreign Office, tell him all about 
it and send him copies of the correspondence 
... as this latter contains reference to the 
Secret Treaty about which we are to say
Contd. from overleaf
Fortunately Kaulfuss who, in spite of the objectionable 
qualities to which attention had been called above, had 
a certain capacity for correct reasoning, informed the 
Siamese Government that he was no longer backed by German 
capital. There was therefore no further objection on the 
part of the British Government and finally the Siamese 
Government was informed to grant the concession to Kaulfuss
Mr. Cerruti, an Italian, once in the service of the 
Federated Malay States, applied for a mining concession 
in Kedah. The Sultan of Kedah recommended the application. 
Siam was willing to approve and the British Minister 
recommended approval but Sir John Anderson refused the 
concession saying that the concession was for hydraulic 
mining in the basin of the Muds River which constituted 
the northern boundary of Province Wellesley, and that, 
unless costly and special precautions were taken, the 
effect might cause disastrous floods in the neighbourhood, 
extending to localities within British territory. It was 
after some long argument from the Siamese Government that 
the concession was approved.
A
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nothing to him. The position appears to 
me ludicrous and intolerable. We have to 
rely greatly on Sir Frank Swettenham for 
information and advice as to Malayan affairs 
generally and yet we conceal from him the 
most important factor in that policy, ie .the 
Secret Treaty I The wisdom of the proceeding 
is still more questionable when it is taken 
into consideration that we know, though we 
pretend that we do not know, that Sir Frank 
Swettenham knows of the Treaty ...(1)
The difficulties surrounding the Convention increased in 
consequence of more constant and increasing demands for land 
in that territory by foreigners, especially Germans. From 
time to time the two Governments tried to come to some under­
standing as regards the question of concession. In 1905 they 
agreed that the Sultans should obtain the assent of the 
Siamese Government prior to granting any concession to appli­
cants. One year later the British Government vested greater
authority in the British Minister in Bangkok regarding the
(2)sanctions of concessions. ' Nonetheless, the attempt came 
to little.
Also the suggestion to publish the Secret Convention to 
put an end to this distressing state was advanced as early as 
1902. It was the opinion of the Foreign Office and Colonial 
Office that one day the Siamese Government would have to admit 
that opposition to the grant of concessions in the Siamese
(1) C.O. 275/2751 C.O. Minutes, March 18, 1901.
(2) F.O. 422/60, Tel. F.O.-Beckett, October 1, 1906.
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Malay States was inspired by England. So it would be better
not to wait until force of circumstances compelled the
revelation but to make the Secret Convention public at once
before the grant of a number of small concessions in these
states, to which the attention of foreign capitalists was
being attracted more and more every day, had given some other
power a right to claim that she possessed vested interests
which could not be ignored. In October, 1902, Siam signed
a Convention with France regarding the settlement of existing
difficulties in consequence of the Agreement between them in
1895* While waiting for ratification, the Siamese Government
was approached by the British Minister as to whether it would
be expedient to publish the Convention of 1897- The British
view as to the advisability of publication rested upon these
grounds: Article IV of the Franco-Siamese Convention which
gave the French Government the right to be consulted on public
(y\ \
works in their sphere of influencev ' was an infraction of 
the most-favoured-nation clause contained in Article X of the 
Treaty of 1856, between Siam and England. While England was
(1) The Article reads: If in future, in the Siamese part of
the basin of the Mekong, the Royal Government desire to 
undertake the execution of Ports, Canals, Railways 
(particularly railways designed to connect the Capital 
with any point whatever in this Basin), they will come 
to an understanding with the French Government in case 
these works cannot be executed exclusively by Siamese 
Personnel and with Siamese capital.
Contd. overleaf
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bo considerate as not to protest against the Article itself, 
she was still of the opinion that the Secret Convention should 
be made public in order to enable her to make a satisfactory 
reply to any criticism which might be aroused in Parliament 
by the provisions of the Treaty with France. This, in 
British belief, might be effected by showing that if the 
French had obtained the advantages in the Mekong Valley 
embodied in Article IV, the British had, five years before, 
secured in a far more explicit form, the advantages provided 
for in Article III of the Secret Convention.
The King and the Siamese Government were much alarmed at 
the suggestion. Undoubtedly they objected to its publication. 
Phraya Suriya, the Siamese Minister in Paris, was instructed 
to explain to Lord Lansdowne the very material distinction 
between the terms of Article IV of the 1902 Convention and 
Article III of the 1897 Convention by referring to the fact 
that there was nothing in the words of Article IV to show that 
the understanding with the French Government required by that 
Article had necessarily to exclude foreigners from the work 
referred to and foreign capital from their construction. The
Contd. from overleaf.
With regard to the use of Ports, Canals, Railways in the 
Siamese part of the Basin of Mekong, as well as in the 
remainder of the Kingdom, it is understood that no defer­
ential dues shall be established contrary to the principle 
of commercial equality stipulated in the Treaties signed 
by Siam. (F.O. 69/2J4. Phraya Si Sahadeb to the 
Marquess of Lansdowne, October 14, 1902. Enclosure 1).
terms did not in themselves amount to an infraction of the 
most-favoured-nation clause, which existed not only in the 
1856 Treaty with England, but also in the treaties with other 
countries. Article III, however, on its very face, was an 
undoubted violation of the most-favoured-nation clause. '
The Siamese Government was afraid that publication might 
cause the irritation of the French Government on discovering 
that the terms of Article IV which it had proposed, and which 
had been emphatically rejected because they were inconsistent 
with the most-favoured-nation clause, had been adopted by 
Siam and England in the Secret Treaty more than five years 
earlier. A charge of duplicity and bad faith would at once 
be brought against the Siamese Government. If the Treaty of 
1897 was published before the vote of the Chamber and the 
Senate upon the question of the ratification of the Convention 
with France, that Convention would never be ratified, and if, 
after the ratification, the attacks of the adversaries of the 
French Government would cause such a reaction in their 
attitude of benevolence that the relations of Siam and France 
would relapse into a condition more intolerable than they were 
before the signature of the Convention. Thus the Siamese 
Government surely had reason to appeal to the British 
Government not, by publication of the Secret Convention, to
(1) C.O. 275/287, Phraya Suriya-Lansdowne, October 24, 1902.
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render abortive her labour for almost ten years to find a
solution of the difficulties pending with France, efforts
which were finally on the verge of success. In view of
these stated reasons the suggestion of publication was dropped.
However, the Franco-Siamese Agreement of 1902 was not
ratified, and in February, 1904, Siam entered into another
agreement with France by which the latter was still given the
right to be consulted on public works in the eastern
provinces under French influence. Two months later England
and France signed the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 which was
of great significance for the British situation in the Malay
Peninsula. Under its terms the northern Malay States fell
(y\)
within the British sphere of influence. ' In view of these
two agreements the British Government thought that the
secrecy of the Secret Convention was no longer necessary.
In August, 1904, the question of the publication of the
Convention was revived. Again it met with strong opposition
(2)from the Government of Siam. ' Therefore in reply to a 
question asked in the British Parliament by Sir C. Dilke, it
(1) British and Foreign State Papers 1905-1904, Vol. 97,
PP- 53-55• For documents on the discussions leading 
to the entente, refer to British Documents on the 
Origins of the War 1898-1914, Edited by G.P. Gooch,
H. Temperley and L.M. Penson, (London, 1936),
Vol. 11, Chapter 1.
(2) F.O. 623/25/296, Prince Devawongse-Paget, April 18, 1904.
was stated that:
The agreements entered into between His 
Majesty's Government and Siam with regard 
to the Siamese dependencies in the Malay 
Peninsula are of a strictly confidential 
nature, and in deference to the strong 
wish of the Siamese Government. it is not 
intended to make them public.(1)
Taking all circumstances into consideration, it is 
obvious that the Anglo-Siamese Secret Convention presented 
drawbacks to both the British and Siamese Governments• The 
Convention, being secret, proved useless,to the British.
Other Powers did not know, or if they did, they pretended 
that they did not know, of British rights of approval of any 
concessions in the area south of Bangtapan. Moreover, all 
these powers including the Malay Sultans did not recognise 
Siamese suzerainty over the area. If they wanted concessions 
they preferred direct communications with the Malay Sultans. 
The provisions of the Convention could be forceful only if 
it had been published. But both the publication and the 
secrecy of the Convention annoyed the Siamese Government.
If the Convention was published the same privileges would be 
demanded by the French Government for the Siamese eastern 
provinces. Again in keeping up the secrecy the Siamese 
Government faced a dilemma in finding all excuses to reject 
concessions from some other Powers. Briefly, the Siamese
(1) F.O. 4-22/66, F.O.-I.O., August 15, 1911
deplored the Convention’s existence. Therefore, the 
following five years after 1904 witnessed a diplomatic battle 
between England and Siam over the question of the Secret 
Convention. Each country was cautious to sacrifice the least.
Siamese suzerainty over the Northern Malay States.
The Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Pattani and Setul
— 9   —
became dependencies of Sukothai in the thirteenth century
(1)when Siam first made conquests m  the Malay Peninsula. y
But it was only in 1769 that Kelantan and Trengganu
(2)voluntarily came under Siamese suzerainty. ' At times when
Siam was busily engaged in wars with Burma these tributary
states revolted against her, but such situations did not last
for long. As soon as Siam became stronger, pressures from
the Siamese court were applied and Siamese suzerainty was
successfully resumed.
In her administration of these tributary states, Siam
gave the Malays a free hand. She saw to it that Malays lived
(3)under their own laws, customs and rulers.v ' As tributary
(1) Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, Pharatchaphongsawadan Krung 
Rattanakosin, Ratchakan Thi~2  ^ (Royal Chronicles of the 
Second Reign of the Bangkok Period), (Bangkok, 1916),
pp. 311-2.
Prince Damrong, Prachum Phongsawadan Phak Thi 3 
(Collected Chronicles, Part III), (Bangkok, 1914), pp. 2-3.
(2) Phongsawadan Chabab Pharatchahatleka, (Royal Chronicles), 
(Bangkok, 1952), Vol. II, part II, p . 28.
(3) Prince Damrong - Prince Narisara Nuwattiwongse,
November 14, 1955? San Somdet, (Princes1 Letters),
(Bangkok, 1961), Vol. VI, p. 174. , *
States the Halay Sultans were bound regularly to send the 
bung a mas, ornamental plants with leaves and flowers of gold 
and silver, every three years to the Siamese capital in return 
for Siamese protection from external threats. ' These States 
we re not under the direct control of Bangkok but under the 
principal Siamese province of Nakornsitammarat until 1791 
when the governing authority was shared between Nakornsitam­
marat and Songkhla, another Siamese province in the Malay 
Peninsula. Kedah and Kelantan came under Nakornsitammarat
while Pattani and Trengganu were the responsibility of the
(2)Governor of Songkhla. J Naturally it was in the interest of 
the provincial governors who were responsible to Bangkok for 
the good behaviour of the vassal rulers to keep as tight a 
control over them as possible. To take just one example, in 
1844- the Governor of Songkhla failed to force the Governor of 
Setul to send the required gold and silver trees to Bangkok, 
and he therefore had to provide them out of the revenue of 
Songkhla and send them in Setul's name.
Divergent opinions arose as to the exact implications of
(1) Prince Damrong, Sadaeng Ban.yai Phongsawadan Syam, 
(Lectures on the History of Siam), (Bangkok, 1949), p«23*
(2) Prince Damrong, Royal Chronicles of the Second Reign of 
the Bangkok Period, pp. 121-122. Formerly Kelantan was 
under Trengganu. After a dispute between their Sultans 
in 1815 it was split into two States. Perlis was
separated from Kedah in 1839• Vide, Jodmaihet Luang 
Udorrisombat, (Luang Udomsombat Document^ (Bangkok, 1913), 
pp. 14— 15.
Siam's suzerainty over these Malay States. The Siamese 
persistently held that apart from the Bunga Mas which was a 
'direct admission of suzerainty' the Sultans had acknowledged 
Siamese authority over the internal affairs of the States. 
There were times when Siam took an active part in the States' 
affairs as arbiter in local disputes. In Kelantan alone Siam 
was responsible for restoring peace on not less than three 
occasions between the years 1837 snd 184-2.^^ And in 184-4- 
the Siamese Court was asked to settle boundary disputes 
between the Sultans of Setul and Perlis. Prom then on Setul 
was ordered by Siam to come under the control of 
Nakornsitammarat instead of under Songkhla as it had been 
before.
New Sultans also had to announce their accession to the 
Siamese King and in return the King sent envoys with presents 
and investiture. The King virtually held the right to appoint 
the new Sultans. Very often he chose the man he wanted.
Van Vliet, a Dutch trader in Ayudhya, reported in 164-4- that
(1) 'History of Kelantan', Tesapiban, Vol. 11,(1906/07), P*16, 
Chao Phraya Tipakorawong, Pharatchaphongsawadan Krung 
Rattanakosin Ratchakan Thi 5, (Royal Chronicles of the 
Third Reign of the Bangkok Period). (Bangkok, 1935),
pp. 14-5-6, Prince Damrong, Preface to Luang Udomsombat 
Document, pp. 4-31-4-.
(2) Phraya Vichien Khiri, Phongsawadan Muang Songkhla,
(History of Songkhla), (Bangkok, 1928), p* 38.
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.... Siam was almost at war with Kedah 
because the son of the late Sultan came 
to the throne without Siamese consent.
The new Sultan did not recognise Siamese 
suzerainty. Consequently trade in Kedah 
was on the verge of declination. Most 
people vacated the State. Finally the 
Sultan sent an envoy and emissaries to 
the Court of Siam. Everything then 
became normal.
Evidence showed that Siam appointed the new Sultans for 
Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah whenever the necessity arose.
To take just two examples, in 1879 there was a dispute among 
the numerous relatives of the Sultan of Kelantan over the 
succession soon after the Sultan’s death. The King of Siam
sent the Governor of Trang to restore peace in the State and
(o')
appointed the new Sultan. ' In 1886 when a childless Sultan
of Trengganu died Phraya Chaiyenharithironk was chosen by
(5)Bangkok to succeed him.
j As an overlord the Siamese King also possessed the right 
|to punish the Sultans whenever they disobeyed an order. In 
1786 King Kama I summoned the Sultan of Pattani to report to 
Bangkok. When the latter defied the command, punishment
(1) J. Van Vliet-Mr. Hoysen, Oct. 15, 1644-, in Luang Vichitr 
Vadakarn, Ekasan Ruang Kwam Sampan Gkub Tangpratet,
Nai Samai Ayudhya (Documents on Relations with fforeign 
Countries during the Ayudhya Period), (Bangkok, 1958),
pp. 57-8.
(2) Prince Damrong, Preface to Nungsu Jodmaihet Lae Nirat 
London,(Diary during the London Trip) , (Bangkok, 1918),p.51
(5) 'History of Trengganu', Tesapiban, Vol.I (1905/06), 
pp. 275-6.
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followed swiftly. Siamese troops under the Kelahom (Defence
(1)Ministry) invaded Pattani and arrested the Sultan. ' In 
1821 the failure of the Sultan of Kedah to send the required 
Bunga Has to Bangkok resulted in the Siamese invasion of 
that State.
The Sultans showed considerable respect and obedience in 
their relations with the Court of Siam. They often turned to 
Siam for help and advice. In time of peace the submission of 
the Bunga Has was prompt and voluntary. In time of war the 
Sultans provided arms and men as required by Siam. Some
Sultans were personal friends of the King. Sultan Hamad of
(2)Kedahv ' went regularly to see King Hongkut in Bangkok.
Relations between Siam and these northern Malay States 
became closer in the reigns of King Hongkut and King 
Chulalongkorn when England began to extend her control over 
the southern Malay States. In 1859 King Hongkut visited 
Pattani, the first time in history that the Siamese King had 
travelled so far. On this occasion the Sultans of Kelantan 
and Trengganu personally met the King. ^ J During the reign
(1) Royal Chronicles, Vol. II, part II, p. 270.
(2) He was appointed Sultan of Kedah during the reign of 
King Hongkut. Manuscript Section, National Library, 
Bangkok, R 4, 130, The Appointment of Officials in the 
Southern Provinces, 1855, undated.
(3) Prince Damrong, Prachum Phongsawadan Phak Thi 3, 
(Collected Chronicles, Part II), (Bangkok, 195*0 > P* 107.
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of King Chulalongkorn, His Majesty made visits frequently to 
the Malay States from 1870 until the end of his reign in 1910, 
thus helping to strengthen the relationship between these 
States and Siam. Even the stubborn Sultan of Trengganu 
became friendly. The official accounts of these visits 
recorded that
.... The Sultan of Trengganu was in the King’s
presence showing high respect ...CD
.... I (the King) talked to him. Then he said 
that he was very pleased and realised how kind 
I was. He assured me that he would remain 
loyal and true to me to the end of his life..D  '
.... Then the King sounded out the opinion of 
the Sultans concerning the rumour that England 
wanted to bring Kedah, Trengganu, Kelantan and 
Pattani under her control. On hearing the news 
the Sultans were terrified and surprised ...(3)
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century Siamese 
influence over these Malay States was hardly seriously 
disputed. In 1786, however, the question of Kedah’s depen­
dency on Siam arose after the Sultan, without Siam’s permission,
(1) Prince Sommot Amorapan, Jodmaihet Phrabat Somdet Phra 
Chunlachomklao Chaoyuhua Sadet Prapat Laem Malayu~
R.S. 109, 117. 119* 124, 128. (Records on King 
Chulalongkorn*s Trips to the Peninsula in 1890, 1898,
1900, 1905, 1909), (Bangkok, 1923), pp.9-10.(RS 1781 = AD).
(2) King Chulalongkorn, Rayatang Sadet Phraratcha Damnern 
Prapat Tang: Bog Tang Rue a Rob Laem Malayu, R.S.109*
(Soyal 7our to the Peninsula in 169d, (Bangkok, 1932),
p.334.
(5) Prince Sommot, op. cit., p.10.
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had ceded Penang to the East India Company in return for a
(1")promise of protection from the Company. J Though Siam did
not protest against it the said promise came to nothing, as
the British authorities in London persistently pursued a
policy of non-intervention. In 1793, seven years after the
occupation of Penang, the British Government dispatched a
definite instruction to the East India Company to this effect
No offensive and defensive alliance 
should be made with the Raja of Kedah.
The suzerainty of Siam over Kedah thus remained undisturbed.
In 1826 the British Government recognised Siamese suzerainty
over Pattani and Kedah, while Kelantan and Trengganu were in
effect acknowledged as independent states. Article XIII ran:
The Siamese shall remain in Kedah, and take 
proper care of that country and of its 
people.... The Siamese shall levy no duty 
upon stock and provision .... The English 
engage to the Siamese that the English do 
not desire to take possession of Quedah, 
that they will not attack or disturb it, 
nor permit the former Government of Quedah 
(the ex-Sultan) or any of his followers to 
attack, disturb or injure in any manner 
the territory of Quedah, or any other 
territory subject to S i a m . (2)
(1) L.A. Wills, "British Malaya 1824— 1867", Journal of 
the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
Vol. Ill, Part 2, (November, 19257, P* 35*
(2) Henry Burney, The Burney Papers, (5 Vols. Bangkok,
1910-1914-), III, May to September, 1826, pp. 400-4-01.
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And Article XII stated:
The Siamese shall not go and obstruct or 
interrupt in the States of Tringano and 
Celantan; English merchants and subjects 
shall have trade and intercourse in future 
with the same facility and freedom as they 
have heretofore had: and the English
shall not go and molest, attack or disturb 
those States upon any pretence whatever.^'
The Burney Treaty received a mixed reception from the
British. The Government of India was satisfied with it,
considering that the provision gave England a chance to extend
(o')
British protection to Kelantan and Trengganu. J But 
Governor Fullerton and the anti-Siamese party in Penang were 
very much dissatisfied. They considered that Henry Burney 
had given in too much to Siam!s "pretensions" in Kedah.
Fullerton termed the mission a failure in so far as the 
peninsula was concerned. During 1826 and 1827 bitter attacks 
against Burney were widespread in the press of Penang and 
Singapore. Nonetheless, the Supreme Government ratified 
Article XII as well as the other provisions of the treaty.
The Treaty was generally accepted as a principal Judgement 
of the independence of these Malay States until about 1882, when 
a difference of opinion arose between, on the one side, the
(1) Ibid.
(2) Mills, Ibid., pp. 149-51.
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authorities of the Straits Settlements, more or less 
supported by the Colonial Office, and on the other side the 
British representatives at the Siamese Court supported by 
the India Office and the Foreign Office.
In 1882 Sir Frederick Weld, the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements, with the support of Frank Swettenham, the 
Assistant Colonial Secretary for Native Affairs, protested
(A )
that Trengganu was independent of Siam,v ' while Giffard
Palgrave, the British Minister in Bangkok, upheld the view of
the Siamese Government which considered Trengganu 'to be an
autunomous but dependent State with the internal affairs of
which it did not ordinarily interfere but over the external
1 (2}relations of which Siam had full control.v 'Four years later 
Weld objected to the Siamese assuming the right to select the 
new Sultan of Trengganu, quoting Article XII of the Burney 
Treaty. Again he was informed by Palgrave that there would 
be no advantage in making any representations owing to British 
fears of the establishment of French influence in Siam. '
In 1888 Sir Cecil Smith, Weld's successor, repeated the same 
argument. In that year he visited Trengganu and asserted that,
(1) See Swettenham's pamphlet on the Origin and Progress of 
Siamese influence in the Malay Peninsula 1786-1882, 
Singapore 1882, enclosed in F.O. 64/82.
(2) C.C. 273/118, Palgrave-Granville, April 26, 1882.
(3) C.C. 273/275, Note on British-Siamese Relations in the 
Malay Peninsula. (1) The Interpretation of the Treaty 
of 1897. (2) The Duff Concession.
as the State had no ties with the Court of Siam, it was
independent. The Sultan, he stated, had no dealings with
Bangkok. The Raja Muda, who paid a visit to Singapore in
1888, said that Trengganu was independent, but being a small
State, they feared Siam. 7 A year later King Chulalongkorn
proposed to establish a Siamese Post Office in Trengganu but
the Sultan objected and said that if stamps were to be issued
(2)
they should bear his own likeness. 7 Sir Cecil Smith took 
the opportunity to report to Lord Knutsford, the Colonial 
Secretary, who in turn proposed to Lord Salisbury that
Trengganu should be brought under British control but the
(x)
latter turned a deaf ear.W 7  In June, 1889, the following
despatch was sent to Singapore:
In the present condition of Siamese relations 
with this and other countries, Her Majesty’s 
Government think it most undesirable to take 
any action calculated unnecessarily to wound 
the susceptibilities of that country. They 
are therefore not prepared to sanction any 
interference with the exercise of Siamese 
influence over Trengganu ...C^)
In 1895, Hugh Clifford, the Resident in Pahang, paid 
visits to Kelantan and Trengganu and during his home leave in
(1) C.C. 273/155, E.B. Gould-Cecil Smith, September 27, 1888.
(2) F.O. 17/1293, Memorandum, C.O., February 28, 1896.
(5) F.C. 69/136, Undated minute by Salisbury.
(4) C.C. 273/163, C.O.-Cecil Smith, June 7, 1889.
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London that year reported to Chamberlain that the Malays
hated the Siamese and that British influence was by far the
stronger in Trengganu. The sending of the 1 golden flower'
from Trengganu to Siam was regarded on both sides as purely
voluntary. It had never been regarded by the Malays as an 
i — -----------—  . prt
‘admission of suzerainty. J But the Colonial Office could 
do nothing. In fact, from 1889 onwards it; had to regard 
Article XII of the Treaty of 1826 as a stipulation against 
British action to take Kelantan and Trengganu directly under 
her protection. Be Bunsen, the British Consul-General in 
Bangkok, also took a similar view. He believed that the
golden flower was regarded by the majority of Malays as a
(2)symbol of dependence. '
In 1896, in Lord Salisbury's despatch to Lord Dufferin 
of January 15, the status of these Malay States was clearly 
stated:
It might be thought that because we have 
engaged ourselves and have received the 
engagement of France not under any cir­
cumstances to invade this territory that 
therefore we are throwing doubt upon the 
complete title and rights of the Siamese 
to the remainder of their Kingdom, or,
(1) F.O. 69/172, Clifford's Memorandum, British Relations 
with the Unprotected States of Kelantan and Trengganu.
(2) P.O. 17/1295, Memorandum, C.C., February 28, 1896.
The divergence of views between the Foreign Office and 
the Colonial Office with regard to Trengganu and Kelantan 
has been described in detail in Eunice Thio, "British 
Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-1909” , Unpublished 
Ph.B. Thesis, University of London, 1956. See pages 
507-342.
at all events, treating those rights with 
disregard. Any such interpretation would 
entirely misrepresent the intention with 
which this arrangement has been signed.
We fully recognise the rights of Siam, 
to the full and undisturbed enjoyment, 
in accordance with long usage or with 
existing treaties, of the entire terri- ^  n 
tory comprised within her dominions ... '
In 1897 soon after the signature of the Anglo-Siamese
Secret Convention, the Foreign Office despatched the following
instruction to Sir Charles Mitchell, the Governor of the
Straits Settlements:
... You should ... warn him (the Resident- 
General of the Federated Malay States) 
that he must not take any action which 
could in any way be construed by the 
Siamese Government as throwing doubts 
on the rights of Siam in the States in 
question.
Two years later this same recognition was confirmed by
the further British-Siamese Agreement of 1899 for the
delimitation of the boundary between the "States of Perak
and Pahang on the one side and the Siamese province of Rahman
and the Siamese dependencies of Kelantan, Kedah and
(?)
Trengganu on the other."
(1) F.O. 422/56, Sir Frank Bertie's Memorandum, September 
10, 1902. The underlining is the writer's.
(2) F.O. 422/47, Draft Despatch to Mitchell, May 5, 1897. 
Mitchell was forewarned by Chamberlain during the Secret 
Convention negotiations that "... it is essential to the 
object of this Treaty that Siamese sovereignty over 
Trengganu and Kelantan should not be questioned; other­
wise there would remain a part of the Malay Peninsula 
which might be utilized by a foreign Power ..."
F.O. 422/45, Ghamberlain-Mitchell, December 2, 1896.
(3) F.O. 422/45, Bertie's Memorandum, September 11, 1902.
The underlining is the writer's.
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Apart from clashes of opinion in British official 
circles, the British and Siamese Governments, from the 1860fs 
onwards, often became involved in disagreements concerning 
these Siamese Malay States. Whenever the suzerainty question 
was put forward, disturbances arose, causing irritation and 
annoyance to both parties concerned. There were at least 
three serious incidents. First, the bombardment of Trengganu 
in 1862; this event occurred over the succession question 
between the two leading princes of Pahang, the Bendahara and 
Mahmud Muzaffar Shah, the ex-Sultan of Lingga. During the 
fighting Sultan Mahmud went to pay tribute to King Mongkut 
in Bangkok, end from there he went to seek refuge in Trengganu 
where his nephew was the Sultan. As soon as the Sultan of 
Trengganu heard of his unclefs arrival, he sought British 
help. J Colonel Orfeur Cavenough of the Straits Settlements 
protested against Siamese action and demanded the immediate 
return of the Sultan to Bangkok. Before any action was taken 
by Siam, the Governor sent two vessels to Trengganu and
(O')
shelled the Trengganu fort. ' The Siamese protested, and 
Sir Orfeur refused to admit that they had any concern in 
Trengganu; but in fact the British authorities in London 
condemned the Straits Settlements Government for this ruthless
(1) Sir Frank Swettenham, British Malaya, (London, 1955)?
pp. J20-21.
(2) Prince Damrong, Collected Chronicles. Part II, p. 110.
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act. However, the tragedy of the episode remained and the
misunderstanding and conflict lingered on.
Secondly, there was the Pahang Rebellion in 1894. A
riot broke out in Pahang in 1894. Uranggaya, the leader,
fled to Kelantan and Trengganu. The British Government
requested the Siamese Government not to allow him to stay on
the grounds that he would again cause disturbance in Pahang.
Remembering what had happened during the Trengganu crisis,
King Chulalongkorn ordered Phraya Tipakosa, High Commissioner
(1}Of Puket, to handle the situation m  Trengganu and Kelantan. J
Phraya Tipakosa tried his utmost but a successful operation
was hampered by many factors, including a shortage of men,
and the geographical situation. This gave rise to much
criticism from the British Government that Siam was backing
(2)
the rebels. Accusations were made v/idely in the Singapore
( ^press. J Sir Charles Mitchell formally protested and 
proposed to intervene directly in the situation by sending
( I L \
Clifford to Trengganu. J The Siamese objected. They said 
that they were sending an armed force to suppress the rebels 
and that if the Straits Settlements officials wanted to co-
(1) P.M., The Pahang Rebellion 1894. The Kingfs statement 
to Phraya Tipakosa, undated.
(2) P.M., Mitchell-Prince Devawongse, August 28, 1894.
(3) The Singapore Pree Press, August 25, 1894.
(4) P.M., Mitchell-Prince Devawongse, May 24, 1895*
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operate they would be pleased. J Instead the British sent 
a gunboat, the H.M.S. 'Redpole' to Trengganu in October 1895 
and warned the Siamese that if the situation still remained 
unsettled they themselves would make a move. Fortunately, 
order was restored before the situation triggered off a 
disaster for both sides.
Thirdly, there was the Perak-Rahman Boundary question.
The problem started as early os 1881 when the Sultan of Perak 
complained to Siam that a large piece of Perak territory had
been absorbed by Rahman, a State under the protection of
(2)Siam.v ' Discussion after discussion was held between the 
Siamese and the Straits Settlements Governments but it was 
nearly twenty years before a compromise was reached. In the 
end, a portion of the lost province was restored to Perak 
by a definition of boundaries of 1899.
There were various consequences of the above incidents. 
First and foremost it became evident that the Straits 
Settlements officials had designs upon the Siamese Malay 
States. Moreover, the Sultans, backed by the British authori­
ties, were turning against Siam in favour of British protec­
tion. Thus it is no exaggeration to say that the problem
(1) F.M., A British Minister in Bangkok - Mitchell,
May 24, 1895.
(2) F.M., Memorandum. Enox-Phraya Bhanuvongse, December 6, 
1885. File on Perak-Rahman Boundary 1885-1891.
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regarding these Siamese Malay States was one of the open 
wounds in Anglo-Siamese relations. The vague suzerainty of 
Siam over them could not be left unresolved. A definite 
decision had to be made as to whether they were independent
protection over the rest of the States in the Malay Peninsula.
So the question of the Siamese Malay States was a factor in
any negotiations between the British and Siamese Governments.
In fact the King of Siam was anxious to settle this problem.
When the Perak-Rahman question reached its conclusion in 1899
the King wrote:
... I cannot help expressing how pleased I am 
that the question has now been settled. As 
regards the territories, though the British 
are the sole gainer, it is better to end up
the matter. An open wound has now been
healed. )
In view of the existence of these three issues, the 
trouble of extraterritoriality, the interpretation of the 
Secret Convention of 1897 and the question of Siamfs suzer­
ainty over the Northern Malay States, England and Siam were 
not the least reluctant to come to negotiated settlements.
The consequences of the problems were bitter. The judicial 
privileges given to the British subjects deprived the Siamese 
of their national pride, the Secret Convention was meaningless
^ or whether they came under Siam. By 1900 Britain claimed
(1) P.M., The King-Prince Devawongse, November 24, 1900.
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to Britain since British rights over the are3 which were 
laid down in the Convention were kept secret, and the 
situation in the northern Malay States did not allow the 
two Governments to rest. The first decade of the twentieth 
century witnessed the attempts of both sides to resolve 
these problems.
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CHAPTER II
ANGLO-SIAMESE NEGOTIATIONS, 1900-1905.
The twentieth century opened with Siam’s strenuous
attempts to solve questions of extraterritoriality, which was
the subject of a real' grievance felt by her. By 1900, foreign
subjects, mostly Asians, who enjoyed judicial rights in Siam
were numerous. This situation was different from what it had
been when Siam entered into treaties with foreign Powers. The
contracting Powers had, in the 1850's and 1860's, intended to
accord privileges under the treaties only to those members of
Western races who from religious, ethical, social and moral
standpoints, were different from the Siamese. It then became
extremely galling to the self-respect of Siam to be deprived
of jurisdiction over a large proportion of her population.
To quote King Chulalongkorn's words
... the troubles of extraterritoriality ... 
occurred in every country where the same 
system was in force. Each country similarly 
aims at its abolition in order to place 
people of all nationalities in the kingdom 
under the same law and tribunals. )
In the 1890's King Chulalongkorn started judicial reforms.
This involved reform of local laws and procedures to bring 
them to equality with those of western nations. The Ministry
of Justice was established in 1892, and all the judicial
(1) King Chulalongkorn, Introduction to the Laksana Kodmai
Arya (Criminal Code), (Bangkok, 1909), p.5.
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functions of the various departments, saving Naval, Military
and the Palace Courts, were consolidated. Prior to this year
there had been as many jurisdictions as departments. The
situation was described by Prince Rabi, 'the father of Siamese
legislation, as follows:
.... the northern provincial courts were under 
the Interior Department (Krom Mahatthai), the 
southern provincial courts came under the 
Defence Department (ICrom Kalahom), there were 
also some provincial courts under the Foreign 
Affairs Department (Krom Tha), and the capital 
court (Nakornban Court) in Bangkok was under 
the Capital Department (Krom Muang). All 
provincial courts ... tried both civil and 
criminal cases, but the court under the Krom 
Muang or the capital court tried only criminal 
cases. Civil cases were under the Central 
Civil Court (San Phaeng Klang^ and the Kasem 
Civil Court (San Phaeng Kasem;. These two 
Civil Courts were not under any department.
There were also courts in Bangkok which came 
under the Interior Department, the Kalahom 
Department and the Tha Department. These 
courts dealt with cases sent from the provin­
cial courts. Added to what have been said 
there were a court under Krom Tha to deal 
with foreign cases, a court of the Lands 
Department (Krom Na) for cases pertaining 
to rice-fields, and a court in the Royal
(1) Prince Rabi of Rajaburi or Prachao Baromwongther Krom
Luang Rajburi Direkrit was educated at Oxford and called 
to the Bar. On his return to Siam in 1895 be became the 
constant companion of his father, King Chulalongkorn.
He was Minister of Justice from 1897 until 1910 when he 
resigned, owing partly to weariness of office and partly 
to circumstances arising from an attack made on him by a 
member of the Royal Family. The Prince was thoroughly 
English in his ideas, so much so, perhaps, that he found 
it difficult to reconcile himself to the ways and methods 
of an autocratic Government.
Collected from Ruang Kong Chao Phraya Mahitorn (The 
Story of Chao Phraya Mahitorn), Compiled by Luang 
Chakrapranisisilvi-Sudh, (Bangkok, 1956).
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Property Department (Krom Praklang Maha Sombat) 
for cases regarding taxes and Royal debts.
Moreover there were courts of the Royal family, 
the Palace Department (Krom Wang), the 
Registrar’s Department (Krom Phra Surasavadi)
In spite of this complex situation, the restrictions on
individual courts' arbitrary powers were often over-ridden
by a powerful head of a Department. The Board in whose hands
an appeal decision was supposed to lie was not strong enough
to enforce any judgement affecting the Department of a strong
(o')
Minister or against an influential nobleman.v J
The abuses of this court system were made clear in the 
Royal Decree on the occasion of the establishing of the 
Ministry of Justice:
Nowadays litigation in various courts 
increases because people are more involved 
in business transactions. In one respect 
the courts to try cases are split up under 
various departments and the judges live in 
different places. In giving a final judgement, 
the judges rely entirely on the words written 
on paper; they cannot get any information at
(1) Prince Rabi, Praratchabanyat Rajburi, (Rajburi Act), 
(Bangkok, 1901), pp. 151-152.
(2) Phraya Nitisatpaisan, a Minister of Justice after the 
Second World War commented that ... "judicial power and 
judicial duty were not completely separate from executive 
administration. The executive administrator always 
intervened in all court procedures. This was against 
the principle of legislation in which it was laid down 
that the duty of the jurist was only to apply laws in 
making any judgement. To allow the executive to in- 
tefere caused a misdirection in the trial." Phraya 
Nitisatpaisan, "Tamnan san" (The Story of the Court) 
Prawatisat Kodmai, (History of Legislation). (Bangkok,
1954)7 p.' 261.
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first hand. This situation leads to distrust 
between the Judge and parties in a lawsuit.
Or at the least it delays the procedures.
Litigation accumulates at the various courts 
of various departments. It takes so long 
before each case is tried. This is a com­
plete waste of time for people who have to 
earn their living. They suffer much from 
this method.
After considerable thought about setting 
these shortcomings in order so as to benefit 
all people throughout the kingdom, the King 
proclaimed the establishment of the Ministry 
of Justice.(1)
The change of the court system was confined at first to 
Bangkok only, but gradually it was applied to the whole 
Judicial administration of the kingdom. The system of Courts 
was as follows: every Monthon or circle was divided into
Muangs, with a district court (San Muang). Thence an appeal 
lay to the Circle Court (San Monthon) established in the 
capital of each province. A final appeal lay from the 
Bangkok Appeal Court to the King, who exercised his functions 
through the "San Dika", or Supreme Court of Appeal.
The procedure, both civil and criminal, was promulgated 
in 1896. The narrow grooves of Siamese law were widened by 
the application of the principles of English law to all cases
(1) Ratchakitchanubeksa, (Court Gazette, Bangkok), 
Vol. XIX, p.200.
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( 1in which the Siamese law was silent or its meaning uncertain;
(o')
In 1897, on becoming Minister of Justice, J Prince Rabi 
edited and published Siam’s ancient laws in two volumes. The 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal were also published, 
and formed Law Reports from which a considerable amount of 
Judge-made law, adapted to modern conditions were gathered. 
Judicial Commissions were appointed in 1896 with three 
purposes: to dispose, first, of unfinished cases still
pending; second, of cases not yet tried at all; and third,
of cases in which all the documents had been lost or des-
(*>)troyed. Several European Legal Advisers were engaged from
time to time to assist the judicial administration; for 
example, Dr. Rolin Jacquemynes, 8 Belgian; Richard Kirk­
patrick, an Englishman; Dr. Tokichi Masao, a Japanese; and
(ZL>
Dr. George Padoux, a Frenchman. J In 1900 there were nine 
foreigners employed as Legal Advisers or Assistant Legal
(1) Ancient Siamese law texts suffered very severely from 
the sack of Ayudhya by the Burmese in 1767. At the 
beginning of the Bangkok period in 1782 only a ninth or 
tenth of the State legislation in use in the Ayudhya 
period survived. In 1805 in the reign of King Rama I, 
the existing laws were collected and re-written, and 
became the basis of justice. Nevertheless, the "Three 
Seals Law" of 1805 (Kodmai Tra Sam Duang) could hardly 
be considered perfect.
(2) The first two Ministers of Justice were Prince Svasti
(1892-1894-) and Krom Luang Pichitprichakorn (1894— 1897).
(3) Court Gazette, Vol. XXV, p. 210.
(4-) Ruang Kong Chao Phraya Mahitorn, pp. 64— 67.
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Advisers by the Ministry of Justice.
In addition to the actual expansion of her legislation,
Siam required the development of a class, upright, able and
educated, from which judicial officers might be drawn. Much
was done by the institution of a Law School, inaugurated in
1897 "by Prince Rabi.^'1
Once embarked on the new road of judicial progress, Siam
aimed at the complete abolition of extraterritorial rights
over foreign subjects. She turned first to England whom she
(2)could "always rely on ... as a support". J Her timing 
coincided with a new phase of British policy in the Malay 
Peninsula. Lord Salisbury had been Foreign Secretary as well 
as Prime Minister until October, 1900, when he surrendered the 
Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne, who did not share the Prime 
Minister's prejudice against an expansion of British influence 
in the Siamese Malay States. It should be remembered that it 
was in this part of the world that disagreements between the 
British Foreign Office and the Colonial Office flared up 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Colonial
(1) Court Gazette, Vol. XXVIII, p. 102. The idea of estab­
lishing a Law School first was aired in 1888 when Rolin 
Jacquemyns, the first General Adviser to the Siamese 
Government, suggested the idea to the King. But the work 
was delayed due to the lack of a suitable organiser.
Ruang Kong Chao Phraya Mahitorn, p. 51.
(2) F.O. 422/56, Archer-Lansdowne, September 29, 1902.
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Office always deprecated any sign of concession to Siam 
while the Foreign Office's policy was to be friendly with 
her. It knew that its Government had no wish to see the 
valley of the Mekong or the provinces to the south annexed 
to the French sphere of influence. Thus the maintenance of 
Siam as a strong, united and independent Power was of paramount 
importance in comparison with the extension of British 
influence over the Malay States intervening between Province 
Wellesley and Lower Burma. However, from the 1800's onward, 
Straits Settlements Governors like Sir Frederick Weld,
Sir Cecil Smith, Sir Frank Swettenham and other Malayan 
officials favoured placing the four Siamese tributary States 
of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis under British pro­
tection. But whenever they over-stepped their Government's 
policy, they were quickly rebuked.
However, international rivalry and tension in the Far 
East at the turn of the twentieth century made the danger of 
foreign intervention in the Malay Peninsula more real than 
before. Germany secured Kiaochow from China; Russia occupied 
Port Arthur. Britain, France, Russia and Germany obtained 
special privileges for the construction of railways and mining 
rights over huge areas in China. The occupation of the 
Philippines in 1898 brought the United States to a front line 
in the Far East where hitherto she had played but a small 
part except for her initiative in opening up Japan.
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Possible competition in the Peninsula came from the 
Germans who were "every day making their influence felt in 
Siam.;^ l; In the twentieth century Germany was looking for 
naval bases in order to extend her empire and trade. It was 
rumoured in 1900 that a well-known German mercantile firm,
Behn Meyer and Company, had asked the Sultan of Kedah for the 
lease of the Langkawi Islands which lay off the coast of 
Kedah on the western side of the Malay Peninsula and about 
sixty miles north-west of Penang, to serve as a coaling station 
and entrepot for the ever-increasing trade to Siam and the
( O ' )
East. J The authorities in Whitehall became alarmed. It 
had long been decided to leave Penang without defence on the 
grounds that no foreign Power possessed a base in these waters 
and the Bay of Bengal was always regarded as a "British lake."
Worse still, the Sultans of the Siamese Malay States 
appeared to regard themselves as free to administer their 
Governments independently, and to grant concessions to persons 
of any nationality. Rumours swept V/hitehall in 1901 that an 
American had applied to the Sultan of Trengganu for all mining 
rights in that State. And earlier the Sultan had granted a 
concession of Redan Island to a Singapore Malay by whom it
('l) Standard (Singapore), December 10, 1890.
(2) London and China Express, 29 December, 1899. Republished 
in The Bangkok Times, January 25, 1900.
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was offered for sale. ' The situation would lead to serious 
danger unless steps were taken to stop it.
As regards the Siamese Government, these uncontrolled 
concessions weakened its control over these States. The 
Sultans seemed to ignore Siam gradually and to turn to others 
for help. The most important case was the Duff Concession 
in Kelantan which created irritations and misunderstanding 
between the British and Siamese Governments during the first 
years of the new century.
The Duff Development Company in Kelantan.
Mr. R.W. Duff, who was for many years in the Straits 
Settlements service and who, when in charge of the operations 
for suppressing the rebellion in Pahang in 1894— 95 had entered 
Kelantan and Trengganu in pursuit of rebels, was impressed 
with the signs of mineral wealth in these unopened states.
On his retirement in 1900, he formed a syndicate to prospect 
the two states for minerals, and to acquire, if the prospect­
ing proved successful, a grant or concession of a mineral area 
for mining purposes. This syndicate was registered with a 
preliminary capital of £10,000 being composed of members of a 
large commercial house of high repute connected with the 
Par E a s t / 2)
(1) F #0. 69/252, Lansdowne-Tower, January 19, 1902.
(2) P #0. 69/224-, Duff Syndicate to F.O., April 24-, 1900
In April, 1900, the syndicate sent Duff to Bangkok to 
obtain a letter of recommendation from the Siamese Government 
to the Sultan of Kelantan and Trengganu. ' Gn his arrival, 
Duff sounded out Mr. Scott, the Siamese Director of Nines, as 
to whether he would be able to procure from the Siamese 
Government an exclusive prospecting licence in these states. 
Scott, who ’’refused to run his head against a brick wall” , 
frankly stated that such a licence could not be granted 
because there were many existing rights in those two states 
which had to be settled before Siam could grant new ones.(2) 
However, by virtue of Article XII of the Burney Treaty of 
1826, which granted British subjects freedom of trade in 
Kelantan, Prince Damrong, the Ninister of Interior, had to 
permit Duff to travel throughout Kelantan and Trengganu 
provided that he was accompanied by a Siamese mining engineer.
In Kelantan, Duff noticed that some gold mines were 
already held by Chinese, under sanction from the Sultan, 
which the Siamese Commissioner in Kelantan was powerless to 
veto. Noreover, the engineer who travelled with him tried
every possible means to obstruct Duff from mineral pros-
C7))pecting. Duff then sought the assistance of the Foreign
(1) P.O. 69/224, C.G.-F.O., Nay 19, 1900.
(2) P.O. 69/224. Report on certain rights acquired by the
Duff Syndicate Limited in the State of Kelantan.
(3) P.O. 69/224, Duff's Report on his visit to Siam, undated.
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Office in London.
After consulting Nr. George Greville, the British Minister 
in Bangkok who was on leave, and the Colonial Office, the 
British Vice-Consul in Bangkok, Nr. C.E.W. Stringer, was 
instructed to afford Duff all assistance but to advise him 
to confine his request for prospecting to specified districts 
instead of the whole area of the two states, which, in 
Greville1s opinion, the Siamese Government would be almost 
certain to refuse.(1)
Duff's demand for a concession in Kelantan met with a 
point blank refusal from the Siamese Government. He was 
informed by the latter that England had already recognised 
Siamese land rights and rights of alienation of land in 
Kelantan and Trengganu. The Siamese Government was not 
prepared to admit foreign capitalists in these two states. 
Recently it had vetoed a proposed German lease of Langkawi 
Islands, north of Penang. If Duff was able to get a con­
cession the example might quickly be utilised by Russians,
(2)French or Germans.v '
Having no alternative, Duff handled the affair single- 
handed. He entered into negotiations with the Sultan which 
resulted in a partnership deed being drawn up between the
(1) F.O. 69/224, Tel. Salisbury-Stringer, Nay 22, 1900.
(2) F.O. 69/224, Duff's Report on his visit to Siam, undated.
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two of them by which Duff acquired the whole of mineral, 
trading and other rights over an area of 2,000 square miles,
C'])
estimated at almost one-third of the total area of Kelantan, J
The syndicate considered the Agreement thoroughly valid
and thought that it was unnecessary to apply to Siam for any
confirmation. The Sultan of Kelantan also repudiated the
right of the Siamese Government to interfere, and threatened
(2)to cancel any Agreement ratified by Siam, ' Consequently,
Duff demanded an authority from the British Government to let
him prospect in Kelantan. But his Government could not consent
on the grounds that England had acknowledged the suzerainty
of Siam over Kelantan. So no title granted to a British
subject by the Sultan was valid unless ratified by the Siamese
King, In August, 1900, the British Minister in Bangkok
received an order from the Foreign Office to the effect that
no grant of land by the Sultan of Kelantan to 
which the Siamese Government objected should 
receive your support and your support of 
Duff's Syndicate should take the form of 
endeavouring to obtain the confirmation of/^\ 
the Siamese Government of any such grant.
In the view of the Siamese Government it was impossible
(1) NA, R5, 5/197, An Agreement between the Sultan of 
Kelantan and Mr. Robert William Duff, October 10, 1900. 
The total area of Kelantan is 5,331 square miles.
(2) F.O. 69/224, Duff Syndicate - F.O. May 17, 1901.
(3) F.O. 69/224, F.O.-Stringer, August 25, 1900.
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to ratify the Agreement, In his address to the Council of
Ministers the King outlined his policy regarding the Siamese
Malay States as follows:
... First, during the past few years our 
Government has noticed that more foreigners 
have wanted mineral prospects in the Siamese 
Malay States, especially in Kelantan. Some 
have come to Bangkok to apply for permission.
Some have gone directly to the states. Some 
have sent their agents and misled the Sultans 
or offered bribes to tempt them to grant 
permission for prospecting.
Second, our Government is aware of what has 
occurred, and on consideration feels that 
mining and commerce in these Malay States 
must inevitably be opened up to foreigners 
in the future, because an exclusionist 
commercial policy is not only useless to 
our country but can also be positively 
injurious when powerful foreign nations 
come to bother us, seeking to force us to 
open up commerce, as can be seen in China, 
for example. Therefore, the best strategy 
for a small country like Siam can only be 
to open ourselves to commerce with foreign 
countries.
Third, to open the country for trade, 
especially in a Malay State like Kelantan, 
our Government is undertaking a considerable 
responsibility. The Malays in these 
provinces are uncivilised and irresponsible, 
and the Sultans are obtuse... If the Siamese 
Government takes no steps to secure the 
situation and allows foreigners to settle 
and trade in the area, when any disturbance 
occurs either with the natives or with the 
Sultans ... the foreign Government may hold 
our Government responsible...
Fourth, ... it is impossible for our 
Government to accept agreements which are 
signed independently between those foreigners 
and the Sultans because various grave con­
sequences may ensue. At the least the 
Sultans are slow-witted. They have no sense 
of contract... Our policy is to govern these
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States through understanding and avoid 
damaging the interests of the British 
Government ... Therefore, we have to take 
drastic actions upon foreigners. All 
those who seek profits in these States 
must come to us in Bangkok and not enter 
into agreements with Sultans, as it is 
understood that these Sultans regard all 
Europeans as the "Whites", and they do not 
differentiate between their nationalities....
Fifth, it is laid down both in the 
existing treaties between Siam and other 
Powers and in Siamese law that permission 
from the Siamese Government is required 
before foreigners possess landed property 
or have the right to deal with it in the 
Siamese provinces. It is obvious that the 
Agreements which they make with the Sultans 
are illegal. Recently, orders were given 
to the Sultans not to conclude Agreements 
of any kind with the foreigners. If the 
foreigners come to ask for anything what­
soever the Sultans must refer them to us ...
Sixth, the High Commissioner of Monthon 
Nakornsitammarat is in charge of the Siamese 
Eastern Malay States and has been instructed 
to look after the general situation of 
Kelantan ... and to appoint a permanent 
Commissioner there ...
Seventh, the new Mining Law recently came 
into force, and officials from the Mineral 
Department have been appointed for these 
provinces. This action reveals our sincere
intention to open these States to those who 
make valid application.
With regard to Mr. Duff's case we would like to make
our policy clear, as follows:
Eighth, it has long been and continues to be 
our intention to grant Mr. Duff a mineral 
concession in Kelantan in accordance with 
the Treaty and the Mining Law.
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Ninth, however, we find it impossible to 
ratify the Agreement between the Sultan and 
Duff, partly because the boundary and wording 
mentioned in the Agreement are not clear and 
partly because the concession is too excessive.
But our most important objection is that, if 
we ratify such contracts which foreigners 
conclude with the Sultans, it will be serving 
an example which in future, other foreigners, 
who are not British, may promise offerings to 
the Sultan and make him sign agreements of 
this nature. Then they will come to force 
us to ratify the Agreement by citing the 
example of the privileges granted to Duff... ^
The rigid intentions of the British and Siamese Govern­
ments convinced the Syndicate that if it persisted to refuse 
to apply for Siamese ratification it would be tantamount to 
opposing the action of the Home Authorities. Duff then
accepted Siamese confirmation of the Agreement if Siam would
(2)not interfere with the internal administration of Kelantan.
He proposed that the Concession agreement be modified on one 
of three ways:
(1) NA, R5, 24/3, King Chulalongkorn-Council of Ministers, 
June 26, 1901. In July, 1901, the King said to 
Swettenham: "You know Mr. Duff and that he says he has 
a concession from the Rajah of Kelantan, an immense 
concession of many square miles. He declines to deal 
with us in the matter; what am I to do with him? ...
But he will not have anything to do with us. How can 
we deal with him, and how can I let the Malay Rajahs 
give concessions like this....?" F.O. 69/222,
Swettenhamfs notes on conversation with the King of Siam 
and Prince Damrong, his brother. July 19, 1901.
(2) F.O. 69/224, Archer-Lansdowne, August 29, 1901.
Either (1) the lessee to make no assignment 
or sub-lease except to British subjects or 
to a Company registered in England or in a 
British Colony;
Or (2) the lessee should hold grants solely 
for commercial purposes, and not assign or 
sub-let more than one-third of the area to 
a Company not registered in England or a 
British Colony;
(s\ \
Or (5) a combination of the above two. J
(2)Whitehall seriously considered these conditions. ' The 
Colonial Office and the Foreign Office suggested to the 
Siamese Government that the concession should provide for 
Siamese confirmation of any sub-lease or transfer on the 
demand of the British Government who should be immediately 
informed on receipt by the Siamese Government of any applicatioi 
for the confirmation of a transfer.
The Siamese raised objections. They pointed to Article 7 
of the Agreement between the Sultan of Kelantan and the
(1) F.O. 69/224, Archer-Lansdowne, September 25, 1901.
(2) The Colonial Office suggested that Sir Frank Swettenham 
should be instructed to visit Kelantan with or without 
Duff to arrange with the Sultan for the possible modifi­
cations of the conditions for the concession as could 
reasonably be accepted by the Sultan and Duff and be 
confirmed by the Siamese Government. But Prince 
Devawongse objected, saying there were a series of 
articles in the Straits Settlements press hinting of 
British designs upon the Siamese Malay States. The 
visit would be heartily disliked by the Siamese. The 
Prince accused Duff of taking everything for his own 
benefit. In fact the Siamese Government was not entirely 
opposed to Duff!s application. It would have been only 
too pleased to grant him a concession had it not been a 
large one. C.O. 275/274, C.O.-F.O., September 2, 1901. 
NA, R5, 5/197, 24/5554, Prince Devawongse-King 
Chulalongkorn, September 8, 1901.
Syndicate, which stated that the consent of the Sultan was
necessary for any lease, and pleaded that an embarrassing
position would be created by the publication of a condition
binding them as to leases to other than British subjects.
The terms of the confirmation should follow the wording of
the Agreement. If this were acceptable to the British
Government, the Siamese Foreign Minister was prepared to
exchange unpublished notes with Reginald Tower, the new
British Minister in Bangkok, declaring that, if requested by
the British Government, Siam would not withhold her consent
(1)from any transfer or sub-lease. '
While the two Governments were exchanging their views
Duff secretly proposed to the Foreign Office that he was
willing to give an undertaking to the British Government not
to part with the concession or any of the rights conferred by
(2)it to any but a British subject. '
The Foreign Office, of course, was satisfied. Tower was 
at once instructed to ask the Siamese to authorise the Siamese 
Legation in London by telegraph to ratify the concession.
But the Siamese Government still remained firm in its insis­
tence that the words "Government of His Majesty the King of
(1) F.O. 69/275  ^ Tower-Lansdowne, January 8, 1902
(2) C.O. 275/285, C.O.-F.O., January 24, 1902.
(5) F.O. 69/275> F.O.-Tower, February 19, 1902.
82
Siam" be substituted for the words "Raja of Kelantan" at
the end of clause 7 of the concession Agreement between the
Sultan and Duff.^ 1J If the Sultan still had rights to lease
or sub-lease the concession the ratification of the Siamese
Government would be meaningless.
Two months passed. The appointment of Kelantan and
(o')Trengganu Advisers was moving into a crisis. J The demand
from England became stronger. Siam came to realise that the
Duff matter should be settled as quickly as possible. The
delay might lead the Straits Settlements officials to the
idea that Siam wanted to exclude British trade from the Malay
States. They might take the situation as an excuse to get
(x\
Kelantan and Trengganu. Moreover, Duff had already agreed
(4)to the terms of Clause 7 of the Concession Agreement. '
In May, 1902, the Siamese Government complied on the 
following conditions: firstly, it agreed to ratify the
concession unconditionally. Secondly, there was an under­
standing between the two Governments that whenever the 
Syndicate might have occasion to execute a transfer or sub­
lease they should first satisfy the Foreign Office in London
(1) NA, R5, 3/197, Luang Ratanabanyati-Lansdowne, March 3, 1902
(2) See the details under the sub-heading 'The Appointment of 
Advisers in Kelantan and Trengganu' in this Chapter.
(3) NA, R5, 3/197, 608/8117, Prince Damrong-Prince Devawongse,
November 27, 1901.
(4) P.O. 69/275, Duff-Luang Ratanabanyati, March 6, 1902.
that the sub-lessee was altogether fit to be entrusted with
the enterprise. Thirdly, the Foreign Office, on being so
satisfied, should advise the Siamese Government before the
latter ratified the sub-lease. And lastly, in order that the
Syndicate might have reasonable certainty that there v/ould be
no difficulty or delay, the British Government would inform
the Directors confidentially that it was in a position, after
thoroughly discussing the matter with the Siamese Government,
to state that the latter would not withhold its approval of
any sub-lease or transfer, where the above conditions had been
(A)completely fulfilled. J
At the height of the Duff crisis Sir Frank Swettenham 
became Governor of the Straits Settlements in 1901. He had 
always been an ardent advocate of a forward policy in the 
Malay Peninsula. With his Governorship the policy of expansion 
came to the fore. There were two reasons behind the scenes: 
first, the petitions of the Sultans of Sai, Legeh and Pattani 
to Swettenham in 1901 complaining against the tightening of 
'Siamese control and asking for British advice;^ ' and second, 
the question of concessions in the Siamese Malay States which 
would lead to grave complications. The Duff affair clearly 
revealed a non-existence of any kind of agreement between the
(1) F.O. 69/2755 Lansdowne-Tower, May 12, 1902.
(2) F.O. 422/56, Tel. Swettenham-Chamberlain, January 17, 1902.
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Siamese Government and the Sultans, - the Siamese loose 
control over these States, the Sultans' hatred towards Siam 
and the possibility of the "third Power" interference. In 
particular, the concession granted to Duff by the Sultan of 
Kelantan made it crystal clear that neither the Sultans nor
Immediately after taking office as a British Minister in 
Bangkok in 1902, Tower pointed out to Prince Devawongse, the 
Siamese Foreign Minister, the immediate danger of the situation 
in the Siamese Malay States and asked what steps he intended 
to take to obviate its likely outcome. The British Government 
wanted Siam to accept Sir Frank Swettenhamfs assistance in 
concluding treaties with Pattani, Kelantan and Trengganu and 
to place at the Siamese Government's disposal some experienced 
British officers to act as Siamese representatives in the 
States.^  ^
Such was the beginning of a most controversial series of 
diplomatic discussions between the two Governments which lasted 
for almost twelve months. This episode was finally viewed by
/>■*- other European Powers recognised the authority of Siam over
the area.
The Appointment of Advisers in Kelantan 
and Trengganu.
(1) F.G. 69/2J2, Memorandum of the interview between Prince
Devawongse and Tower, January 9, 1902.
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Paget, Tower's successor, as follows:
.., The Siamese Government should be blamed 
for their ... supineness, prevarication, and 
tortuous methods ... (they) were unable to 
connect or more probably wished to be blind 
to the connection between cause and effect 
... Their attitude ... was purely childish, 
and their extreme sensitivity makes diplo­
matic intercourse both unpleasant and 
difficult.^  5
An equally curt comment came from King Chulalongkorn:
In our long association with England, never 
before have we experienced such bad treatment.
No other British representatives looked down 
upon us in the same manner as did Mr. Tower 
and Mr. Paget, the British Ministers. True, 
they are not warlike like those Prenchmen, 
but they are ruthless, threatening, and want 
everything to satisfy themselves. I am 
depressed and fed up. The whole affair has 
become even worse than dealing with Prance.... '
Talks in Bangkok opened in an unfriendly atmosphere.
The King and his ministers at home and abroad were bitterly 
opposed to the "good intentions" of the British Government. 
Prince Devawongse, though admitting Siam's shortcomings in 
Trengganu and Kelantan, was opposed to British Advisers in
f 7 ' )
the Malay States. Once Siam accepted a measure of foreign
control over her actions she ceased to be master of her own 
destiny. The Prince always believed that the Siamese had
(1) P.O. 4-05/171, Annual Report for the year 1906 by Paget.
(2) NA, R5, Pile 2, No.60. King Ghulalongkorn-Phraya Suriya,
Siamese Minister in Paris, March 17, 1905•
(5) P.O. 69/232, Tel. Tower-Lansdowne, January 10, 1902.
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a right to look after their own affairs, even though in
certain respects outsiders might manage them better. Prince
Damrong,^ the most responsible actor on the scene, expressed
no fear. He referred to the events in 1901 when, in the
light of the Straits Settlements press rumours that Siamese
administrative control over the Malay States was scandalous,
Phraya Si Sahadeb, the Vice-Minister of Interior, was sent
on a tour of the Siamese Malay States and obtained assurances
(2)of submission from the Sultans. In London, the problem
was also discussed between Luang Ratanabanyati, the Siamese 
Charge d'Affairs, and Lord Lansdowne. Though the Siamese
(1) Although nothing could add to the Prince's widely-praised 
abilities as a statesman, historian, diplomat and scholar, 
the writer finds it necessary to quote Paget's tribute 
to His Royal Highness. Paget wrote:
"At the time of my arrival in Siam in 1902 Prince 
Damrong was, and had been for some years past, - with the 
exception of course of King Chulalongkorn - the most 
outstanding and important figure in the administration 
of his country.
Nominally filling the Office of Minister of Interior, his 
influence and activities extended nevertheless to every 
important question, whether of Internal or Foreign Policy..
... in the light of the complicated political situations 
as I witnessed and all the events that transpired during 
my seven years' stay in Siam, I am of opinion that but 
for King Chulalongkorn's wisdom, backed by Prince Damrong's 
perspicacity, energy and grip on the country, the indep­
endence of Siam, might have been seriously threatened by 
the interests of her more powerful neighbours...."
Dedication to Prince Damrong of Siam 194-7, (Bangkok, 1962), 
pp. 1-3*
(2) NA, R5, 3/197, Tel. Damrong-Si Sahadeb, October 19, 1901.
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minister had listened with great interest, he remained
studiously non-committal, saying that there was nothing to
worry about since Siam had lately effected great improvements
in the administration of these States to which new Commiss-
(y\)
ioners had been appointed. J Cn the part of the King, His
Majesty expressed a fear of French retaliation in the Eastern
territories if he were to employ British officers in the
Malay States.
The question presented even greater difficulty of
adjustment after a curt talk in Singapore in February between
the King and Sir Frank Swettenham, the man whom the British
Government seriously asked to play the honest broker between
C7)')Siam and Kelantan, Trengganu and Pattern. Swettenham was
supposed to inform the King of the British Government's views 
on the general situation in the northern states and give 
some advice. But nev/s of the King's visit reached Singapore 
so swiftly and unexpectedly that Swettenham had no time for 
a well prepared scheme. Ten days before the crucial talks
(1) NA, R5, 5/197, Memorandum of the Interview between Luang 
Ratanabanyati and Lord Lansdowne, London, February 11, 1902
(2) F.O. 69/252, Tel. Tower-Lansdowne, January 29, 1902.
(5) In fact, Sir Frank Swettenham wanted to come to Bangkok
but King Chulalongkorn thought that such an invitation
would be sure to provoke much gossip and possibly trouble 
from French quarters. His Majesty, therefore, determined 
on a personal Journey to Singapore ostensibly to accompany
Prince Nagara Svarga travelling to Europe. F.C. 69/252, 
Tel. Tower-Lansdowne, February 8, 1902. F.O. 69/227, 
Tower-Lansdowne, February 8, 1902. C.O. 275/286,
Swettenham-Chamberlain, February 5, 1902.
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began, telegrams from Swettenham poured into the Colonial 
Office asking for special instructions. J But Chamberlain 
decided to leave the matter entirely to Swettenham. Thus it 
gave the Governor an opportunity to voice the hopes of his 
Colony in advocating action in disregard of Siamese authority 
creating an altogether unfriendly diplomatic atmosphere.
Swettenham gave the King three alternatives - first, to 
give up Kelantan and Trengganu altogether; second, to employ 
Englishmen there, or, third, to reach agreement with the 
Sultans of Kelantan and Trengganu defining the relations of 
their states to Siam and securing the Sultans the right to 
manage the internal affairs of their own states in return for 
their recognition of the right of Siam to control their
(O')
external relations. J
As might have been imagined, the King was much dis­
appointed at the tenor of Swettenhamfs advice by the pressure 
put upon him as to the territorial cession. If it were
(1) One of the telegrams read:
"King of Siam leaves Bangkok 20 inst. to confer 
with me. Have you any special instructions?"
Another one followed:
"Will you approve of my endeavouring to obtain for 
Britain, by public or secret Treaty, all islands south 
of 7th degree north latitude, including Langkawi and 
Redang Island?"
B.C. 422/56, Swettenham-Chamberlain, February 14, 1902. 
Swetterh0m-Chamberlain, February 22, 1902.
(2) F.O. 69/228, Tower-Lansdowne, March 8, 1902.
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accepted a similar move would be made by the French on the
eastern frontier of Siam which would practically reduce the
Siamese Kingdom to the limits of the Anglo-French Agreement
of 1896; viz, the Menam Valley. Disheartened and alarmed,
the King hurried back to Bangkok before anything had been
agreed upon. J Prince Devawongse noted:
His Majesty is credited with having said that 
he believed Sir Frank Swettenham was his 
sincere friend, and that he had been glad to 
confer with him, at the instance of His 
Majesty's Government, but that he now sees 
Sir Frank in a different light.(2)
Then he criticised Swettenham:
... In fact Sir Frank Swettenham lacked diplo­
matic prudence. With the British Government's 
support he went to extremes with a view to 
getting everything he wanted ... Now we have 
reasons to hit the British Government back.
The question of territorial cession never 
came up in the talks either in London or in 
Bangkok. The British Foreign Office convinced 
us that Sir Frank Swettenham, as an experienced 
hand, would make a successful intermediary.
But now even when His Majesty proposed to 
appoint an English man in Kelantan and
(1) Queen Sukumal Marasi who accompanied the King on the 
trip, described the situation in a letter to her son,
Prince Nagara that: "His Majesty lost his temper since
his discussion with the Governor of Singapore reached a 
deadlock. He became angry even with those who got sea­
sick. He did not have a word with me for two days' 
running." Queen Sukumal Marasi-Prince Nagara, March 8,1902
Phraratchahatleka Phrabat Somdet Phra Ohunla-Ghomklao 
Chaoyuhua Lae Lai Phrahat Somdet Phra Pitucha Chao 
Sukumal Marasi Phra Akara j athewi. (Letters of King Chula­
longkorn and Queen Marasi), (Bangkok, 1950).
(2) F.O. 800/142, Lansdowne Private Papers, Tower-Lansdowne, 
March 10, 1902.
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Trengganu he rejected it as being 
ineffective. On the contrary he 
suggested that Siam should cede to 
England these two states, not to 
mention a demand for other territory.
If this advice was adopted it would 
be in complete antithesis to the 
British pledge to respect Siamese 
integrity and would bring an immediate 
crisis to Siam... How could we regard 
England as our real friend! (1)
On the King's return it became the task of Tower to 
restore negotiations to their proper channel. The simplest 
solution was to uphold the Foreign Office's former attitude 
of bolstering up Siamese sovereignty, or at least protection, 
over Kelantan and Trengganu rather than taking drastic
measures which would lead to the extension of British pro-
(o')tection over them. J Tower proposed that British officers 
be appointed in the Siamese Malay States as residents or
advisers in some capacity.
\
By this time the King and his ministers became convinced 
that the British had designs on Kelantan and Trengganu. They 
saw that before it was too late they should make a compromise. 
Thus the Siamese Government was reconciled to the appointment
(1) NA, R5, 3/197* Prince Devawongse-The King, March 4, 1902. 
Later Phraya Suriya complained to Sir E. Monson, the 
British Minister in Paris, about Swettenham's hostility 
to Siam. He said it would be better on every account 
for England to make a formal proposal to the Siamese 
Government for the acquisition of these territories if 
she required them, so Siam would then know v/here she 
stood. F.O. 69/234, Monson-Lansdowne, July 16, 1902.
(2) F.O. 800/142, Tower-Barrington, February 13, 1902
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of officers on the condition that these officers should be 
attached to the Siamese Ministry of Interior. It also pro­
posed to take steps towards securing arrangements with the
Sultans of Kelantan and Trengganu for future relations between
Cl')their states and Siam. J
Five offices, the Siamese Foreign Ministry, the British 
Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the Straits Settlements 
Government and the Siamese Legation in Paris, were engaged in 
the negotiations. The talks started in Bangkok, transferred 
to London in June, 1902, when Tower became ill, were inter­
rupted and afterwards resumed by the Siamese Minister in 
Paris, and finally taken up by Phraya Si Sahadeb in London in 
September, 1902. All negotiations had to avoid touching upon 
the susceptibilities of the Siamese King and great care had to 
be taken to conciliate the Sultans and to accommodate 
Swettenham's temperament. As a result, the issues became very 
involved and fresh points cropped up continually.
One of the troubles was a visit of the Sultan of Kelantan
(1) F.O. 69/228, Tower-Lansdowne, March 24, 1902.
F.O. 69/226, Lansdowne-Tower, April 9, 1902.
The Siamese asked that Pattani should be excluded from 
the discussion because the state was well under the
control of Siam. The arrest of Abdul Kadel, the Sultan 
of Pattani, by Phraya Si Sahadeb on February 20, 1902, 
on the grounds of gross disobedience proved the existence 
of some sort of Siamese authority. Traditionally, the 
matter of Pattani was directly related to the Siamese 
King, so it should be kept apart from the negotiations. 
The Foreign Office in London agreed.
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to Singapore in May, 1902. When the Sultan heard that an
agreement was being prepared between his state and Siam, he
became very much alarmed. Moreover, Siamfs action towards
the Sultan of Pattani inspired distrust in him. On May 15,
(1)he proceeded to Singapore seeking British protection.v
His whole month’s stay in Singapore, together with 
elaborate receptions, irritated the Siamese Court officials, 
who considered that Swettenham had deliberately insulted 
them.
With a request from the Sultan pledging the British 
Government to take Kelantan under British protection, 
Swettenham’s desire to turn the Siamese Malay States into 
British Malaya reached its climax. To him the time had come 
for England to abandon the present negotiations, to break the 
British treaty engagement with Siam, to take the Malay States 
and to give France a free hand in the Valley of the Mekong.
(1) F.O. 69/236, Swettenham-Chamberlain, 16 May, 1902.
(2) Phraya Prasiddhi, the Siamese Charge d ’Affairs in London, 
complained to Lord Lansdowne that the occasion of the 
Sultan’s visit was taken advantage of by Swettenham to 
show him honour of a kind to which his rank and position 
in Kelantan by no means entitled him. For example, on his 
arrival in Singapore the Sultan was received by a guard of 
honour, and by salutes from guns. The same ceremony was 
observed on his departure and, moreover, the Straits 
Settlements Government's yacht "Sea Belle" was placed at 
his disposal to take him back to Kelantan and fifty Sikhs 
accompanied him on the voyage back, equipped with arms and 
ammunition. F.O. 4-22/56, Phraya Prasiddhi-Lansdowne,
July 8, 1902.
(3) F.O. 422/56, Swettenham-C.O., June 5, 1902.
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Despatch after despatch from Swettenham flowed into the 
Colonial Office pressing it to accept Kelantanfs independence.
He wrote:
British interests are in danger ... In every 
transaction, hitherto Siam has gained,
Britain never ... I know the British _dcL..not 
want them, they want us ... At this moment 
oUr~influence in the Peninsula is predominant 
and our prestige great ....
I cannot suppose that His Majesty's Government 
desired to enlarge the area of the Siamese 
dominions for the benefit of humanity, 
because of all Eastern people, the Siamese 
are the most contemptible, the most un­
reliable and the most corrupt. They are 
cruel and lazy, unjust and untruthful and 
they are not even courageous. Indeed I have/.^ 
looked in vain for any good characteristics. '
One could hardly wish for a clearer statement of the
expansionistic and anti-Siamese feeling prevalent in the
Straits Settlements; feelings, however, which were not com-
(0s)
pletely shared by the Foreign Office.v J In June, the Sultan 
was simply told that the British Government could not help.
(1) P.O. 422/56, Swettenham-C.0., June 11, 1902.
(2) The Foreign Office completely ignored Swettenham's 
request. Sir Francis L. Bertie, the Assistant Under­
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, commented,
"A foolish telegram. It seems quite impossible to get 
Sir Frank Swettenham to realise the position.”
Lansdowne urged the Colonial Office to uphold their 
main principle, that of respecting Siamese sovereignty 
over Kelantan. The Colonial Office gave way. F.0.422/56, 
Memorandum by Sir Frank Bertie, September 10, 1902.
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(1^The poor Sultan left Singapore in despair, '
The word defining the exact status of Trengganu and 
Kelantan also became a cause of tension. The Siamese Govern­
ment claimed the states to be under the "sovereignty1 of the 
King of Siam, referring to Lord Salisbury's despatch to Lord 
Dufferin in 1896, in which the Prime Minister wrote that 
England would
recognise the rights of Siam, to the full and 
undisturbed enjoyment, in accordance with 
long usage or with existing treaties, of the 
entire territory comprised within her 
dominions ,..(2;
But Chamberlain and the Foreign Office preferred the word
"dependencies" which was deliberately used for Kelantan and
C $3Trengganu in the Perak Boundary Agreement of 1899*
There was also a question of foreign trade. In July, 
1902, Swettenham informed Chamberlain that the Siamese Govern 
ment had asked the Sultan of Kelantan to agree to the sugges­
tion that all imports and exports between Siam and Kelantan
(zn
should be free of duty. J The British Minister in Bangkok
(1) The Siamese believed that Swettenham did make an effort 
in vain to conclude a separate agreement with the Sultan. 
Thus their hatred towards the Governor grew.
(2) See Chapter I,pp. 58-59.
(5) F.C. 422/56, Memo by Sir Frank Bertie, September 11, 1902
(4) F.C. 69/258, Swettenham-Chamberlain, 29 August, 1902.
The first regular Siamese steamer to Kelantan only began 
to run in 1899. The Sultan collected an import tax of 
5 per cent.
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made a protest to Prince Devawongse who completely denied 
knowledge of the rumour.
Next came the Siamese demand for the control of the 
Telegraph, Railway and Postal Departments in these two states. 
The Foreign Office contended, however, that this was part of 
the internal administration.
The highlight of the controversy was the question of 
advisers. From the start there existed mutual understanding. 
The Siamese Government agreed that the advisers should be 
Englishmen and, in return, Lord Lansdowne undertook that the 
actual appointment should be exclusively Siamese. In the 
first Siamese draft agreement it was stated that there would 
be an exchange of notes between the British Minister and 
Prince Devawongse, and it was stipulated that the "Residents" 
should be of British nationality, nominated by the Siamese 
Government but they could not be removed without the consent
(a \
of the British Minister in Bangkok. ' However, Swettenham,
whose uppermost idea was to render the position of such
Residents as secure as possible from Siamese interference,
did not consent to a Resident being appointed by Siam without
(o\
reference to the British officials. J In his opinion, if 
the British Government did not retain a say in this matter
(1) F.O. 69/229, Tower-Lansdowne, April 24, 1902.
(2) F.O. 69/229, Tower-Lansdowne, May 6, 1902.
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it might have men appointed who, though English, were more 
Siamese than the Siamese themselves. Swettenham wrote to 
Charles Lucas, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Colonial
Office:
British interests will not be best served if 
they are represented at Bangkok by people 
who are notoriously pro-Siamese. As for 
Rivett-Carnac, he is paid £4,000 a year by 
the Siamese. Nr. Black, the Consul, I hear, 
is also going to join them as he cannot 
resist Siamese gold.(1)
Lord Lansdowne concurred. He added:
The mere fact that the Adviser is to be an 
Englishman gives us absolutely no security 
that he is fit for the post, and it stands 
to reason that we must be better judges of 
our fellow countrymen than the Siamese 
Government, and that our field of selection 
must be wider than theirs.(2)
The Siamese reaction to the demand was cold. All the 
negotiations took a turn for the worse when Prince Devawongse 
abruptly told the British Ninister that the Siamese had never 
contemplated the idea of appointing British officers. Prince 
Damrong also declared that Siam would rather lose Kelantan 
and Trengganu than give a written assurance that the Residents 
should be of British nationality. In great disappointment,
(1) F.C. 69/238, Memorandum by Lucas, September 12-13, 1902. 
Rivett-Carnac was the Adviser to the Siamese Ministry of
Finance.
(2) F.C. 69/238, Private, Lansdowne-Verney, September 24, 1902.
(3) F.C. 69/22^5, Tower-Lansdowne, May 25, 1902.
97
Tower telegraphed immediately to Lord Lansdowne:
At what time the present pretension germinated 
in their brains, I am as yet unable to form 
a conjecture ... Should the King endorse 
Prince Devawongse1s contention, all negotiations 
would have to be altered. It would be necessary 
for His Majesty's Government to assume a 
definite policy towards the Rajas of Kelantan 
and Trengganu "to protect" in the words of 
Sir Frank Swettenham, "our own interests and 
theirs 1*0)
Indignation in the Foreign Office reached a fever-pitch.
Lord Lansdowne cabled back to Tower:
It is useless for you to waste your time in 
interviews with the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, or for me to waste mine in interviews 
with the Siamese Minister, if so little /pN
dependence is to be placed on their statements. '
Four days later ddlnite instructions came from the Foreign
Office ordering Tower to abandon the talks until it was clearly
recognised that officers of British nationality would be
C7)')appointed as Residents in Trengganu and K e l a n t a n . I n  the 
event, the King agreed, but the word "adviser" was to be used 
instead of "Resident". The Siamese wanted to avoid the use 
of the word which was a British term for the British officers
•n
in the protected states of Malaya. J
(1) F.O. 69/232, Lansdowne-Tower, May 19* 1902.
(2) F.O. 69/232, Lansdowne-Tower, May 19, 1902.
(3) F.O. 69/229, Record of Conversation between Tower and 
Prince Devawongse in Tower's letter to Lansdowne,
May 23, 1902.
(4) F.O. 69/229, Beckett's memorandum on Lansdowne's views,
June 18, 1902..
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That was in Iiay, 1902, and throughout the following
four months the battle dragged on over the concurrence of the
British Government in the selection and removal of the 
C'])Advisers. J
The delay worried the Whitehall officials. At the end
of May the Foreign Office received a telegram from Tower
intimating that the French Minister in Bangkok had sent a
note to the Siamese Government demanding the exclusion of
(o')
foreign rivals' capital from the Mekong Valley. J There 
were also fears lest Siam should throw herself into the arms 
of Germany. From 1891 onwards German influence in Siam had
4
been growing, more especially so with the construction and 
administrative control of the railways in the hands of Germa^i
(1) Rivett-Carnac wrote a letter to warn Paget that, " . . ..
There are certain things that the King will consent to, 
and certain things which ... he will never consent to ...
I feel sure that the King will never so far abdicate his 
rights in this respect as to leave the nomination entirely 
in the hands of the British Government or bind himself 
only to select men from a list prepared by the British 
Government." F.O. 69/229, Tower-Lansdowne, May 6, 1902.
(2) F.O. 69/229, Tower-Lansdowne, May 25, 1902.
(5) German interests in Siam originated in 1891 with the
appointment of Herr Bethge as Director-General of railways. 
Germans in Siam at the time numbered not more than fifty, 
and German commercial interests were represented by one 
firm of rice-millers and general importers. With the 
construction and administrative control of the railways 
in the hands of Germans, German interests grew apace.
From 1891 to 1909, the number of Germans swelled from 
50 to 200, due almost entirely to the ever-increasing 
German personnel employed on the railways.
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And in the commercial field, German shipping assumed the
pride of place previously held by England.
August approached. Prince Devawongse boldly announced
the reasons of the Siamese Government for not rushing into
the agreement. These reasons bore upon the future policy of
France in respect of Siam. Negotiations with a hope of
reaching a permanent settlement between Siam and France were
then being held in Paris. Thus, if the French Government
became aware that the Siamese Government had concluded a
separate agreement with the British Government regarding a
portion of Siamese territory, the effect might imperil the
(I')solution of so vital a question. '
Three days afterwards Lord Lansdowne presented an ulti­
matum to the Siamese Government demanding a reply before the
end of September. If nothing was settled by then, the British 
should regard themselves at liberty to withdraw the proposal 
and should look for a solution in another direction. They
would probably make an arrangement directly with the Malay
(2)Sultans. ' Such a contention was evidently indicated by an 
instruction to Swettenham to visit Kelantan and Trengganu in 
August, 1902.^^
(1) F.G. 4-22/56, Archer-Lansdowne, August 26, 1902.
(2) F.O. 69/226, Lansdowne-Archer, August 19, 1902.
(5) F.O. 4-22/56, Bertie's note on Archer-Lansdowne, August
26, 1902.
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The Siamese Government yielded to the demand. It sent
Phraya Si Sahadeb, the cleverest Siamese official, in
Swettenham1 s opinion, ' as a special envoy to London. But
a complete settlement was delayed as a result of Swettenham1s
unwanted presence in Kelantan and Trengganu. Phraya Si
protested strongly to Lord Lansdowne that Swettenhamfs act
constituted a breach of Article XII of the 1826 Treaty which
bound England not to "go and molest, attack or disturb" the
states of Kelantan and Trengganu "on any pretence whatever".
He complained:
To send the Governor of Singapore into the 
Siamese Malay States without consulting the 
z Siamese Government was an infringement of the
whole spirit., pinpoint an intention of the 
< Secret Treaty of 1897* How strange and in­
comprehensible it appeared that the present 
time should be selected for such an act as 
this. Cw
Then came a challenging reply from Sir Francis Bertie:
Western and Oriental ideas of time differed.
The Siamese Government might think that they 
were proceeding with due expedition, but we 
considered they were delaying so much that
we might force to do direct.(3)
(ZL)
On October 6, 1902, the Agreement was signed. ' The
(1) F.C. 69/237, Private, Swettenham-Lucas, July 10, 1902.
(2) F.O. 4-22/56, Phraya Si Sahadeb-Lansdowne, September 8, 1902.
(3) F.C. 4-22/56, Memorandum by Sir Frank Bertie, September
8, 1902.
(4-) F.O. 69/232, Lansdowne-Archer, October 7, 1902.
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British Government recognised the States of Kelantan and 
Trengganu as dependencies of Siam. The Sultans were prohibited 
from having any political relations with any foreign Powers 
except through the Government of Siam. The King of Siam had 
the right to nominate officers to be Advisers and Assistant 
Advisers in the States to act as his Representatives, but the 
Sultan was to pay their salaries. Whenever the gross annual 
revenue of the State exceeded 100,000 dollars, 10 per cent of 
that revenue should be paid to the King of Siam, and if the 
gross income fell below 100,000 dollars, the usual Bunga Mas 
should continue to be sent. The Siamese Government was 
forbidden to interfere with the internal administration of 
these States in any other way than as stated in the Agreement.
Immediately after the signature in London, Sir Prank 
Swettenham, with the copies of the Agreement, rushed to
Kelantan and Trengganu to obtain the signatures of both Sultans
(1)on the Agreement. ' Singlehanded, he persuaded the Sultan of 
Kelantan to sign the English and Malay versions of the Agreemeni
(1) 0.0. 273/287, Chamberlain-Swettenham, October 13, 1902. 
P.O. 69/239, Swettenham-Chamberlain, October 14-, 1902.
( 1 )but the Sultan of Trengganu refused. Swettenham then
carried off the copies to Singapore while continuing to
bombard the Sultan of Trengganu with private messages pressing
him to sign the Agreement. The stubborn Sultan remained on
his ground and sent two messengers to Bangkok to inquire the
(2)views of the Siamese Government. ' In May, 1903, the 
Siamese Court sent Phraya Kocha, the Siamese Commissioner in 
Kelantan, to explain the matter to the Sultan. The attempt 
was abortive. The Sultan ignored any kind of agreement which 
had been made behind his back. He flatly refused to sign and 
never did.
The action of Swettenham created a bad impression among 
the Siamese who had already expressed their opinion in London 
that the parties to the Agreement ought to sign together.
Thus they refused to sign the Agreement obtained by Swettenham. 
Instead Phraya Sukhum, Siamese High Commissioner of 
Nakornsitammarat, was sent to Kelantan. His visit resulted
(1) In his report to Chamberlain Swettenham relayed the
conversation which he had had with the two Sultans. The 
points raised by the Sultan and Chiefs of Kelantan were 
like this: Would the Adviser be a British officer?
Would they henceforth fly only the Kelantan flag? Was 
tne Sultan secure in his position, and would his des­
cendants succeed him as had always been the custom? 
Swettenham said 'yes' to all these questions.
The Sultan of Trengganu, on the other hand, totally denied 
his subordination to Siam and asked for the real reason 
behind this move of the British Government.
P.O. 422/56, Swettenham-Chamberlain, October 19 and 20,1902
(2) P.M., Copy 7838, Khun Nikornkanprakit's report to Prince 
Damrong, October 17, 1902. F.O. 422/56, Swettenham-
Chamberlain, November 19, 1902.
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in the signature of the Sultan in the other two versions, 
Siamese and Malay, of the Agreement. J The question was 
which copy of the Agreement should be accepted. After a long 
discussion the two copies were compared in Bangkok in January, 
19C3, in the presence of Ralph Paget, the new British Minister; 
H.W. Thompson, the Assistant Adviser to Kelantan; T.H. Lyle, 
the British Vice-Consul; W.A. Graham, the Adviser to Kelantan; 
Phraya Si, and Phraya Kocha. It appeared that the Malay texts 
were practically identical. However, the Swettenham version 
bore two signatures, those of the Sultan and the Raja Muda of 
Kelantan while the Siamese copy had only the Sultan’s seal, 
with the words "Rajah of Kelantan" below it. The Siamese
(2)explained that it was not the custom of the Sultan to sign. '
The English and Siamese versions sometimes differed and words
were omitted. Paget pressed the Siamese to sign the English
version but they raised various objections. In the end, the
question was settled by an exchange of notes explaining the
('I')differences which existed between the two versions. ' J
The selection of advisers posed another exhausting problem 
These questions evolved themselves into a complicated issue 
ov/ing chiefly to the Siamese distrust of Swettenham. The
(1) P.M., Copy 9652, Tel. Phraya Sukhum-Prince Damrong, 
November 21, 1902.
(2) P.O. 4-22/57 , Paget-Lansdowne, January 29, 1903.
(3) P.O. 4-22/57, Paget-Lansdowne, July 16, 1903.
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Agreement vested the Siamese Government with the right of 
appointing both Advisers and Assistant Advisers. Although 
these officials were to be Englishmen they were to be persons 
in the Siamese service or be favourably known to both Govern­
ments. However, there was a general understanding between the 
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office that they should speak 
Malay and should have administrative experience among the 
Malays. Therefore, when the Siamese Government proposed 
Mr. Scott, the Siamese Mining-Direct or, and Mr. Trotter, of 
the Siamese Police, as Adviser and Assistant Adviser to 
Kelantan the British Government rejected them on the grounds 
that none of these candidates fulfilled its requirements. ' 
Instead, Paget was instructed to propose Mr. D.G. Campbell, a
Secretary to the Resident in Selangor, as Adviser to
(2)
Kelantan. ' For more than ten weeks, although during that 
time the Siamese Government named several other candidates, 
the British Government endeavoured by representations both to 
the Government in Bangkok and to the Siamese Minister in 
London to induce the Siamese Government to accept Campbell.
The British asked the Siamese to give way inasmuch as they had 
helped them to obtain an acknowledgement of suzerainty from
(1) F.O. 422/56, Archer-Lansdowne, 31 October, 1902.
(2) The names of Adviser and Assistant Adviser in Trengganu 
should be left until the Sultan signed the Agreement. 
Campbell was recommended by Swettenham. He entered 
service of Selangor in 1883 and had acted as Resident of 
that State and of Negri Sembilan.
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Cl")the Sultan. J They suggested Swettenham1s visit to Bangkok
to insist on selecting Campbell since there was no one else
(2)in their favour 'and they even threatened to advise the 
Sultan not to recognise any Siamese official sent to him 
unless it was with the concurrence of Swettenham. This 
alarming tone could not soften Siamese resistance. Apart from 
Campbell being unknown to them the Siamese made it clear that 
they would never consent to appoint any of Swettenham*s men.
If Campbell was selected he would, naturally, take his orders 
from Singapore rather than from Bangkok and such an appoint­
ment would be regarded everywhere, and especially in France,
as equivalent to a British annexation of the Sultan*s 
('S')territory. ^' In the meantime rumours reached Bangkok that 
Campbell was about to leave for Singapore. There were fears 
in the Siamese Court circles lest the Straits Settlements
(1) F.O. 4-22/57, Paget-Lansdowne, January 9, 1903,
(2) NA, R5, File 1, No.60. Conversation between Phraya
Pipatkosa and Paget, January 15, 1903•
(3) NA, R5, File 1. Report on the interview between the 
Siamese Minister, Phraya Visuti Kosa and Sir Thomas 
Sanderson, February 3, 1903. In fact, Paget was consid­
erate in this matter. In his private letter to Campbell 
of the Foreign Office, he v/rote: 11... I felt from the 
very first that trying to force Campbell on the Siamese 
Government ... was scarcely justifiable. I wrote in 
this sense to Sir Frank Swettenham some time ago, but he 
seemed tothink it absolutely necessary to insist on 
Campbell and that if we did not do so the Agreement would 
prove a farce.”
cf. , F.O. 69/24-5, Private, Paget-Campbell, April 10, 1903.
Government secretly persuade the Sultan to accept Campbell.
The King ordered Phraya Sukhum to take steps to safeguard
(1)against Swettenham*s interference in Kelantan and Trengganu.
His Majesty lamented to Prince Devawongse that differences 
should arise over a small matter like the selection of 
Advisers. He wrote:
I am upset and perturbed. Small points are 
being magnified out0of all proportion as
happened in Burma.
The King comforted himself with his belief that Swettenham 
would not easily win the confidence of the Sultan of Kelantan. 
In his private letter to the Siamese Minister in Paris the
King expressed the view that:
We need not have worried because the Malays, 
like other nationalities, hate foreign inter­
ference. It is a big bluff when the British 
said that the Malays support them. In fact 
the Malays do not respect the British for 
they know full well how heavy-handed (literally) 
the British are. If the Malays seek British 
help it is because Great Britain is a great 
Power. The Malays adored Mr. Duff simply 
because they were supplied with ready cash.
But soon after they received the money, they 
wanted to cancel the concession.C3)
The King and Prince Devawongse took different views 
towards the selection. The Prince believed in the principle
(1) NA, R5, Pile 1, No.60, Tel. Phraya Si Sahadeb-Phraya
Sukhum, February 20, 1903.
(2) NA, R5, File 2, King Chulalongkorn-Prince Devawongse,
January 15, 1903.
(3) NA, R5, File 2, No.60, King Chulalongkorn-Phraya Suriya, 
March 17, 1903.
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of forcing a Siamese candidate upon the British Government,
But the King thought that it would be a matter of luck if
the Siamese could find a person favourable to the British.
But if they could not choose the right one they had better
inform the British straightaway. He said:
To give the States to the British without 
getting anything in return was fatal to the 
prestige of the nation. Be frank in case 
we cannot cope with the situation and give 
the British an opportunity with our eyes open. '
March wore on, and the Siamese had still resisted and
refused to yield. Reluctantly the British Government offered
a compromise by meeting the Siamese halfway. It agreed to
(O')
accept Graham, 'who was the latest Siamese nominee, as
Adviser to Kelantan provided that Thompson, a District officer
at Guantan, Pahang, recommended by Hugh Clifford, was appointed
as Assistant Adviser. Probably such a bargain was due to
the fact that the Foreign Office officials were tired of
Swettenham*s suggestion to select only his own subordinate.
Once Sir Francis Bertie remarked:
I cannot admit that no one is to be accepted /.x 
unless he is a nominee of Sir Frank Swettenham. '
(1) NA, R5, File 1, No.60, King Chulalongkorn-Prince 
Devawongse, January 19, 1903.
(2) Graham was then Assistant to the Ministry of Agriculture 
in Bangkok. Prior to this he had been in the Shan States 
and had been charged with the management of the Kachin 
tribes and acquitted himself very creditably. He was an 
expert in agriculture and spoke Siamese, Malay, Burmese, 
and Hindustani. F.O. 69/229, List of Englishmen in 
Siamese Employment, Tower-Lansdowne, May 26, 1902.
(3) F.O. 422/57, Lansdowne-Paget, March 2, 1903.
(4) F.O. 69/239, Bertie-Lansdowne, Private, December 10, 1902.
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The suggestion was adopted but the Siamese Government
asked Thompson to stay in Bangkok for a certain time on his
way to Kelantan, in order to become personally known to the
members of the Siamese Government and to learn in detail the
(1)duties he was expected to perform in his capacity. '
Graham took office in 1904 and various steps were then
(2)taken to develop social services in Kelantan. ' Subsequently, 
however, his appointment could not, from the Siamese viewpoint, 
be considered a success. Graham showed himself lacking in 
tact, patience, Judgement and breadth of thought, the chara­
cteristics most essential for the post. Since his arrival, 
there had been constant conflicts between him and the Duff 
Development Company who possessed many administrative rights, 
much influence with the Sultan, and had played a prominent
(1) NA, R5, File 1, No.60, Prince Devawongse-Phraya Visuti 
Kosa, March 3, 1903. In order to do the Sultan a favour 
Luang Thammarattutatorn, a Siamese agent in Kelantan, 
voiced His Highness1 opinion as to whether he wanted a 
Siamese or an Englishman as Adviser and whether he 
preferred an Englishman from the Siamese Government to 
the one from the Straits Settlements. In reply, the 
Sultan said he could not care less which nationality the 
man belonged to or from where the person came from so 
long as he was a good man. But if he was really given 
a chance to choose he would choose no one, as he wanted 
no adviser. Vide NA, R5, File 2, No. 60. Prince Damrong- 
Prince Sommot Amorapan, (The King's Secretary), March 24,
1903.
(2) FM, 331/5857, Si Sahadeb-Pipatkosa, August 19, 1904.
part in the affairs of the State. With the support of the 
British Government and the Sultan on Duff's side, Siamese 
prestige gradually disappeared. On the other hand there was 
a cry for British protection. The personal relations between 
Prince Damrong and the British officials in Bangkok also 
deteriorated as a result of verbal duals over the behaviour 
of Graham.^'1
The waning of Siamese influence in Kelantan and 
Trengganu came at a time that marked the waxing of British 
political influence in that area. In 1904 the northern Malay 
States fell within the British sphere of influence under the 
terms of the Anglo-French Entente of April 8, 1904. The
(1) In 1905, when Mr. W.R.D. Beckett, the British Consul, 
suggested the substitution of a more tactful and less 
antagonistic official for Graham, he met with a strong 
protest from Prince Damrong, who was always ready to 
shield Graham. The Prince said:
MIs it Graham's dismissal that you want? Very well,
I say that if Graham is dismissed, I will resign my 
office of Minister of the Interior."
And in a letter to the Sultan of Kelantan he wrote:
"I am surprised to hear of your disagreement with 
Graham. I have always been in close touch with the 
affairs of the State. Everything shows a marked 
improvement. Even the revenue increases. There seems 
to be no discontentedness. You did not explain clearly 
about your difference of opinion with Graham. Have 
you discussed it with Graham? Presently the King is 
away from Bangkok. You had better think carefully.
If there are disagreements as regards religion or 
customs which cannot be settled, then you and Graham 
should present the matter to His Majesty for consul­
tation. "
NA, R5, 45/197, Damrong-the Crown Prince, July 5, 1907, 
Damrong-the Sultan of Kelantan, July 3, 1903.
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Treaty stipulated that: >
France shall recognise the influence of 
Great Britain in the Siamese possessions 
on the west of the Basin of the Menam, 
including those in the Malay Peninsula 
and the adjacent islands; and that Great 
Britain shall, on the other hand, recognise 
the influence of France in the Siamese 
possessions on the east and south-east of 
f the Menam including adjacent
The Government of Siam became suspicious of British intentions.
9
Undoubtedly, the 1904- Entente Gordiale removed British fears 
of thirty years standing that a forward policy in the north 
of Malaya would lead France to grab Siam and exclude British
commerce.
Siam turned her intention to Kedah and Perlis, the two 
remaining Malay states where she possessed loose and undefined 
relations. Although in practice the Sultans had to refer 
important issues to Bangkok, they were at liberty to grant 
tentative concessions to persons of any nationality which 
would place Siam in an embarrassing situation should she sub­
sequently offer any objections. In 1904- the Siamese Govern­
ment viewed with disfavour the case of a German, Mr. Kaulfuss,
concession for a mining area near the Kedah-Rahman border.
(1) British and Foreign State Papers 1903-1904-, Vol. 97,
pp. 53-59.
(2) F.O. 4-22/58, Beckett-Lansdowne, October 29, 1904.
who was endeavouring to extract from the Sultan of Kedah a
|/ At this time an Italian, Mr. Cerruti, acting for Dutch and
I (n)German firms applied in vain for a similar concession. '
Late in 1904 the same Sultan refused to accept Mr. Heal, an
officer of the Mining Department, whom Prince Damrong proposed
(2)to send to report on the mining possibilities of the state. y 
The Siamese Government thus had no machinery by which to 
control the Sultans’ actions. These prevailing conditions 
could not long continue without leading to serious difficulty. 
Before England took advantage of -Shis situation the Siamese 
Government wished to appoint Advisers, with duties similar to 
those of the Kelantan Adviser, in Kedah and Perlis. The 
opportunity to do so came early in 1905 when the Sultan of 
Kedah approached the government in Bangkok for a loan.
Advisers in Kedah and Perlis, 1905 
For a decade Kedah had been in a state of mal-adminis- 
tration and financial chaos. This was due to the serious 
illness of the ruler, Abdul Hamid Halim Shah, his neglect of 
the affairs of state, and lavish expenditure of the royal 
income. The already bad financial situation became worse with 
the extravagant wedding celebrations of the Sultan’s five 
children which began in June, 1904, and continued for three
(1) G.G. 273/314-} Paget-Lucas, January 25, 1905.
(2) P.O. 422/53, Beckett-Lansdowne, October 29, 1904.
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months. The occasion ended in disaster for the State as the
(1)
cost of the whole celebration exceeded 125,000 dollars. y
When the Siamese Government sent her financial adviser, Mr.
W.F. Williamson, to Kedah to investigate the State’s finance
in March, 1905, the debt had risen from 700,000 to 2,800,000
(o')dollars in one year. ' The total debt of the State was
( 3)estimated at 2,785,304 dollars. In sheer desperation,
the Raja Mud a (the heir to the throne) proceeded to Bangkok
with a letter from the Sultan stating the critical financial
condition of Kedah and apparently asking for a loan of 2,000,000
(4)dollars and the appointment of an Adviser.
Siam nov; had solid reasons to strengthen her hold on 
Kedah. She informed the Raja Muda that the loan would be 
granted on the condition that Kedah accept the services of a 
Financial Adviser to reorganise the finances of the state and 
that in view of the Sultan’s ill-health the State Council of 
not more than five members, of whom the Financial Adviser 
would be one, should be established. The Council would be
(1) Syed Mohammad and M.G. Knowles, ’’The Three Million Dollars 
Wedding”, Malaya in History, IV, 2, (July, 1958),
pp. 10 et seq.
(2) F.C. 422/59, Paget-Lansdowne, Tel. March 14, 1905. The 
revenue of the State was about 800,000 dollars a year.
(3) Ibid. Williamson's Memorandum respecting Kedah's affairs, 
April 16, 1905*
(4) George W. Maxwell, The Annual Report of the British 
Adviser to the Kedah Government for the Year 1909-1910• 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1910), p. 9.
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responsible for the efficient administration of the State in
the Royal family agreed to the above proposal as shown in 
their addresses to Siam, though there were suspicions among 
the anti-Siamese in the Straits Settlements that they wrote 
under the dictation of Bangkok.
The British reaction to Siam’s proposed appointment of 
an Adviser to Kedah was one of dismay. From the very start, 
Mr. W.R.D. Beckett, the British Consul in Bangkok, was
instructed by the Foreign Office to do all he could to dis-
(2)courage such an idea.v J Kr. Barnes, Secretary for Chinese
Affairs in the Straits Settlements, hurriedly suggested to
Sir John Anderson, the Governor of the Straits Settlements,
to appoint an Adviser to the Sultan of Kedah and to advance
(S')a loan to the S t a t e . B u t  the loudest opposition came from 
the Governor himself. He made out that:
( 1 ')the face of the Sultan's indisposition. J The Raja Mud a and
I do not anticipate that any better results 
would accrue ... It would be as disastrous to
ah as to British interests
(1) F.C. 4-22/59, Paget-Lansdowne, March 31, 1905.
(2) F.O. 4-22/58, F.O.-C.O., December 27, 1904-.
(3) F.O. 4-22/59, Bernes' Memorandum, January 21, 1905. 
(4-) F.O. 4-22/59, Anderson-C.O. , November 30, 1904-.
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It was an attempt on the part of Siam to 
encroach on the independence of Kedah.
Though the administration might be lax 
and the court costly and extravagant, 
the people would prefer paying more for 
their Sultan and his Court . . .. )
However, the Foreign Office adopted a different vein.
It thought that it was impossible to oppose the proposal if
the Siamese Government insisted on sending an Adviser to
reside in Kedah. By this time the Siamese had shown their
courtesy by consulting the Foreign Office about the matter
(2)and expressed their readiness to accept an Indian official.v ' 
In Lord Lansdowne fs view, even if the appointment was exclusi­
vely Siamese, it was equally difficult to negative the scheme. 
Thus it was more advisable to take the advantage of the 
situation by asking for British consent to the appointment 
and removal of the Adviser. J
Still Sir John Anderson saw no reason to modify the views. 
He maintained that Kedah was well able to manage its own
( L \ . \
affairs and Siamese interference was unnecessary. x Paget,
who once said, "I am no such admirer of the Siamese and
their methods that I would wish to support them through thick
(1) F.C. 628/294, Paget-Lansdowne, January 25, 1905.
(2) F.O. 422/59, Paget-Lansdowne, Tel. March 28, 1905.
(5) F.O. 69/264, F.O. Memorandum on Paget's letter of
January 25, 1905.
(4) C.O. 273/511, Anderson-Lyttleton, February 16, 1905.
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and thin , was annoyed and complained:
The Siamese seem to me to have every 
argument on their side and I think we 
should cut a sorry figure if we put any 
difficulties in their way ..•
It is a great pity that Singapore and Siam should 
get on so badly, but the fact is that Singapore 
can never see any good in Siamese intentions 
and is ever ready to find fault with Siamese 
methods, officials and in fact everything 
Siamese.(1)
Anderson has, I fear, taken the Siamese fen 
grippe'. He can see no good in them and loses 
no opportunity of abusing them and thwarting 
them whenever possible. Sir Prank Swettenham 
was very much down on them as you know, but 
then Sir Prank Swettenham's attacks were mostly 
justified by facts, while Anderson's at times 
appear to be groundless.(2)
A matter of immediate concern was whether the British 
Government should insist on raising its disapproval of the 
appointment of an Adviser or it should give the Siamese Gov­
ernment a free hand in the arrangement. To prevent the appoin­
tment seemed unreasonable. Both the Foreign Office and the 
British Minister in Bangkok firmly believed that having 
abundantly recognised Kedah as a dependency of Siam and after 
insisting on the institution of the same system in Kelantan 
it was hard to justify opposition to Siam's spontaneous offer. 
Moreover, the Pinancial Adviser of the Siamese Government and 
the Director of the Department of Mines, after their
(1) P.O. 69/264, Private letter, Faget-Campbell, February 20, 
1905.
(2) P.O. 628/26/294, Private, Paget-Langley, February 7> 1905*
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investigations in the Malay States, confirmed that Kedah
found it necessary to secure the appointment of an Adviser
on Economy and the Sultan was willing to receive one. Finally
Sir John Anderson gave way but he imposed more conditions.
First, the Government of Kedah would be left in the hands of
the local authority; second, the Adviser would be removed
once the debt had been repaid, and third, the Adviser and his
Assistant would be of British nationality, appointed and
removed only by British consent. It was clear in the last
condition that the Colonial Office officials aimed at selecting
their man as an Adviser. They feared that the presence of a
British Adviser selected by the Siamese Government might lead
to constant jealousy and friction with officials of the Straits
d ' )Settlements as in the case of Graham in Kelantan.v J
By this time the Siamese were convinced that the Straits 
Settlements Government wished to encroach upon and absorb the 
Siamese Malay States. In the minds of the Siamese, their own 
resistance, which was woven into the Kelantan and Trengganu 
crisis, could not stop the appointment of a British Adviser 
there. Instead it had caused smouldering irritation with the 
British Government. Unmistakably, Kelantan in 1902 had been 
a dress-rehearsal for Kedah three years later. The Siamese, 
therefore, agreed to the first and second conditions but they
(1) F.C. 422/59, Lansdowne-Paget, Tel., June 17, 1905•
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decidedly deprecated the desire of the British Government
to control the selection of the Adviser by insisting that
the appointment had no political significance, and was merely
a business precaution adopted to secure the Siamese Government
Cl')against loss in mailing a loan. ' Prince Damrong thought that 
Siam, having required no other loan security from Kedah, was
solely dependent on the honesty and ability of the Adviser she
(2)sent. ' What she could do was to notify the British Legation
in Bangkok of all important steps contemplated. This should
be a sufficient safeguard for the British Government to have
an opportunity to intervene in case of the Adviser selected
being in the British view undesirable.
On June 16, 1905, the Siamese-Kedah loan Agreement for
2,600,000 dollars was signed. The only conditions imposed
were that Kedah should accept the advice of the Financial
Adviser to be appointed by Siam, and that the budget should be
communicated to Bangkok. None of the State revenues had been
( *)
mortgaged as security. 'J Paget commented:
The question of Kedah advisership will not 
give much more trouble. I cannot see why it 
would. It is so curious that the Colonial 
Office and Singapore do not realise that we 
put ourselves in a very false position and
(1) F.O. 69/269, F.O.-C.O., June 24, 1905.
(2) F.C. 422/59, Paget-Lansdowne, July 20, 1905.
(3) The Straits Times, August 19, 1910.
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lose dignity by raising opposition in these 
questions where we have not got right and 
justice on our side.(^)
Shortly after the signature of the Agreement, the Siamese
Financial Adviser proceeded to Kedah to pay the arrears of
salary to Government officials and to report on the general
(2)financial condition of the State. J He left Kedah in 
September. In the same month, fir. G.C. Hart, formerly of the 
Indian service, became Financial Adviser to Kedah. As stated 
in Article VT of the Agreement his duty was explicitly confined 
to 1 all matters relating to Finance”. However, in British 
eyes, the Adviser played a more important role than giving 
financial advice despite Prince Damrong's assurance of the
Siamese policy to interfere as little as possible with the
(existing regime in Kedah.
To counter-balance the increase of Siamese influence in 
Kedah, Britain urgently revived a proposal for the appointment
(/L)
of British Consular Officers to be stationed there. J Nov/
(1) F.O. 69/264, Private, Paget-Langley, July 18, 1905.
(2) C.O. 275/515, Paget-Lansdowne, June 21, 1905.
(5) F.C. 628/26/294, Private, Paget-Campbell, June 29, 1905*
(4) F.O. 422/59, Lansdowne-Paget, June 17, 1905, C.O.-F.O.
June 14, 1905. The idea of appointing officers with roving
commissions to watch and report on events in the Siamese
Malay States, to advise the Siamese in their dealings with
the Malays and to assist British enterprise was first
raised in 1886 when Satow, the British Minister in Bangkok,
suggested the appointment of British permanent Consuls to
Contd. overleaf
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with Siam consolidating her suzerain rights, Britain found 
it essential to establish a Consulate in Kedah to watch over 
British interests. Moreover, the State was well within her 
influence as defined in the Entente of 1904. Accordingly, 
on December 23, 1905, Mr. Meadows Frost, who had been in the 
Federated Malay States service since 1898, was appointed
Contd. from overleaf
resile in Puket on the west coast and in Songkhla on the 
east coast. Though Sir Frederick Weld, the Governor of the 
Straits Settlements, was in favour, the idea was not put into 
practice because the situation in the Siamese Malay States 
was not pressing. In 1892, the duty of the British Resident 
Councillor in Penang was extended to cover the western Malay 
States but there was still no Consul for the eastern coast 
because: ’’the Siamese and Malay provinces on the east coast 
of the Peninsula should, I (Satow) think, remain part of 
the district of His Majesty's Consul at Bangkok, as they 
lie within easy reach of this place.” In 1901 the scheme 
of a permanent Consul was revived by Swettenham who thought 
that as the Resident Councillor in Penang had not sufficient 
time to devote to the duty it was desirable to appoint a 
Consular officer for Kedah. Anyhow, he strongly opposed the 
Consular appointment in Songkhla lest it would lead to 
similar appointment by other Powers. Unfortunately, when 
the suggestion reached the Colonial Office in the end of 1901, 
the question of Kelantan and Trengganu intervened and put a 
stop to the discussion.
After the Agreement of 1902 had been concluded, the 
discussion of the Consular arrangement was re-opened when 
Paget, the British Minister, urged the desirability of 
creating Consulates in Kedah and Songkhla. Again, when the 
Colonial Office, the Foreign Office and the Straits Settle­
ments Government were exchanging their views, there was a 
rumour concerning the Siamese proposal to put in an Adviser 
in Kedah. The British Government thus quickly abandoned the 
plan in order not to encourage the Adviser scheme.
As collected from, C.O. 275/277, Stubbs' report, October 8, 
1901, and F.O. 69/248, Paget-Lansdowne, August 12, 1903,
and September 19, 1903.
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British Consul in Kedah with the following instructions:
You v;ill be subordinate to His Majesty's 
Minister at Bangkok but you will send copies 
of your despatches to him and the High 
Commissioner of the Federated Malay States, 
with whom you will correspond direct on 
local questions affecting the Straits Settle­
ments and the Federated Malay States.
The Kedah Consular jurisdiction included Perils, Setul,
Trang, Puket and Tongkah.
In 1905, Perlis accepted a similar agreement with Siam. 
The amount of debt which the country had contracted together 
with the emptiness of the Public Treasury forced the Sultan 
of Perlis to apply to the Siamese for a loan and for a 
European Adviser to aid him in putting the finances in order. 
Mr. Duke, who had formerly been in the British Shan States 
service, was appointed from Bangkok as an adviser to the 
Sultan.^ ^ ^
In analysing the overall negotiations regarding the 
Siamese Malay States, the appointment of Advisers, though they 
were men in the Siamese service, marked the Siamese acceptance 
of the limits of their own control over this area. The 
Siamese had to allow for a considerable degree of British 
influence. At that time British influence in other parts of 
the Malay Peninsula was at its height. The Siamese Government
(1) Meadows Frost, The Annual Report of the British Adviser 
to the Perlis Government for the year l909-1910.
(Kuala Lumpur , 1910), p . 1~.
realised that the time would soon come for these Siamese 
Malay States to join the British Empire. Thompson, an 
Assistant-Adviser in Kelantan, favoured Britain, while the 
British Consul in Kedah strongly protected British interests 
in that State and also in Perlis. Though no Adviser was 
appointed in Trengganu, the Sultan was a man of strong char­
acter who yielded not an inch to Siamese control. Hence 
Siamese power in this part of Malaya was coming to an end.
While the Siamese and British Governments were engaged 
in the affairs of the Malay States, the problem of extra­
territoriality was not overlooked. By 1900 the result of 
Siam’s attempts to put an end to the judicial privileges of 
foreign subjects was still unsatisfactory. The only Power 
that had made some concessions was England. By the Chiengma 
Treaty of 1883 she had agreed to submit her subjects in the 
north to Siamese jurisdiction. y And by the 1899 Agreement 
an arrangement had been made for the registration of British
(1) The chief towns concerned were Chiengmai, Lampoon,
Thurn, Phre, Nan and Utaradit, which, according to the 
Siamese administrative system, fell within the Circle 
(Monthon) of Payab; Fichai, Sawankalok and Sukotai 
within Monthon Fitsanulok, and Rahang within Monthon 
Nakonsawan.
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subjects throughout Siam. J Nonetheless, major difficulties 
over extraterritoriality remained. The Treaty of 1883 was 
not only confined to the northern provinces but also gave
unchallengeable rights to the British Consuls to transfer the 
cases to their own courts. The 1899 Agreement, though it 
appeared promising in theory, created complex problems in 
practice because it was not easy to decide the nationality 
of individuals when Siam's population included so many Asians. 
So the Siamese Government moved on with its plan to free 
itself from judicial ties. The new movement, which was con­
centrated in the northern ares, was to withdraw the right 
of transfer of the Consul in order to give the Siamese Court 
complete judicial power over all British subjects.
Negotiations regarding the Revision of the 
Chiengmai Treaty of 1883, 1902-1905.
The changed situation in the north in the 1890's was 
one of the factors which caused Siam to give attention to 
strengthening her judicial power. It should be noted that 
the Government of Siam began to take steps to consolidate its 
hold over, and to centralise its administration in, the north
(1) This Agreement laid down the classes of persons entitled 
to registration as British subjects, and the procedure 
to be followed in case of a question arising as to the 
right of an individual to hold a British certificate.
See Appendix III.
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from the 1890’s onwards. Prior to this the King of Siam
had lacked any real authority in this area. The chief reason
for the change arose from the seizure by France in 1895 of
all territory lying to the east of the Mekong, and notably the
occupation by the French of Luang Prabang, which aroused fear
of further aggression and encroachment on Siam’s northern and
eastern frontiers. In 1896 the Siamese Government, with the
assistance of a Forestry officer from Burma, introduced
(1)measures to preserve the teak forests of the north. ' This 
move proved of the greatest assistance in extending Siamese 
influence. In a few years control of all forests and forest 
concerns slipped out of the hands of local owners and chiefs
and they were brought under the direction of the Bangkok
(2)Government. '
In addition, Siamese officials were gradually being
(1) Mr. Herbert Slade was recommended by the Government of 
India to the Siamese authorities as a man thoroughly 
fitted by long experience to take the post of Conservator 
of Forests. F.O. 69/211, Private, Verney-Bertie, March 
18, 1900.
(2) Forest operation in the north prior to the operation of 
the Treaties of 1874- and 1885 was conducted in two ways.
In the western states, Chiengmai, Lampang and Lampoon, 
leases of forests were granted by the Chows or hereditary 
princes, while in the eastern states, Phre and Nan, where 
it was not the general custom to grant leases, purchases 
either of isolated parcels of logs, or of outturn for a 
period, were made direct from Chows or from persons 
holding permits from them. British subjects had dealt in 
timber before 1874-, being covered by the general provision 
for free commerce contained in Article V of the Treaty of 
1826 and Article VIII of 1855* 6ne important British 
firm in Bangkok, the Borneo Company, had worked forests
in Chiengmai as far back as 1864-. F.O. 69/212, Memorandum 
on Bombay-Burmah Trading Corporation Limited - and the 
biamese Government.
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appointed to the more influential posts in all the chief towns.
The Treasury was reorganised by a European official from
Bangkok and attempts were made to transmit the taxes to Bangkok
instead of allowing the local authorities to pocket most of
(1 ")the revenue themselves. ' The local courts at Chiengmai and 
Lampang were also taken over by the Ministry of Justice at 
Bangkok and the Chows who formerly exercised both executive 
and judicial functions were replaced in their judicial res­
ponsibilities by Siamese judges. The system of local govern­
ment was altered to correspond with that of Bangkok. The 
Siamese High Commissioner endeavoured to work through the 
Chows as much as possible. The Chows resisted all these 
encroachments on their ancient privileges with a kind of 
passive animosity, but always yielded to a little pressure.
The transfer of the control of the teak forests, of course, 
stripped them at one blow of much of their power and prestige. 
Though they still received a fair share of the royalty on 
timber, they much preferred the old method of bribery and 
corruption.
Up to the time (1898-1902) when the administration and 
forests were taken over by the Siamese central authorities, 
the British community in the north, comprising Burmese and 
Shans, employed permanently in teak operations and engaged in 
the transit trade, had little cause to complain of their
(1) E.O. 69/208, Black-Stringer, May 1, 1900.
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position. Subsequently, however, they began to feel the 
effects of forest restrictions and Siamese "reforms", 
especially the measures taken by Siamese officials to prevent 
the acquisition of land by foreign settlers. These measures 
were made necessary by the desire of British subjects (mostly 
Asians) to hold land outside the limits set by the Anglo- 
Siamese Treaty of 1855 which allowed foreigners to hold land
only within the limit of 24 hours' journey by boat from
(1)Bangkok. J This discontent found expression in July and
(2 )August, 1902, in a movement known as "the Shan rising". '
The trial of the Shan Rising case, which involved mainly 
British Asian subjects, presented a difficult task, due 
chiefly to the right of the Consul to transfer the cases to 
his own court. The situation prompted Prince Devawongse to 
propose to Archer, the British Consul in Bangkok, to strike 
out the clause in the Chiengmai Treaty of 1885, by which the
(1) P.O. 69/250, Langley's Memorandum, February 4, 1903*
(2) A small band of Shans attacked Phre, and massacred some 
twenty Siamese officials stationed there. A few days 
later a similar raid was made upon Lampang and, though 
it was repulsed, the Siamese troops fled to Chiengmai.
For the time being, administration and government were 
•completely suspended, and the Lao contributed to the
general confusion by murdering all Siamese officials to 
be found in the outlying districts. Vide F.O. 628/21/279, 
628/21/280, "The Shan Rising in July", August, 1902.
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British Consul had power to remove cases to his own court ' 
in return for a clause giving to British subjects the right
to hold landed property in the territory covered by the Treaty
(2)of 1885.'' British Asian subjects would be deprived of the 
rights of extraterritoriality still remaining to them, and the 
Siamese would have full interests of limited jurisdiction.
The main reasons advanced in favour of this surrender were, 
firstly, that during its existence the provisions of the clause 
had seldom been involved and, secondly, its surrender was a 
small matter, and might be offered as a 'quid pro quo1 for the 
right to hold land, since appeal to Bangkok still afforded a 
safeguard against ultimate injustice and acted as a check on
O )  Article VIII of the 1885 Treaty contained two provisions 
affecting British subjects, who, under the terms of this 
treaty came within the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Chiengmai. The first of these provisions gave 
the British Consul or Vice-Consul the power pending a 
trial in which a British subject was defendant or accused, 
or in which both parties were British subjects, to 
transfer the case, at any time before judgement, to the 
Consular Court. The second of these provisions enabled 
the Consul or Vice-Consul to require that any British 
subject, undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, should be 
removed to the Consular prison, there to complete the 
remainder of his sentence. See also Chapter I.
(2) F.O. 69/256, Prince Damrong-Lansdowne, June 6, 1904.
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C ' ] )Siamese Judges.
Unfortunately, early in 1903, when the subject of the 
revision of the 1883 Treaty caught the attention of the 
British authorities, two petitions signed by some 700 
British Burmese and Shan subjects in the north reached Bangkok, 
pressing complaints against the shortcomings of the 1883 
Treaty and urging the British Government to resume full 
consular jurisdiction. The main criticism contained in the 
petition was that the terms of the 1883 Treaty, more especially 
Articles VIII and IX which compelled British subjects to refer 
their disputes to the arbitration of a Siamese Judge and 
Siamese law, were not suitable to the conditions. The lan­
guage of the International Court, like the law it was supposed 
to interpret, was Siamese. Both language and law were 
generally inadequate to cover disputes involving intricate 
accounts of western commercial transactions. The court did 
not provide an English interpreter, in spite of the large
(1) This subject was first brought forward by Greville, then 
British Minister in Bangkok, in 1898, with ^ Sesuggestion 
that the restriction on the holding of land by British 
subjects be withdrawn throughout Siam in return for the 
abolition of the Land Tax Schedules of the Treaty of 1856. 
But a year later he reported to Lord Salisbury the 
Siamese objections to such a withdrawal. The Agreement 
abolishing the Land Tax Schedules was eventually signed
in 1899 but it did not include any reference to the 
subject of the tenure of land by British subjects.
B.C. 69/208, Greville-Lansdowne, December 21, 1899-
(2) B.C. 628/305, Stringer-Grey, July 24, 1906.
sums received from British subjects for Court The
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leniency of British Consuls in not availing themselves more 
often of the removal clause was criticised. The opportunity 
frequently arose for the Consul to exercise his right to 
withdraw cases and try them in the Consular Court according 
to English law, but this right was rarely exercised. Moreover 
the number of British subjects and their interests in Northern 
Siam had so greatly increased that a Treaty which was at its 
best a make-shift in 1883, had by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, become an intolerable burden. (1) Naturally, 
the British subjects chafed at being under Siamese jurisdiction 
especially when such a severe differentiation as that imposed 
by Article VIII was made between British subjects in the north 
and those in the south of Siam. In Bangkok the presence of 
European advisers and European officials constituted a whole­
some check on the vagaries of Siamese officialdom. In
Chiengmai there was not a single European adviser and only one
(2)or two European officials in minor positions. J
The British officers in Bangkok found themselves on the 
horns of a dilemma. They had to choose between abolishing the
(1) B.C. 69/246, The humble petitions of the British subjects 
in Northern Siam, Inclosure 2 in Paget's letter to
Lansdowne, December 17, 1903*
(2) C.O. 273/314, Stringer's Report on the Working of the 
International Court at Chiengmai for the year ended 
June 30, 1904.
?
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International Court system altogether or surrendering the 
removal clause. The first alternative seemed hardly fair and 
probably impolitic. The abandonment of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction was a graceful concession which the Siamese 
Government would appreciate. The latter was doubtless most 
anxious to retain the rights granted by the Treaty of 188$.
M s The mere suggestion of its abrogation would meet with ill-will
and obstruction from Siam. Thus they were left with the
second alternative and this gave rise to two questions; 
firstly, how far and in what respects would the bargain be 
advantageous to British subjects? And secondly, to what extent 
would the proposal find favour with the British subjects?
Differences of opinion concerning the issue arose among 
British negotiators. Archer all along favoured the idea of 
surrendering the removal clause, since during some eighteen 
months of International Court jurisdiction the Consul had
found it necessary to exercise the right to withdraw cases on
( ' I )three occasions only. ' The acquisition of residential 
rights, on the other hand, had been one of the fondly-cherished
(1) B.C. 628/21/274, Beckett's Memorandum on the Chiengmai 
International Court system, February 11, 1902.
F.O. 628/22/278, Stringer's Memorandum on the suggested 
alternative in the Chiengmai Treaty, August 26, 1902.
C.O. 273/314, Report on the Working of the International 
Court at Chiengmai for the year ended June 30, 1904.
F.O. 69/168, Report by Vice-Consul Archer on the 
International Court at Chiengmai, July 25, 1895- 
F.O. 69/231, Beckett-Archer, October 5, 1902.
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hopes of British subjects. Although in practice the Siamese
Government did not exercise strict control of the British
subjects regarding landed property, and though a large number
of British subjects permanently settled in the north, the
Siamese Government refused to admit their ownership in any
(1)formal or judicial proceeding. '
Beckett, then the Consul in Chiengmai, was concerned as 
to the inadequacy of the 'quid pro quo'. In his view, the 
right of withdrawal of cases exercised a most salutary influ­
ence over the Siamese judges. Its non-operation would render 
the relations between the latter and the British Consul
difficult while "adding very considerably to the prestige of
(2)Siam in the eyes of other nations."v ' In return for the 
deletion of this clause, some general redrafting of the Treaty 
ought to be feasible to render it more applicable to the 
conditions. He proposed, firstly, that British subjects 
should obtain their title-deeds, not through the British 
Consul as provided in Article IV of the 1855 Treaty, but 
directly from the local authorities, and that in any event 
the application should be disposed of without reference to 
Bangkok. Secondly, the Judge of the International Court, 
whilst formally presiding over the Court, should, both as
(1) F.O. 628/278, Archer-Lansdowne, August 23, 1902
(2) F.O. 69/231, Beckett-Archer, October 5, 1902.
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regards the actual administration of justice and the varied
duties connected with the Registrar's Department of the
Court, be controlled and advised by a British Adviser with a
CDlegal training, approved by the British Government.v '
Paget demanded even more. He thought that the bargain 
to strike out the removal clause was one-sided. Its likely 
effects might be a greater laxity in the proceedings of the 
International Court, a large increase in the number of Appeals 
to Bangkok, more frequent disagreement between the British and 
Siamese authorities regarding cases on Appeal, a more frequent 
necessity for the arbitrary exercise of the right of final 
decision, and great discontent among British subjects in the 
north of Siam, to whom the question of jurisdiction was of far 
greater importance than a public acknowledgement of their 
right to hold land. Moreover, once it was admitted that 
British subjects in the north were liable to the jurisdiction 
of a Siamese Court, uncontrolled except by appeal to the 
British and Siamese authorities in Bangkok, it would not be 
easy to refuse, with any semblance of logic, if a request were
made to bring all British subjects all over Siam under Siamese
(2)Courts. ' As he put it:
(1) F.O. 69/231, Beckett-Archer, October 5, 1902.
(2) F.O. 69/246, Paget-Lansdowne, December 17, 1903
*
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The Siamese would look upon this negotiation 
as the thin end of the wedge towards putting 
forward a request later for the total abolition 
of our jurisdiction in Siam.(^)
Thus, more stringent conditions should be required to
close the bargain. In addition to Beckett's demand for the
presence of an Adviser at the International Court, he asked
that this Adviser should be British, selected and approved by
the British Consulate with the power of control over the
court. No proceedings against a British subject should be
(2)held without his presence.v '
In view of these divided opinions Paget reported the 
matter to the Foreign Office asking for a guidance on the 
detailed scheme. Unfortunately Whitehall provided no cut- 
and-dried principles on the issue. In reply Paget was simply 
instructed to enter into negotiations concerning an agreement 
modifying the Treaty of 1883. There were no specific inst- 
ructions as to the policy.
During some two years between 1903 and 1904, spasmodic 
negotiations took place in Bangkok. One proposal or another 
was discussed, but without success. The situation which 
arose was briefly as follows: the Siamese Government consi­
dered the 1883 Treaty out of date and required a completely
(1) F.O. 69/246, Paget-Langley, Private, August 4, 1903.
(2) F.C. 69/246, Paget-Lansdowne, December 17, 1903.
(3) F.O. 69/244, Lansdowne-Paget, February 27, 1903.
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revised version instead of a supplementary Agreement, while
(1)Paget was not authorised to make such a revision.v '
In April, 1904, however, these negotiations were aban­
doned since the Foreign Office, after further consultations 
with the India Office, came to the conclusion that there would
be danger in surrendering the safeguard furnished by the
(o')
"removal clause". ' The fquid pro quo' offered by the 
Siamese Government, which consisted merely of the right to 
hold land, was meagre as compared with the important con­
cession she wanted from England. The Foreign Office, the 
India Office and the Colonial Office all agreed that in
(1) F.O. 69/246, Paget-Lansdowne, August 4, 1903.
(2) F.O. 422/58, Lansdowne-Paget, April 12, 1904. There were
two events leading to this caution. First, the Nai Som 
case, and second, the newly signed Franco-Siamese Treaty 
of 1904. In 1902, there was a complaint concerning the 
unjust proceedings in the International Court against a 
Mr. Som, an employee of the Borneo Company Limited. There 
was a difference of opinion between the British Consul and 
the Judge. The Consul had not removed the case to his 
own Court on the understanding that pending appeal the 
accused should be allowed freedom and the judgement should 
be suspended. On the other hand, the Judge insisted that 
should he refuse to agree the Consul was powerless to 
prevent the judgement being put into effect. This case 
excited much local feeling. It was an example of the 
grievous wrong that might have been done to a British 
subject had the removal clause been withdrawn. The Franco-
Siamese Treaty of 1904 contained an Article by which
French subjects were placed, in regard to jurisdiction,
in an almost identical position to that of British 
subjects. Thus, British subjects would have cause for 
complaint if, at the very moment when a new Treaty was 
concluded with France, the right to remove cases into the 
British Consular Court were surrendered.
Vide F.O. 69/253, Lansdowne-Paget, April 28, 1904.
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general British subjects in the north of Siam would far
rather forgo the privilege of holding land than forgo the
protection afforded them by the removal clause and the appeal
(1")to their own authorities in Bangkok. ' As matters then
stood, British subjects, with the changed conditions and
commercial development of some forty years after the Treaty
of 1855, had spread far beyond the original limits assigned
by Treaty and enjoyed with the tacit approval of the Siamese
Government residential rights free from almost all restriction.
Though the Siamese Government did not officially recognise
the title of foreigners to their land, the fact remained that
land was acquired and houses were built and rented, and resi-
(2)dential rights freely exercised by British subjects. '
However, at the end of 1904- the India Office changed its
ideas again. It was still anxious for the abolition of the
restrictions with regard to holding land and suggested to the 
Foreign Office that if it was impossible to substantiate a 
claim under the most-favoured-nation Article of the 1855 
Treaty, it would be better to demand a general revision, not 
only of the Agreement of 1883, but also of that of 1856, with 
a view to getting rid of the objectionable provisions with 
regard to the holding of land by British subjects.
(1) C.O. 273/315, 0.0. Minutes, October 27, 1905.
(2) F.O. 69/255, Beckett-Lansdowne, November 17, 1904-.
(3) F.O. 4-22/58, Lansdowne-Paget, April 12, 1904-.
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Accordingly, Beckett, who was in charge of the British 
Consulate during Pagetfs annual leave, was instructed to 
sound out the Siamese Government unofficially.
The time coincided with the arrival of Mr. Edward 
Strobel, an American who was appointed General Adviser to the 
Siamese Government. Beckett clearly looked to the newcomer, 
instead of to Prince Bevawongse, for consultation. The Prince, 
the author of the original proposal, seemed likely to feel 
considerable personal pique at the rejection of his proposal. 
Naturally, he would view any further negotiations in an un­
favourable light. The only course open in dealing with the 
Prince was to demand the tenure of land by British subjects 
as a right under the most-favoured-nation clause and also by 
prescription. This would irritate the Government of Siam and
tend to create "the loss of face" which was the dread of the
(1)Siamese. J But Beckett’s estimation of Strobel was unfor­
tunate. The talks between the two in no way facilitated a 
solution of the difficulty. In fact, the new General Adviser 
was quick to avail himself of various arguments in the
(1) F.O. 69/255, Beckett-Lansdowne, November 17, 1904-.
(A )
furtherance of Siamese aims. '
After various talks with Strobel, Beckett informed Lord 
Lansdowne that negotiations could be opened if the British 
Government was willing to withdraw the operation of the 
removal clause of Article VIII of the 1883 Treaty in respect 
of all actions arising in connection with the land for which 
the British subjects would obtain the right of possession, and 
if British European subjects were excluded from the sphere of 
the International Court except in the land cases. Strobel
A
stressed that the Siamese Government had no wish to assert
jurisdiction over Europeans. Its only object was to secure 
the submission of British Asian subjects to the Siamese 
Courts because extraterritoriality originated from difference 
in race, customs and religion, and existed because social and 
legal conditions in Siam were incompatible with European ideas 
and customs. Extraterritoriality should not, therefore,
(1) C.O. 273/515, Paget-Lansdowne, September 22, 1905•
Beckett, during many discussions with Strobel, tried to 
claim residential rights for British subjects in the north 
under the most-favoured-nation clause of the 1855 Treaty. 
But Strobel candidly pointed out that, though the Siamese 
Government did not enforce the provisions of that clause 
as stringently as they might do, there was no ground for 
maintaining that those provisions had lapsed. What was 
allowed as a concession to foreigners could hardly be 
claimed as a right. If such claims were made it would be 
his duty to advise the Siamese Government to contest 
them strongly, and to enforce their Treaty rights more 
strictly in future in order to induce the foreign Powers 
to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards proposals 
for the abolition of extraterritoriality. Vide P.O. 
69/255, Beckett-Lansdowne, November 17, 1904.
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rightly be applicable in Siam to Asians, to whom it would be
(1)no hardship to be under Siamese jurisdiction. '
The officials at Whitehall strongly objected to the
distinction between British and Asian subjects. Davidson
of the Foreign Office remarked:
It is a very great mistake at this period of 
the world*s civilisation and at this point 
of our own imperial development to create, 
or assent to the creation of, fresh artificial 
discriminations based on race or colour ... 
of Her ha je sty's subjects, (m
The India Office also pointed to grave constitutional objec­
tions. In fact such formal discrimination was not an absolute 
necessity because in practice if a white man were brought 
before the International Court in a criminal case the Consul
would at once exercise his power of removal, and in civil
(3)cases he would normally take the same course. ' J
The Foreign Office then dropped the question of racial 
discrimination. In hay, 1905, Paget was instructed to propose 
to the Siamese Government that in return for the abolition in 
the Chiengmai Consular district of the restriction imposed
(1) F.O. 69/255, Beckett-Lansdowne, November 17, 1904.
(2) F.O. 69/255, Davidson's Memorandum on Beckett's letter,
November 17, 1904.
(3) F.O. 69/255, F.O. Note on Beckett's letter of November 
17, 1904. F.O. 69/269, I.C.-F.O., hay 3, 1905.
F.O. 69/265, F.O. Note on Paget's letter of September 
22, 1905.
1 3 8
upon British subjects in Siam in regard to the tenure of land,
the operation of the removal clause of Article VIII of the
Treaty of 1883 should be withdrawn with respect to all actions
(1)arising in connection with titles to land. '
It was not until October, 1905? that discussions started.
All along, Strobel, who conducted the policy of the Siamese
Government and who seemed at first to view the proposition
favourably, as Beckett reported to Lansdowne, in no way
committed himself to a compromise. He laid great stress upon
the fact that the British proposal did not give the Siamese
(2 )anything approaching what they wanted. ' His chief aim was 
that all British Asian subjects should be subject to the 
Siamese tribunals in all cases and not only in land cases. 
Legally speaking, the Siamese law should govern actions con­
cerning all land throughout the whole of Siam. The British 
concession, therefore, did not give any 1 quid pro quo' to 
Siam in return for the concession to British subjects of the 
right to hold land. The British Government offered to 
strengthen Siamese Jurisdiction over land by renouncing the
F.O. 69/263, Lansdowne-Paget, May 18, 1905.
(2) P.O. 69/265, P.O. Memorandum on Paget's letter to 
Lansdowne, September 22, 1905.
(3) About this time Strobel opened discussions on the subject 
of land with M. Boisonnas, the French Charge d'Affaires, 
and informed the latter of his discussions with Beckett. 
Boisonnas once came to see Beckett to inquire as to 
Beckett's views on the subject. Vide P.O. 69/255, 
Beckett-Lansdowne, November 17, 1904.
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removal clause in land cases, but the Siamese Government 
believed that they had already sufficient jurisdiction over 
land. If British subjects were to hold land they wanted 
jurisdiction over them in person. The occupant of the land, 
whether a Siamese or a British Asian subject should be placed 
upon precisely the same footing. Strobel pointed out that 
neither he nor the Siamese Government discriminated between 
white and coloured British subjects but that such an arrange­
ment was the true principle on which extraterritoriality was
(A )
based. ' The Siamese Government would give way on the land
question only if it received a 1 quid pro quo1 in the form of
(2an extension of Siamese jurisdiction over Asian foreigners.
To quote Strobel's argument:
The results of extraterritoriality produce 
problems which are difficult enough even 
when the foreign population is a fluctuating 
and transitory one; but those difficulties 
would be immensely increased if the foreign 
subjects became permanently attached to the 
soil. If they could buy land and settle on 
it there would be a large population within 
the State, but not of the State.(5)
(1) C.G. 273/315, Paget-Lansdowne, September 22, 1905*
(2) P.O. 371/133, P.O. Memorandum, July 24-, 1906.
(3) C.G. 273/315. Memorandum on Extraterritoriality in Siam 
by Strobel, September 11, 1905- This statement rested on 
one of two hypotheses; either Strobel did not recognise 
the title of foreigners to their land, or he was ignorant 
of the fact that many foreign subjects were then holding 
land in the north of Siam. In his private conversation 
with Beckett in November 1904, he clearly showed that he 
could not grasp the exact situation in that area. To
Contd. overleaf
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Subsequent talks between Strobel and Paget did not help 
to achieve a better understanding. Strobel's persistence was 
not weakened by other possible bargains suggested by Paget, 
such as the passing of a regulation concerning the compulsory 
sale of land by British subjects if it was required for public 
purposes, the imposition of certain taxes upon British subjects 
to put them on an equal footing with Siamese subjects, or an
(A)
extension of the International Court system.v ; The Siamese 
Government preferred to stand by its former suggestion that 
British Asian subjects should be placed under Siamese juris­
diction. The point was whether the British Government would 
agree to such submission, or, failing that, agree to a geo­
graphical distinction, and enter upon some arrangement whereby 
certain classes of Asians who visited Siam more than others, 
such as Indians, Burmese, Shans and natives of the Straits 
Settlements, would have the right to hold land, and would be
Contd. from overleaf
quote Beckett's report on the talk: "I therefore asked 
Mr. Strobel why it was that the Government (Siamese) ... 
had for several years past allowed the East Asiatic Company 
(Limited), a Danish firm, to hold leases and work forests 
in the Phre district, thus placing the subjects of a Power 
which had no Treaty rights in the north on an equality with 
British subjects. Mr. Strobel expressed the greatest 
astonishment at hearing that Danish subjects enjoyed such 
privileges, which, if it were really the case, was mani­
festly improper. He said he would at once inquire of 
Phraya Si Sahadeb, the Vice-Minister of the Interior, who 
happened to be in the next room at the time ...."
P.O. 69/255, Beckett-Lansdowne, November 17, 1904.
(1) C.O. 273/315, Memorandum on Extraterritoriality in Siam 
by Strobel, September 11, 1905.
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subject to the Siamese Courts alone. Other Asians who wanted 
to acquire land would have to be included within this class 
which would make them subject to Siamese jurisdiction. In the
case of white British subjects special arrangements might be
( '1')made in each individual case. ' But the British Government
considered this idea to be an accentuated form of discriminatioi
between white and British Asian subjects.
By the end of 1905 Paget became disheartened. He proposed
to the Foreign Office that they let the matter drop. In a
private note to Langley Paget wrote:
We shall have to offer a good deal more 
than we have done hitherto if we really 
wish to obtain the right^ for British 
subjects to hold land.(2)
Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, agreed. Hence 
the question was dropped until a favourable opportunity arose 
for pushing further claims.
Taking into consideration the complex process of these 
negotiations it is clearly noticeable that the two parties 
were equally matched. The British, believing that the Siamese 
Government desperately needed the abolition of extraterrit­
oriality, tried to strike the best bargain. The Siamese
(1) G.O. 273/515, Paget-Lansdowne, October 27, 1905*
(2) F.O. 69/265, Paget-Langley, Private, October 2, 1905.
(3) F.O. 371/131, Paget-Grey, January 12, 1906.
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Government, on the other hand, looked upon the restriction 
against foreigners holding land as the last trump-card she 
had in hand to obtain a mitigation or abolition of extra­
territoriality. Were this card easily given up, it would 
be tantamount to surrendering all hopes. Not surprisingly, 
the negotiations ended in failure.
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CHAPTER III
THE MALAY PENINSULA RAILWAY 
and
THE FRANCO-SIAMESE TREATY OP 1907
By the end of 1905 all Anglo-Siamese negotiations had 
reached a deadlock. These negotiations, centring on extra­
territoriality, had started as early as 1902, and as they 
proceeded, embraced within their scope a large number of 
matters demanding attention, until at the beginning of 1906, 
they had resolved themselves into two main divisions; first, 
a modification of extraterritorial jurisdiction so as to 
include both Europeans and Asians, and secondly, a re­
adjustment of political relations in the Malay Peninsula.
However, the situation was not hopeless. As the latter 
half of 1906 approached these two countries opened a new line 
of discussion. This time its focus was the problem of con­
structing the Malay Peninsula Railway. The talks, though 
unpromising at the start, gradually showed optimistic signs 
that the difficulty of the judicial problem would not be left 
unresolved. Before the railway matter could be brought to a 
satisfactory conclusion it inevitably had to be linked up 
with talks regarding extraterritoriality; and in a short 
time, discussions over jurisdiction could be revived on a 
more friendly basis after the two Governments' second thoughts.
1m
The Malay Peninsula Hailway Negotiations, 1906-1907*
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Siamese 
Government started to embark on an extensive programme of 
railways to connect Bangkok with the provinces in the north, 
east and south-west. Having realised the benefits which would 
result, both financially and administratively, it wanted to 
push the railways southwards as quickly as possible into the 
provinces and dependencies of the Peninsula. At that time 
communication between Bangkok and those states was carried on 
by the sea route alone. To reach the further states, such as 
Kelantan and Trengganu, entailed a journey by steamer of some 
four or five days, while the journey to Kedah and Puket 
probably took some eight to ten days with transhipment at 
Singapore and Penang. This situation no doubt rendered these 
Malay States less valuable to Siam politically and economically.
The construction of a line to the southward from Bangkok 
down the east coast of the Malay Peninsula was periodically 
among the projects mooted by the Siamese Government. Indeed 
an earnest of the project is to be found in some eighty miles 
of railway to Petchaburi, opened in 1901, but it was only 
in 1905 that any scheme for connecting the Malay States to 
Bangkok by rail came under serious consideration.
In June 1906, Prince Damrong, accompanied by an English 
engineer, Mr. Gittins, a Secretary and Expert Adviser to the 
Minister of Public Works, and Phraya Sukhum, High Commissioner
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of Nakornsitammarat, paid a visit to the Siamese Malay States. 
On their return to Bangkok Gittins drew up a report strongly 
urging the construction of a trunk line connecting Trang, a 
port in the province of Puket on the west coast, with Bangkok 
by way of Patalung, Nakornsitammarat, Bandon, Bangtapan and 
Petchaburi. The approximate length was 530 miles involving a 
total cost of 44,000,000 baht or some £3,000,000.^ ^
This proposal, strongly supported by Prince Damrong, 
received the Siamese Government's approval. The final 
agreement of the Ministers was as follows:
(1) ... the construction of the Malay Peninsula Railway 
is subject to a closer administrative control than 
the Railway in Ghiengmai. The situation in the 
Malay Peninsula is critical. It is closer to 
foreign Powers than any other Siamese territory.
Thus the building of the Malay Peninsula Railway
is a considerable investment. It may be of great 
benefit as well as of great loss.... It is not 
enough to consider only its construction. ...
(2) Our Siamese Malay States are rich in minerals and 
the land is fertile. The British have long desired 
to gain them but they have not yet had an 
opportunity....
(3) Row the situation has changed a great deal. 
Communications have improved. More foreigners come 
to seek their fortunes in this virgin land. Those 
who are lucky become millionaires. Thus other 
individuals and nations are becoming more ambitious.
(1) NA, R5* No. 7/224, Mr. Gittins' report on the Siamese 
Peninsula Railway .
146
(4) Now it is clear that ... mining in the British Malay 
States is not developing because mineral resources 
are running out. But quantities still remain in our 
Siamese Malay States. More foreigners come to pros­
pect minerals in Siam. What should be the Government's 
response? If we decide on a closed door policy and 
refuse them, other Governments may intervene and force 
us to open the door. They may even pursue a dangerous 
strategy. But if we open the door, giving concessions 
to all, soon our Malay States will be full of for­
eigners ... After careful consideration we think that 
the best policy is to open the country to foreigners 
for commerce. But we have to safeguard our adminis­
trative power by:
1. Developing the Siamese Malay States to convince 
the British that we are taking this step for the 
sake of the states' development ....
2. Building railways as soon as possible to connect 
the Siamese Malay States with Bangkok in order 
to ensure sound administration. J
An immediate start on the construction of the line was 
also urged by Gittins because:
1. Politically, the delay in opening these railways is 
tantamount to a late opening of the southern portion 
of Siam. The Straits Settlements press may criticise 
and finally the Straits officials may intervene ...
The Sultan's integrity is also in doubt. If our 
Government hastens communications with these states ... 
the situation will become more secure.
2. The longer construction is delayed, the more risk 
there will be for Siam ...
3. Certain surveys had been made by the Straits 
Settlements Government in Siamese territories,
Kelantan for example. So we should construct 
the railways as soon as p o s s i b l e . (2)
(1) NA, R5i No. 7/224, The opinion of the Ministers about 
the Malay Peninsula Railway *.
(2) NA, R5, No. 7/224, Mr. Gittins' opinion about the Malay 
Peninsula Railway .
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As to the construction work, the Siamese Government 
decided to grant no contracts to any private companies or 
individuals whether foreigners or natives. At first Prince 
Damrong wanted to start the construction with a small but 
most beneficial section, probably the southern section. But 
after the 1906 survey he was inclined to change the scheme. 
Politically the opening up of the southern provinces meant 
foreign immigration into the country. To guard against it 
the railway should be started at Petchaburi and should proceed 
southward. And owing to a slim budget the expense should be 
reduced to the minimum. J
Unfortunately before the plan was put into practice 
political troubles threatened to delay indefinitely the 
project of constructing the railway. The crux of the whole 
problem was the infiltration of German political influence in 
Siam since the Siamese Royal Railway Department which would 
be responsible for the construction of the proposed line was 
dominated by Germans.
Less than a month after Prince Damrong!s return from his 
Malay States tour,the British Government received a warning 
concerning the proposed railway from Beckett to the effect 
that British interests in the Malay Peninsula would be pre­
judiced if Germans were allowed to obtain a footing, whether
(1) NA, R5, No. 7/224, Report, meeting of Council of 
Ministers, September 5* 1897*
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(1)financial or administrative.v ' Sir Edward Grey immediately 
instructed Beckett to intimate unofficially to Mr* J.I. 
Westengard, the Acting General Adviser to the Siamese Govern­
ment, the British objection to the construction of the pro­
posed line being left in the hands of German engineers, even 
though they were officials of the Siamese Railway Department. 
The British Government wished to obtain a formal undertaking 
that the survey and construction should be entrusted only to 
British engineers under the management and control of a sepa­
rate Railway Department headed by a Siamese or British 
Director-General responsible to the Minister of Public Works. 
This Department should be called the Southern Railway Depart­
ment, as opposed to the Northern Railway Department then in
(2)German hands. ' In preferring this request reference was
(1) Standard, January 9, 1907* Prior to this Beckett, on his 
own initiative, had hinted to Westengard that the British 
Government would be displeased if German advantage and 
influence were allowed to extend to the Malay Peninsula 
by the absorption of Malay Peninsula lines. If the 
German-dominated Railway Department were to control the 
Malay Peninsula system, a very large influx of German 
employees into the Peninsula would of course ensue, with 
the natural corollary of increased German political 
influence there. In his long report Beckett informed 
Sir Edward Grey that Gittins shared this opinion.
Gittins confessed to Beckett that though he felt unable, 
in his position of expert adviser, to make any proposal 
against the survey or construction of the railway line 
by the Siamese Royal Railway Department, he entirely 
agreed with Beckett that every possible effort should be 
made to prevent such a consequence resulting. F.O. 422/60, 
Beckett-Grey, August 9, 1906.
(2) P.O. 422/60, Telegram, Grey-Beckett, August 18, 1906
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made to Clause 7 of the 1904 Franco-Siamese Treaty, which
provided for the exclusion of foreign officials and capital
in the French sphere of influence. If such was the case, the
British Government was entitled to expect similar treatment in
its sphere of influence. Further, the request was in accord-
(1)
ance with the spirit of the 1897 Secret Convention. J Siam, 
by the Convention, had recognised the privileged position of 
England in that portion of the Malay Peninsula lying south of
(o')Bangtapsn. J The preponderant influence of England in the 
territories situated to the west of the basin of the Menam 
was again admitted by France in the Anglo-French Entente of 1904.
(1) F.O. 371/131, Telegrams, Grey-Beckett, August 19, 1906 
and Beckett-Grey, August 13, 1906.
(2) To support British rights over the southern portion of 
Siam the Colonial Office suggested the desirability of 
publishing the Secret Convention of 1897* But the 
Siamese Government still adhered to its objection to the 
publication by referring to fears of similar French 
demands regarding the territories lying within the basin 
of the Mekong. Also the Foreign Office did not favour 
its publication. In its view the British Government 
could, at any time, under the 1897 Convention and without 
the publication of that instrument, prevent the acquisition 
by Germany of large interests in the Malay Peninsula by 
imposing its veto if the number or extent of German con­
cessions in that region were becoming dangerously large.
Sir Edward Grey did not think that in such an event the 
Siamese need experience any difficulty in frankly informing 
the German Government that numerous concessions already 
granted to them in the region precluded the Siamese from 
considering any further application from Germans. However, 
the whole matter was left in the hands of Strobel for 
discussion with Sir Edward Grey, when he passed through 
London in January, 1901. C.O. 273/323, Tel. Grey-Beckett, 
Sept. 28, 1906. C.O. 273/312, Campbell-Fiddles,
January 9, 1906.
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This communication received a purely negative response 
from various Siamese officials. While expressing their full 
appreciation of the reasons for the British Government's 
desire for the line to be constructed by British engineers, 
and giving their assurance that they would willingly and 
openly conform to British wishes in this respect, these 
officials maintained that the exclusion of other nationalities 
in favour of the British in the Siamese Railway Department 
appeared unjustifiable. The German officials were, for the 
time being, officials of the Siamese Government and their 
exclusion from any connection whatever with this railway would 
cause friction not only with the German Director-General, but 
also with the German Government, thus placing the Siamese 
Government in a serious dilemma. The Germans had obtained 
control of the Railway Department by engineering skill rather 
than by diplomatic action, and although they endeavoured, as 
was natural, to extend their influence over the Department 
as much as possible, they had never gone so far as to suggest 
the exclusion of all other nationalities. Several British 
engineers were still employed in the Royal Railway Departmerft!^ 
It was a one-nationality Department that the Siamese Govern­
ment had hitherto been at pains to avoid in the case, for 
instance, of the Post and Telegraph Department. This 
endeavour had apparently met with the approval of the British
(1) NA, R5, No. 7/224-, Phraya Sukhum-The King, September 17,
1907.
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Government. The communication was surprising also in that
it hinted at the exclusion of all foreign subjects except
the British from the enjoyment of commercial privileges in
the peninsula. The theory of exclusive commercial rights
had been put forward in the case of Mining Concessions, but
the Siamese Government had always resisted it as being
dangerous and difficult in practice, and likely to lead it
(1)into difficulties with other Powers. J As regards Prench
action, the Siamese Government had agreed to Article VII of
the 1904- Convention merely because it knew full well the
remote possibility of railway extension in the East, and in
(2)practice it would never become operative. '
However, in order to get a clearer insight into the
(1) .P.O. 4-22/6C, Beckett-Grey, September 12, 1906.
(2) Presumably, the feeling of surprise which was evinced in 
the Siamese minds was associated with, if not created by, 
a feeling of suspicion towards the Government of the 
Straits Settlements. The Siamese were quick to remember 
what appeared to them the uncompromising attitude of that 
Government in the matter of concessions to non-British 
subjects in the Siamese Malay States. Though the British 
tried to convince them that it was not their object to 
restrict or exclude the commercial privileges and rights 
of other nationalities in the Peninsula but to exert 
their influence and make it paramount, the Siamese still 
suspected that the present suggestion regarding the 
exclusion of all but British and Siamese in the work of 
railway construction was part of a larger scheme of 
commercial and political absorption emanating from the 
Colonial Government. P.O. 371/550 Memorandum on the 
Proposal of the Siamese Government to construct a Railway 
in the Siamese Malay Peninsula, and the suggested publi­
cation of the Secret Convention with Siam of 1897, 
December 51, 1906.
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general situation, the Siamese Vice-hinister of the Interior
and Westengard visited the Siamese Malay States in October
(1)by way of Songkhla. Before the visit took place, the 
Colonial Office, at the suggestion of the Foreign Office, had 
written to Sir John Anderson stressing Westengard1s Singapore 
visit as an excellent chance for a friendly discussion of the 
matter relating to the proposed railway, so that the lingering 
suspicion still entertained by the Siamese towards the
authorities of the Straits Settlements might be removed or at
(2)least materially diminished. J Unfortunately Sir John 
Anderson did not discuss the railway question with Westengard 
since the latter did not give him an opportunity. All he 
could do was to state the readiness of the British Government 
to give any possible assistance towards the development of 
the Northern Malay States.v '
For the time being it was agreed that the matter should 
be left in abeyance pending the discussion between Sir 
Edward Grey and Strobel, the General Adviser to the Siamese 
Government, on the letter's return from the United States 
through London to Siam in two or three months'time and that
(1) F.O. 422/60, Beckett-Grey, September 11, 1906.
(2) C.O. 273/323, C.O.-Anderson, September 21, 1906.
(3) C.O. 273/333, Anderson-Elgin, January 11, 1907.
no steps would be taken contrary to the wishes of the
(1)British Government as indicated by Beckett. '
Another serious difficulty which arose in connection with 
this negotiation was that of finance. The estimated sum 
required for the construction of the whole length of railway 
was some 51,000,000 baht, or £3,000,000 to £4,000,000.
Various methods of finding the necessary funds were seriously 
considered by the Siamese. Firstly, the Government proposed 
to raise a loan of £3,000,000 from foreign banks. If this 
failed, Prince Damrong urged either a special loan or a 
separate appropriation from the Government funds. At the 
latter two alternatives, the Minister of Finance demurred, on 
the grounds that the Exchequer could not bear the strain.
There was also a scheme for construction with the assistance 
of a private company. At this stage proposals to build the 
railway were made by the representatives of two British firms, 
hr. Duff and Mr. Leonowens. The object of both was to provide 
some scheme which, while it was compatible with the views of 
the British Government, whose aid was invoked, would grant a 
large measure of control to the Siamese Government, who would 
by this means be in a position to avoid causing offence to
(o')Germany or loss of prestige to itself. '
(1) F.G. 422/60, Beckett-Grey, October 11, 1906.
(2) F.O. 422/60, Tel. Beckett-Grey, October 31, 1906.
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The chief features of the proposals were:
1. Interest at 5 per cent to he guaranteed by the 
Siamese Government who would have a first charge 
on the property.
2. Completion of railway and its branches or 
extensions within a period to be fixed.
5. Option of purchase by the Siamese Government at
some date to be fixed after construction was 
completed.
4-. Administration and control to be vested in a
Director-General of Siamese nationality who 
should be subject to a Board composed of one- 
third nominees of the Siamese Government or 
the Director-General and two-thirds nominees 
of the bond-holders.
5. Should either Government so desire, appointed
officials would allot amounts not exceeding 
30 per cent of the total share capital in 
shares to each Government. They were also 
ready to make such alterations or new provi­
sions as the British Government or the Siamese 
Government might deem desirable. )
In the event, neither firm could guarantee their financial 
ability to carry through the enterprise. Consequently, the 
whole matter had to remain in abeyance.
In November, 1906, Beckett learned from the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank that Siam required a loan of £2,000,000 for 
railway construction and that a German contributor to the loan
(1) ibid.
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d')could not be excluded.v y He telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey 
for advice. In reply, Grey instructed him not to take any
action. If Germany secured a part of the general railway
(2)loanv ' in conjunction with France and England, her association 
with the Malay Railway would be remote, and hardly dangerous 
to British interests. If the whole loan were German, or if it 
were for the Malay Peninsula line only then there would be 
ground for objection. The Foreign Office, in fact, put more 
emphasis on the problem of how to prevent its construction by 
the German engineers of the Siamese Railway Department than on 
the method of financing the line.^y It pointed out specific 
cases in China which reflected the fact that the extension of 
political influence was often affected by and directly 
connected with the personnel of an important trunk railway
(1) The loan was subsequently negotiated and taken up in 
the following proportions:
In London £1,000,000
France 1,000,000
Germany 750,000
Denmark 250,GOO
F.O. 422/60, Beckett-Grey, November 7, 1906.
(2) The sum which the Siamese Government calculated was needed 
to meet expenditure on railway construction during the 
years 1906-1909 was some 52,000,000 baht or about 
£5,500,000, of which 25,000,000 baht would be devoted to 
Malay Peninsula Railway, 15,000,000 baht to Northern 
Railway, 9,000,000 baht to Bangkok-Patriue Railway and 
2,000,000 baht to the Nakornchaisi-Supan Railway.
NA. R5, Phraya Suriya1s Statement, November 25, 1906.
(5) F.O. 422/60, Tel. Grey-Beckett, November 8, 1906.
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line. The situation became more serious when Beckett urgently 
reported to London that Siam insisted upon building the 
railway under the control and administration of her German- 
dominated Railway Department. Thus German aspirations would 
be realised. Such action would render impossible the proposals 
for the construction of the railway which Duff and Leonowens 
put forward, proposals in which speed and economy and the 
maintenance of British interests were the objective. Worse 
still, there would be no purpose in Sir Edward Grey’s dis­
cussion with Strobel. In Beckett’s opinion the Foreign Office 
had to intimate clearly to the Siamese Government, before the 
tempting loan was accepted, whether it wanted no control by 
the German Railway Department or whether it wanted - and this
was the keystone of the situation - the employment of British
(1)engineers. ' Charles Lucas, the Assistant Under-Secretary 
of the Colonial Office, supported his view. To quote his 
remark:
... For a great many years past we have vainly 
tried to get the Foreign Office to take a strong 
line with Siam. They have always refused and 
the position is about as bad as bad can be...
The Foreign Office always pleaded the danger 
of French encroachment which went on steadily 
until the French had pretty well all they 
wanted. Now the Germans are getting a footing 
through the Railway Department and the immediate 
question is whether the lines linking up with 
our States are to be made by German engineers. ^
(1) F.O. 422/60, Tel. Beckett-Grey, December 6, 1906.
(2) C.O. 275/535, 0.0. Note on F.O.-C.O., February 2, 1907
157
In any case, anxiety in Whitehall died down to some
extent when Sir Edward Grey was assured by the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank that the Siamese Government had not communicated
with the Bank's office regarding the loan. Beckett was then
instructed to try his best to delay consideration of the loan
(1)until it was discussed in London with Strobel. ' But if a
decision was imminent, he was authorised to state -
If the Siamese Government, in opposition to 
our wishes, entrust the control of the Malay 
Peninsula Railway to the German Railway 
Department, thereby ignoring the special 
interests which our geographical position 
gives us in that region, we should regard 
this proceeding as detrimental to British 
interests, and as a breach of the spirit of 
the Agreement of 1897, which practically 
recognised the justice of our claim to a /Q\ 
preponderant position in the Peninsula...
(1) F.O. 422/6G, Tel. Grey-Beckett, December 8, 1906.
(2) Ibid.
When the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank signed a loan 
contract of £3,000,000 with the Siamese Government 
Beckett urgently ascertained whether or not this sum 
included funds for the construction of the Malay Railway. 
If it did, the amount required for this purpose should 
be eliminated and dealt with by a separate loan, and no 
decision in regard to the latter should be taken till 
Sir Edward Grey had an opportunity to discuss the question 
with Strobel. If, however, a definite assurance that the 
construction of the Malay line would not be entrusted to 
the Siamese Railway Department were given, the British 
Government would not object to its inclusion in the loan 
at present under negotiation. In reply, the Siamese 
Government agreed that this loan would not be used for 
Southern railway. P.O. 422/60, Tel. Grey-Beckett,
December 11, 1906.
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A possible solution of the whole problem depended
entirely on the talk between Strobel and Sir Edward Grey in
London. Beckett was well prepared not to yield an inch. A
week before the discussion took place he had suggested to the
Foreign Office the removal of the section of the completed line
extending from Bangkok to Petchaburi from mainly German control
with a view to completely severing from the Royal Railway
(1)Department the entire western system of the railway. '
The long-awaited talk was held on January 16 in London.
Unfortunately it did not shed any light on the scheme since
Strobel was apparently unacquainted with the details of what
had been discussed in Bangkok. He did not express a definite
opinion as to how the railway should be constructed. What he
did was to oppose the construction of the v/hole line en bloc,
(2)on the grounds that Siam could not afford it. ' He also 
renewed the objection raised by the Siamese Government to the 
publication of the Secret Convention of 1897*
Back in Bangkok a considerable amount of discussion 
regarding the construction and control of the railway, the two 
controversial points, took place during January, February and 
March, 1907* As always, the Siamese Government insisted that
(1) P.O. 422/61, Tel. Beckett-Grey, January 16, 1907.
(2) P.O. 422/61, Tel. Grey-Beckett, January 19, 1907-
the control should be left in the hands of the Royal Railway 
Department, At this stage, the railway duel moved into 
another phase when Beckett proposed that the railway con­
struction should be excluded from control of the German- 
dominated Railway Department as a solution to the existing 
problem between Bngland and Siam; this problem concerned a 
modification of jurisdiction on the Ghiengmai Treaty of 1885 
basis in the Malay Peninsula and the interpretation of the
Agreement of 1897 in 3 political and not a commercial sense
(1)as wanted by the Siamese Government. ' Discussions on these 
issues lasted for months but the word ‘compromise1 did not 
exist in either Governments1 vocabulary.
As regards the legal problem, jurisdiction in the Malay
Peninsula was complicated by the question of the status in
Siam of natives of the Federated Malay States and Johore.
By the Registration Agreement of 1899 the Siamese Government
recognised the extraterritorial rights of
All persons of Asiatic descent born within 
the Queenfs dominions or naturalised within 
the United Kingdom, or born within the 
territory of any Prince or State fin India1 
under the suzerainty or in alliance with 
the Queen.
In accordance with a strict interpretation of this 
clause, natives of the Federated Malay States and Johore were 
not included. About the year 1900 the question as to whether
(1) F.O. 422/61, Beckett-Grey, December 19, 1906.
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they should be entitled to such registration was submitted for
the consideration of the British Law Officers but it was
decided that they were not so entitled. The question was then
completely left out until Beckett called the attention of the
authorities in London to it in 1905* Then it was agreed by
the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office that natives of
the Federated Malay States and Johore should be equally
( '1 ')entitled to registration with British Indian subjects.
The British Government proposed to add after the word “Queen” 
the words "or born or naturalised in the States of Perak,
Selangor, Negri, Sembilan, Pahang, and the state and terri-
(p1
tory of Johore. J
The request was snubbed by the Siamese Government. In 
an official note from Prince Devawongse to Paget, the British 
Minister who returned from home leave, the Prince stated his 
regret that the British Government should contemplate an 
extension of extraterritoriality to a further class of people 
at a time when the Siamese Government thought it could 
cherish hopes of a curtailment of the extraterritorial system. 
He also added observations which had from time to time been 
made in earlier correspondence on the subject of a partial 
surrender of British jurisdiction in return for British
(1) F.O. 572/29, C.O.-F.O., December 50, 1905*
(2) F.O. 571/131, Grey-Paget, January 25, 1906
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subjects acquiring the right to hold land; for the treaties 
under which foreign Powers acquired extraterritoriality in 
Siam we re made at a time when the subjects of those Powers in 
Siam were exclusively of European race and when the adminis­
tration of justice was in an undeveloped state. But by the 
beginning of the twentieth century there were thousands of 
foreign Asian subjects whose inclusion was never envisaged by 
the early Treaties and whose enjoyment of extraterritorial 
rights was accidental. On the other hand, the administration
of justice in Siam was much improved and could offer reasonable
(1)
guarantees against oppression and injustice. J If Siam had 
to recognise the registration of natives of the Federated 
Malay States and Johore, she would lay herself open to claims 
by other Powers to register the subjects of states under their 
protection. For example, the Japanese authorities would claim 
jurisdiction over Koreans in Siam. In support of his conten­
tion, the Prince referred to the case of the Cambodians and the 
long discussions which had taken place between France and 
Siam before the latter, in order to secure the 1904 Convention, 
was compelled to admit that Cambodians in her country should 
be placed under French jurisdiction.
Prince Devawongse made a counter-proposal for the 
establishment of an International Court for the Siamese Malay
(1) F.O. 628/27/309, Paget-Grey, March 27, 1906.
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( 1 )Provinces with a European Adviser; appeals to lie to the 
Siamese Appeal Court in Bangkok, in which two Europeans should 
always sit; and in return for these additional safeguards the
powers of the Consul to withdraw cases and submit them to his
(2)own court to be surrendered. J
No matter how much the British officials wished to 
control the Malay Peninsula Railway they could not accept it 
as a bargaining point for the establishment of the Internationa] 
Court in the Siamese Malay States. Such a contention would 
harm both British interests and the principle of Malay nation­
ality, which the British Government tried its best to maintain 
in these States. For political reasons, the Straits Settle­
ments Government was entirely opposed to any step which would 
strengthen the hold of Siam on that part of the Peninsula.
The questions of an International Court in the Malay 
States and the registration of natives of the Federated Malay 
States and Johore were then left in abeyance in the hope that 
they might form the basis of a more comprehensive bargain in 
future.
As regards the interpretation of the Secret Convention,
(1) The Siamese Malay States comprised a portion of the west
coast of the Peninsula included within the jurisdiction of 
the British Consul for Kedah, namely, the States of Kedah, 
Perlis and Setul, and the purely Siamese province of Puket.
(2) F.O. 372/29, P.O.-C.C., October 15, 1906.
(3) F.O. 372/29, F.O. Note on Paget-Grey, March 27, 1907.
F.O. 422/61, Grey-Paget, February 27, 1907*
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the two Governments always experienced difficulty in the 
Malay Peninsula. The power of veto by the British Government 
was for some time made the means of blocking all concessions 
to foreigners. The inexpediency of this attitude was pointed 
out by Paget and Beckett and the Foreign Office in London 
supported their views in correspondence with the Colonial 
Office. As a result Paget was instructed to arrive at some 
understanding with the Siamese Government for checking conces­
sions. The arrangement arrived at did not satisfy Strobel who 
wished the British Government to surrender its veto in regard 
to concessions unless they fell within certain categories. 
Another attempt was then made to vest greater authority in 
the British Minister regarding the granting of concessions.
But all these efforts ended in deadlock.
Therefore, by March 1907, the only firm assurance of 
the Siamese Government concerning the railway could be summed 
up in this way:
With regard to the Malay Peninsula Railway, whether in the 
matter of construction by German engineers or control by the 
Royal Railway Department, the Siamese Government did not either 
intend or wish to oppose the desire of His Majesty's Government 
Beckett was annoyed and blamed the Siamese for bringing 
in Germany as a supporter against the pressure of England and 
France. He complained:
. .. The Siamese led by Prince Devawongse are 
not behaving straightforwardly ... They have 
given no sign as yet of being willing to 
listen to our intimation as to the employment 
of British engineers on the proposed Peninsula 
Railway. It is extraordinary that the Siamese 
can never accept a situation with a good grace,
and even when they know they will in the end
have to yield, they yield with such reluctance 
that the only impression left is one of pain 
on both sides.(1;
However, later in April 1907, the attitude of both sides 
appeared to have changed. Relations between the British and 
Siamese Governments improved. Strobel proposed an agreement 
on a non-political and business basis with the Federated 
Malay States Government for the construction of the railway. 
Briefly, the Federated Malay States Government would advance 
the necessary capital, approximately £4,000,000, at a conspic­
uously low rate of interest between 3-J and 4 per cent to the
Siamese Government. In consideration of its advancing this 
money, the Federated Malay States Government would be able to 
make whatever stipulations it wanted regarding the personnel 
to be engaged in construction and control. Each section of 
the railway when completed would have to be handed to the 
Siamese Government who would have virtual control after
(1) F.O. 628/27/309, Private, Beckett-Langley, February 4, 1907
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(1)construction. ' The proposal was submitted direct to
Sir John Anderson, to whom it appeared to be acceptable in
(2)
principle. y The line of railway through Johore which was 
being constructed by the Federated Malay States would probably 
be finished within a year and would provide a complete con­
nection between Singapore and the northernmost limits of the 
Federated Malay States. That Government also wished to extend 
the line northward, through the Siamese Malay States, along 
the eastern and western coasts of the Peninsula. In addition, 
by means of an agreement concerning the construction and loan, 
England could secure control and many other objectives and 
advantages.
From now on the matter was the subject of direct communi­
cation with the Federated Malay States Government and there 
appeared little likelihood that any private company, such as 
Duff or Leonowens, would be granted the contract to build this
railway.
From April until July, 1907, the Siamese Government tried 
to solve problems of detail regarding the railway construction.
(1) G.O. 275/353, High Commissioner of the Federated Malay 
States - Elgin, April 8, 1907.
This idea was in fact a carbon-copy of Prince Devawongse ' s 
proposal which was drawn up to allow the extension of the 
Federated Malay States railway system into Siamese terri­
tories when the Bukit Matajam Kulim (Prai-T8ping line) 
extension was proposed in 1904.
(2) C.O. 273/333, High Commissioner of the Federated Malay 
States-Elgin, April 8, 1907.
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'The main issue was whether a separate Department was needed. 
Strobel saw no necessity for one. Cnee the construction was 
placed in the hands of British engineers there would be no 
reason for it. He feared that if in future railways were 
built in the direction of the Mekong Valley France would like­
wise claim the need for a separate control of such railways. 
After all, Strobel could not see why, if the construction were 
left to British engineers, the British Government should not
be satisfied to leave the control under the Royal Railway
(1)Department. y
The British saw the situation differently. They strongly 
pointed out that as the Malay Peninsula Railway was being 
constructed to join on to the Federated Malay States’ Railways, 
a German Director-General would scarcely be conducive to 
harmonious working.
Proposals, counter-proposals and more counter-proposals 
of this nature went on for months without a sign of a final 
settlement. On many occasions, the negotiations were nearly 
dissolved until Siam proposed a transfer of her rights over 
Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis to England in July, 1907* 
From then on the Railway question was regarded as a considerable 
quid pro quo. Finally the long drawn out discussions resulted 
in a compromise between the two Governments in a separate 
Railway Agreement of 1909.
(1) F.O. 422/61, Paget-Grey, April 15, 1901
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The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907*
An important factor which brought a solution to the 
railway talks in 1909 was the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 
by which France agreed to bring French Asian subjects in Siam 
under Siamese jurisdiction in return for Siamese cession of 
Battambang, Siemreap and Sisophon. This idea of territorial 
and judicial sacrifices revived Anglo-Siamese negotiations 
regarding extraterritoriality which had broken off in 1905* 
Consequently, the railway talks which had then been on the 
rocks, became involved as part of a promising bargain.
The Treaty of 1907 was the conclusion of long-term 
discussions between France and Siam. It should be noted that 
during nearly half of the nineteenth century Siamese relations 
with the French were in a constant state of disagreement, and 
periodically the situation became acute. Doubtless Siamese 
procrastination and evasion were to some extent responsible 
for this, but on the other hand Siamese hatred and mistrust 
of France were due to the aggression and hectoring tone of 
the French Colonial Party, and also to the unsympathetic 
attitude of French diplomatic and Consular officials.
After the crisis of the henam River in 1893 relations 
between these two countries went steadily from bad to worse. 
Siam suffered a serious blow from the stipulations of the 
1893 Convention. By 190C, Chantaboon had been occupied by
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French troops for seven years without signs of evacuation, 
although Siam contended that every condition imposed by the 
Convention had been fulfilled with the utmost fidelity. The 
neutral 25 kilometre zone which had been established along 
the Mekong had become a place of lawlessness and disorder.
The French assumed more and more authority over the zone while 
the Siamese officials who were held responsible for all that 
happened there were forbidden to enter it. Moreover the 
exceptional cordiality between the French and Russian 
Legations aroused anxiety in Siamese official circles. ' 
Rumours circulated in Bangkok that Russia was trying to gain 
territory, probably Pulo Condore, on the French Indo-Chinese 
coast, from France, and some Danish officers, who were pros­
pecting at Koh Chang (Chang Island) were working in the 
interests of Russia. Mr. Rolin-Jacquemyns, the first 
General Adviser to the Siamese Government, expressed his 
opinion to Mr. Inagaki, the Japanese Minister, that there was 
nothing to prevent a secret arrangement between France and 
Russia for the cession of some port, such as Chantaboon, or
(1) Phraya Phipat Kosa, the Siamese Under Secretary of State, 
told Tower', the British Minister, at the end of 1901, 
that M. Olarowsky, the Russian Minister, had told Prince 
Devawongse that Siam would have to reckon with a 'hostile 
Russia1, unless speedy terms of settlement we re made with 
France to the latter's satisfaction. The Siamese Govern­
ment telegraphed to its Minister in St. Petersburg, 
asking the Russian Government for a reply. The latter 
denied. F.O. 69/227, Tower-Lansdowne, January 26, 1902.
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(1)some island on the east coast of the Gulf of Siam.v '
However, the bitterest friction concerned jurisdiction 
and the registration of French subjects in Siam. The con­
troversy derived first from the difference in the interpre­
tation of Article IV of the 1895 Convention, and secondly 
the presumptious view held and acted upon by the French Consuls 
that subjects of countries which had no treaty with Siam 
should fall under French protection. The fourth Article 
dealt with the handing-over to France by Siam of the French 
Annamite and Laotian subjects of the right bank of the Mekong 
who came originally from the left bank. Siam also had to
allow former inhabitants of the left bank who lived in Siam
(O')to return home if they so wished. J But nothing was said 
of persons who chose to stay in Siam. Naturally, a French 
silence led the Siamese to the conclusion that these people 
were to remain Siamese subjects. The French Government, on 
the other hand, construed Article IV as giving it jurisdiction 
over the children and even grandchildren of persons who came
(1) F.O. 69/208, Archer-Lansdowne, November 29, 1900.
(2) Article IV read:
The Siamese Government shall hand over 
to the French Minister at Bangkok or the 
French frontier authorities all the French 
Annamite and Laotian subjects of the left 
bank (of the Mekong) as well as the 
Cambodians detained under any pretext 
whatever. They shall set no obstacle in 
the way of the return to the left bank 
of the former inhabitants of the district.
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to the right hank and who wished to remain there. The
Siamese Government, while allowing all persons belonging to
the left bank to return if they wished, maintained that the
Article could not turn those who wanted to remain in Siam
into French subjects or protected persons. The French
insisted on their interpretation and any person who was willing
to pay a small fee and was ready to affirm that his ancestors
came from the left bank could get his registration paper
Cl')without further proof being asked. ' In regard to the 
registration of foreigners of countries who had no treaty with
Siam, a large number of Chinese and Japanese became French
(o')subjects. J In 1901, the French officials in Siam admitted
(1) Between 1815 and 1900 cases of disputed nationality arose. 
The Siamese arrested and tried in the face of French 
protests, a number of persons of remote Cambodian ancestry, 
furnished with French certificates of registration. There 
were two important cases. First, the Kadir case: Mr. 
Kadir, a French subject, was accused of homicide and 
arrested by the Siamese police. The French Minister pro­
tested against his arrest but the Siamese Government 
refused to release him and he remained in prison without 
trial. The second case was that of Mr. Mohamed Sillah, 
the ringleader of a party of French proteges who attacked 
some Siamese subjects owing to a dispute about some land 
close to Bangkok. He was arrested on a charge of murder. 
His father was born in Cambodia but settled in Siam in 
1832. The son obtained a French certificate in 1894-•
The French demanded his release. Vide F.0.69/262, 
Morrison*s Memorandum, October 1, 1897* F.O. 69/178,
F.O. Memorandum, -undated.
(2) F.O. 69/159, Be Bunsen-F.O., September 17, 1895* In 1895 
the French Minister in Bangkok took the Japanese subjects 
in Siam under his protection at the request of the 
Japanese Government. It was not until 1898 when a Treaty 
between Siam and Japan was signed that jurisdiction over 
Japanese subjects was given to Japanese Consular 
authorities.
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that by their process of registration, continued during 
several years, the French Consulate enjoyed protection over
(1)several thousand Asians. J
These continuing differences called for a better under­
standing. Siam was most anxious to put a stop to the French 
aggressive policy and she was prepared to make even large 
sacrifices to that end. Fortunately the keen rivalry between 
France and England, her territorial neighbours, offered Siam 
a good chance. These two colonising Powers, each being afraid 
of Siam falling into the other's protection, made efforts 
towards coming to a better understanding with Siam. The 
latter, likewise, gained an advantage in opening negotiations 
with France and England simultaneously in the hope that the 
two rivals would beat each other in offering a more beneficial 
bargain.
The registration question first became the subject of 
discussion between the French and Siamese Governments during 
King Chulalongkorn's tour of Paris in 1897? when talks on 
the same subject were in progress between Britain and Siam.
But no settlement was reached. M. Hanotaux, the French 
Foreign Minister, was uncompromising while the King was 
indifferent towards bettering relations with France. The 
French Minister maintained that his Government would settle
(1) The Times, (Bangkok), December 19, 1901.
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the difference with Siam only if the latter ceded Battambang
and Angkor to France. Unfortunately, such a condition could
(1)not be accepted. '
In 1899 the registration problem over British subjects 
in Siam was settled but the Siamese-French deadlock remained. 
Three times within three years (1899-1901) the negotiations 
in Bangkok between the French and Siamese authorities nearly 
reached agreement. In April, 1899, IVU Doumer, the Governor- 
General of Indo-China, an administrator of remarkable
ability, when in Bangkok virtually agreed upon the terms of
(2)settlement. ' Briefly, the Siamese propositions involved 
two points: the re-organisation of the registration
(1) Vide F.O. 69/178, Interview between Phraya Suriya, 
Charge d ’Affaires of Siam, accompanied by M. Gor. 
d ’Grelli, and M. Hanotaux at the French Foreign 
Office on January 20, 1897- F.O. 69/178, Interview 
between Phraya Suriya and Hanotaux at the French 
Foreign Office, January 25, 1897.
(2) In March, 1899, Phraya Si Sahadeb paid a friendly 
visit to M. Doumer in Saigon. After their talk, 
they decided that it would be better for the 
Governor to go to Bangkok and get in touch 
personally with the Court. On April 16, 1899, 
Doumer arrived in Bangkok. Siam Free Press,
March 21, 1899. The Straits Times, January 26, 
1902.
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( 1 )schemev 'and the evacuation of French troops from Ghantaboon.
France, on the other hand, asked for an extension of her
territory across the Mekong, for certain commercial privileges
in the Mekong Valley, and for the employment of Frenchmen
in the Siamese Government service.
At the end of 1899 M. Defrance, a French Minister
possessing an exceptional knowledge of the situation, almost
(2 )concluded an arrangement when negotiations were suspended. '
In 1901 M. Klobukowski, the new Minister, again suggested the
same basis for settlement of the differences. However no 
favourable proposition could break the ice. And the discussion 
was dropped only to be raised again.
The negotiations would have been settled had the question 
touching on Ghantaboon not intervened. Indeed, the French 
Gonsuls considered all the other arrangements as fulfilling
(1) The Siamese proposed to draw up a registration scheme on 
the same basis as the Anglo-Siamese Agreement of 1899, 
accepting the following as French protected persons: 
first, all French citizens by birth or by naturalisation; 
second, all persons born in French Colonies or in French 
protected States; third, all persons including children 
born on the left bank of the Mekong and brought to the 
right bank against their will; and lastly, all persons 
actually registered as subjects of foreign States having 
no Treaty with Siam whose names were agreed on by France 
and Siam. F.O. 69/196, Greville-F.G., 24- April, 1899.
F.O. 69/218, Archer-F.O., September 36, 1901. F.O.
69/206, Amended Draft Convention pending questions between 
Siam and France. Enclosure I in Stringer-Salisbury, 
February 13, 1900.
(2) F.O. 69/206, Stringer-Salisbury, February 13, 1900. 
F.C. 69/209, Stringer-Salisbury, March 1, 1900.
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their requirements, but the evacuation of Chantaboon remained
(1)the real stumbling-block. ' As the French Authorities were 
apparently waiting for the Siamese Government to propose or 
suggest some quid pro quo for the evacuation,the Siamese 
were awaiting the evacuation before making concessions. At 
the end of 1901, Prince Devawongse and Rolin-Jacquemyns 
proposed to transfer the discussions to Paris in view of the
threatening attitude of most of the French negotiators in
(2)Bangkok.
In August 1902, when the tension of Kelantan-Trengganu 
crisis highlighted the Anglo-Siamese negotiations, Phraya Si 
Sahadeb was sent as a special envoy to London. On his way he 
stopped in Paris for talks with the French Government .
The time chosen was opportune. Doumer's impending return to 
France in order to enter political life and his desire to 
achieve a triumph in the Far East for French Colonial policy 
to use as an electoral card, prompted the French Government
(Ll)
to expedite a settlement with Siam. J On October 7? 1902.
(1) Archer wrote to Lansdowne that Klobukowski evidently 
looked upon Prince Devawongse as the real obstacle to 
satisfactory negotiations but in Archer's opinion the 
real difficulty was the King's antipathy for the French 
nation and suspicion of their methods. F.O. 69/217? 
Archer-Lansdowne, December 16, 1901.
(2) C.O. 275/275, C.O. Iiemorandum, September 27, 1901.
F.O. 69/217, Archer-Lansdowne, December 16, 1901.
(5) Temps, August 2, 1902.
(4) F.O. 69/227, Tower-Lansdowne, January 23, 1902.
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one day after the Agreement between Siam and England on
Kelantan and Trengganu had been agreed upon, a new Convention
was signed by which, among other stipulations, Siam ceded a
considerable portion of territory to France in return for
the evacuation of Chantaboon.v J Undoubtedly, the two
Governments meant to put a stop to all troublesome questions
by this Convention, but its terms were strongly opposed by the
(2)Colonial Party, and the Treaty failed to secure ratification. J 
Negotiations were, however, resumed in Paris in May, 1905, 
for the additional Convention to render the 1902 Convention 
acceptable to the Chambers. France demanded the complete 
abolition of Siamese suzerainty on the right bank of the 
Mekong. The protection question was to be settled by admitting 
Cambodians to the same privileges in Siam as other local 
people born within the French possessions. French Consular 
Agents with full power of Jurisdiction were to be established 
at Siemreap and Sisophon. To this end Article V of the
(1) F.O. 69/247, Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires de Siam 
1895-1902, Delcasse's letters circulated to Foreign 
Consuls, October 7* 1902.
(2) While awaiting ratification France put forward fresh 
demands with which the Siamese Government was unable to 
comply. These requests implied the construction of 
railway lines in Ubol and Nongkhai by the French and the 
appointment of Frenchmen to Siamese high offices, such as 
the post of Financial Adviser and Director of Customs 
which we re occupied by Englishmen. (Mr. Rivett-Carnac 
and Mr. Ambrose respectively). F.O. 422/57* Paget- 
Lansdowne, May 1, 1902. F.O. 69/245, Paget-Lansdowne,
May 1, 1905. F.O. 422/57* Lansdowne-Paget, March 27* 1905*
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1867 Siamese-French Treaty providing for the exercise of 
Siamese Jurisdiction over Cambodians residing in Siam was 
to be revoked.
In reply, Phraya Suriya, the Siamese Minister in Paris, 
refused practically every French demand. Meanwhile Delcasse 
threatened to break off the negotiations unless Siam took up 
a more reasonable attitude. He even refused to discuss 
isolated articles but pressed for a definite answer of the 
whole treaty from the Siamese Government. J
With the assistance of Strobel, who stopped in Paris in 
November 1903, on his way to Bangkok to take the place of 
Rolin-Jacquemyns as Adviser to the Siamese Government, the 
negotiations were conducted on a more friendly basis. Strobel 
knew full well the necessity of finding a solution to the 
ever-growing pressure on the eastern frontier, and thought 
that Siam had to be prepared to make a few concessions. He 
saw no objection to the French claim to exercise Jurisdiction 
over the Cambodians in Siam. As regards the question of the 
land concessions on the right bank of the Mekong, he expressed 
the view that, so long as it was clearly stipulated that the 
concessions were only to be employed for commercial as 
distinct from military purposes, the French demand amounted 
to little more than a reassertion of the provision concerning
(1) F.O. 422/57* Monson-Lensdowne, September 14, 1903
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the reservation of certain spaces on the river bank which was
already contained in Article VI of the non-ratified 1902
(I')Convention. J
At this stage Phraya Suriya was left by the Siamese
Government without sufficient instructions as to how far he
was authorised to meet French demands. In spite of his many
urgent telegrams there was no definite reply from Prince
Devawongse whose position as Foreign Minister in Bangkok was
seriously shaken. The final settlement was delayed until
Strobel took up office in January 1904. With his diplomatic
experience as Secretary to the United States1 Legation in
Madrid and as American Minister at Santiago added to his
competent authority on internal questions, Strobel did not
waste much time in convincing the King and his Ministers that
a refusal to the French additional Convention would only
result in demands of greater severity in the years to come.
On February 13, 1904, the Franco-Siamese Treaty was
signed. By this Treaty arrangements were made regarding the
registration of French-protected persons in Siam on practi-
cally the same lines as the Anglo-Siamese Agreement of 1899*
(1) F.O. 69/246, Paget-Lsnsdowne, November 18, 1903*
(2) The Siamese Government accepted the French list of pro­
tected persons after revision by the French authorities
on the condition that they should be at liberty to comment 
on fraudulent and erroneous registrations. It was esti­
mated in 1904 that by this arrangement France made valid 
her claim to some 8,000 proteges, approximately classified 
as follows: 750 Chinese, 2,000 Laotians, 2,000 Cambodians,
3,000 Annamites. Vide F.O. 69/254, Paget-Lansdowne, 
February 9, 1904.
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The International Court system was applied in the north to
French, European and Asian subjects. The trial of cases was
based on the 1883 Chiengmai Treaty. But there was one
difference. The appeals from the International Court were
to be heard by the Siamese Court of Appeal in Bangkok, and
not by a joint Court as in Article IX of the English Treaty.
There was an understanding, however, that one of the judges
(I')on Appeal should be a European.v ' Other stipulations of the
(o')
Treaty were that France agreed to evacuate Chantaboon, J but, 
on the other hand, Siam was obliged to cede Krat with the 
adjacent islands and the territory along the sea coast south­
east of Krat to France.
After this Treaty, however, the French Government still 
showed restlessness and a wish to effect some fresh arrangement 
regarding the provinces of Battambang, Siemreap and Sisophon, 
the provinces under Siamese suzerainty. It was not until 
Strobel's trip through Paris on his return to Bangkok from 
leave of absence in February 1907, that sortie hints were thrown
(1) F.O. 69/256, Paget-Lansdowne, February 24, 1904.
In March and April 1905, Conventions were concluded with 
Denmark and Italy respectively on the lines of the 
French Convention of 1904. The cases to be brought 
before International Courts in the north of Siam were 
to be cases in which Danish and Italian subjects were 
parties.
(2) The evacuation of Chantaboon by French troops duly took 
place in January, 1905*
out to him by the authorities at the Quai d'Orsay that
France would be glad of a rearrangement of the territories on
(1)the Cambodian frontier. J The proposal which met Strobel on 
his arrival in Bangkok was a French demand for Battambang, 
Siemreap and Sisophon in exchange for Krat and the islands of 
Donsai, a wedge of land cutting into Siam on the north-east 
frontier. As the balance of the proposed exchange appeared 
very much in favour of France, Strobel suggested the extension 
of the scope of negotiations to include the abandonment of 
French jurisdiction over French Asian subjects in Siam. It 
was Strobel's view that Siam would not suffer a loss of these 
Cambodian provinces so long as they satisfied her pride in
* i - —  - —.— i
obtaining jurisdiction over the subjects of a foreign Power,
Also the loss of Krat in 1904 had caused great sorrow to the
Siamese, especially to the King. It was possible that Siam
(2)agreed to the French demand in order to recover Krat.
Strobel's proposal met with a favourable reception on 
the part of the French authorities. The negotiations then 
proceeded with unexpected rapidity, reaching a conclusion
(1) F.O. 422/61, Paget-Grey, March 27, 1907.
(2) F.O. 422/61, Memorandum by Lister, March 23, 1907*
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on March 23, 1907, ^ }
The French Treaty of 1907 constituted a very considerable 
advance in the political status of Siam. It created a wide 
and novel extension of the regime built up in the north from 
1874- to 1905* It extended the International Court
(1) A summary of the Treaty was to the following effect:
1. 'The Siamese Government should cede the territories of 
Battambang, Siemreap and Sisophon to France, receiving 
in return the territories of Donsai and Krat, with 
adjacent islands.
2. All French Asian subjects or proteges who registered 
after signature of the Treaty should be subject to the 
Siamese Courts. All other French Asian subjects should 
be subject to the International Courts, but the right
of withdrawing cases from the International Court should
cease in respect of all such cases as came within the 
scope of laws regularly promulgated.
5. French Asian subjects should enjoy all rights equally 
with the Siamese.
4-. An arrangement was made regulating and safeguarding 
the rights of Phraya Kathathorn of Battambang.
5. An Agreement was entered into regarding the lease by 
the Siamese Government to the Indo-China Government of 
certain lands on the Siamese bank of the Mekong, with a 
view to facilitating commercial navigation.
6. There was an exchange of notes regarding the Island 
of Koh Chang and the islands situated in the south to 
the effect that no territory in these regions should 
be ceded to a foreign Power by Siam.
Department of Publicity, Pratet Thai Ruang Kan Sia 
Dindaen Gkae Farangset, (Siamese Loss of Territory to 
France) , (Bangkok, 19?G) , pp. 59-64-.
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(1 )regimev 'throughout Siam to all Asian subjects and proteges
inscribed in the French Consular list who had registered
before the date of the Treaty, with the proviso that the
right of withdrawing cases to the Consular Court should
cease in respect of all such cases as should come within the
(o')
scope of the laws regularly promulgated* J It rendered
subject to the purely Siamese Courts those Asians registered
after the date of the Treaty. It provided for a complete
cession of extraterritorial jurisdiction regarding Asians
from the date when the Siamese laws came into force. It
conferred on Asians equal rights of property, free residence
and travel with the Siamese, while imposing on Asians equal
taxation with the latter. It dealt exclusively with Asians,
provided no guarantees for the efficient working either of
(3)the International Courts or of the purely Siamese Courts, '
(1) There were six International Courts established at 
Bangkok, Chantaboon, Krat, Ubol, Chiengmai and Nan.
The regulations for the trial of cases were based on 
the procedure already in force in Chiengmai.
(2) Court Gazette, Vol. XXV, p. 210.
(3) Laung Chakrapranisisilvisudh, Fkkarat Nai Kan San, 
(Freedom of Justice). Published in a book to commemorate 
the opening up of the Civil and Criminal Court building
by His Majesty the King, (Bangkok, 1963), p. 94.
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and lastly it set up invidious racial distinctions between 
the Asian proteges and the French citizens - a distinction 
which the British Government found it difficult or, perhaps, 
impossible to make.
Judging from the haste with which this Treaty of 1907 
was concluded, the actual negotiations covering a period of 
barely one month, and in view of the fact that since 1857 
French policy towards Siam had consistently been based on the 
principle of a strict and Jealous assertion of extraterritorial 
rights, the explanation of this sudden abdication of these 
rights, as far as her Asian proteges were concerned, without 
any precautionary guarantees, rests on one of two hypotheses, 
hither France was weary of asserting rights on behalf of 
proteges who differed little, if at all, from the Siamese 
themselves in racial characteristics, or she was prepared to 
submit to any sacrifices of extraterritorial rights as regards 
these proteges as a quid pro quo for her territorial ambitio
(1) In his article 'The Treaty of March 25, 1907, between 
France and Siam and the Return of Battambang and Angkor 
to Cambodia1 printed in Far Eastern Quarterly, 5 (August, 
194-6), pp. 4-39-54- Briggs, (Lawrence Palmer) suggested 
following conditions which made the negotiations 
favourable: First, France was willing to abandon extra­
territoriality since the legal status of Siam had been 
reformed. Second, France was beginning to adopt a more 
amicable policy with Siam. Third, there was a general 
feeling that the fate of these provinces was sealed by 
the 1896 Agreement. Fourth, Strobelfs urgings were 
irresistible. Fifth, King Sisowath of Cambodia was in 
France during the negotiations. And. lastly, at that 
time King Chulalongkorn was about to visit Europe and 
His Majesty wanted all disputes settled before his 
departure.
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Whichever hypothesis may be correct, the fact remains 
that the modifications of the extraterritorial system conceded 
by France throughout Siam for her Asian proteges supplied 
the stimulus, which would otherwise have been lacking, to 
bring the Anglo-Siamese negotiations to a definite conclusion. 
At the same time it prepared the Siamese for the political 
quid pro quo which was as necessary to England in the Malay 
Peninsula as it had been to France in Cambodia.
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ANGLO-SIAMESE NEGOTIATIONS, 1907-1909
The year 1907 was a landmark in Siamfs struggle for 
freedom of jurisdiction, inasmuch as it saw the submission of 
French Asian subjects in Siam to the jurisdiction of the 
Siamese tribunals, and brought also a radical change in the 
system of extraterritoriality and jurisdiction over British 
subjects. The Anglo-Siamese talks regarding jurisdiction, 
which ended in failure at the end of 1905 because of the 
British Governments refusal to submit only British Asian 
subjects as distinct from British European subjects to Siamese 
courts, and because of the Siamese Governments reluctance to 
offer a more beneficial quid pro quo than the right of British 
subjects to hold land in Siam, moved into a new phase. 
Following closely the pattern of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 
1907, the two Governments handled the negotiations more 
reasonably and practically. From the start the atmosphere was 
friendly and for the first time a settlement seemed close at 
hand.
To do justice to the British Government it is undeniable 
that it had long realised the necessity of making important 
concessions respecting extraterritoriality to the Siamese 
Government. The bone of contention was made apparent by the 
1885 Chiengmai Treaty which submitted British subjects in the 
north of Siam to the International Court. But the delay in
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giving up extraterritorial privileges of British subjects all
over Siam was caused by the price to be asked for such a
bargain. With France's judicial concession in 190? the
British Government became more acutely aware of the issue.
The British authorities knew that they could not stand idly
by and something had to be done to ease the judicial problems
of British subjects in Siam.
It was a stroke of luck for the British Government that,
following shortly upon the signature of the Franco-Siamese
Treaty, an approach for negotiations regarding jurisdiction
was made by Strobel to Paget, to the effect that the time had
come for the British Government to acquire important territory
in the Malay Peninsula. The suggestion was for a cession to
England by Siam of the states of Kedah, Kelantan and
Trengganu in return for certain concessions to Siam in the
(1}matter of extraterritorial jurisdiction. '
(1) F.G. 422/61, Paget-Grey, April 27, 1907-
It should be noted here that since his appointment in 1904 
Strobel had played an important part in the affairs of the 
Foreign Ministry. Being a Professor of Law himself, he 
soon clearly understood the various disadvantages under 
which Siam was placed as regards judicial matters and he 
initiated the steps towards the abolition of extraterrit­
oriality. At the same time, being an American and having 
no political axe to grind, he was in a position to estimate 
accurately the true political requirements of England and 
France, and to act as an impartial mediator between these 
countries and Siam. From 1904 onwards negotiations took 
place with the British, French and American Governments 
based on the ground that the Siamese Government had no 
need of jurisdiction over European or American subjects, 
its only object being to secure the submission of native
Contd. overleaf
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The proposal sounded promising to Paget, The Siamese 
Government had made a large territorial sacrifice to France 
in order to obtain a concession regarding jurisdiction, and 
there seemed no reason why the British Government should not 
likewise expect some territorial or other concession to be the
price of a partial surrender of its extraterritorial juris-
(1)diction. J He wrote the following passage in a note to the 
Foreign Office:
... the advantage of the bargain would appear 
to be entirely on our side. It will be a 
distinct advantage that the questions as to the 
publication of the Secret Convention and the 
grant of concession, which have formed the 
subject of a good deal of controversy since 
Mr. Strobel’s first arrival in Siam, should be 
finally disposed of ... With the surrender of 
our jurisdiction such questions as the right 
of British subjects to hold land and the right 
of the Federated Malay States natives to /p)
registration would also ipso facto disappear.  ^ '
Contd. from overleaf
British, French and American subjects to the Siamese Courts 
France took the lead. In 1907 the French Government 
transferred its Asian proteges to the jurisdiction of the 
Siamese Courts. Thus Strobel won the entire confidence of 
the King and his Ministers. The whole conduct of foreign 
affairs passed from Prince Devawongse, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs from 1885, into the hands of Strobel. (With 
the introduction of M. Rolin Jacquemyns as the first 
General Adviser in 1891, the management of foreign affairs 
passed to a certain extent into the Adviser’s hands but 
the Belgian had neither the breadth of view nor the tact 
to gain entire confidence).
James V. Martin, A Histor:/ of the Diplomatic Relation 
Between Siam and the United States of America 1885-1929* 
page 270. Court Gazette, Vol. XXII, November 26, 1^05•
F.M. File 1, Treaty negotiations with the United States,
Devawongse-The King, August 9, 191-0.
(1) F.O. 422/61, Paget-Grey, April 27, 1907.
(2) F.O. 422/61, Paget-Grey, April 29, 1907.
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In Whitehall, Foreign Office officials were in favour
of the offer, though they very much doubted whether the Siamese
(a \
Government would follow Strobel's advice. J But if negotia­
tions were to be opened the problem arose as to the terms on 
which they should start. The question that faced the British 
Government was how to obtain advantages equivalent to those 
gained by the French Government, while avoiding extreme con­
cessions themselves. At this stage the Foreign Office consid­
ered one much-disputed demand, the right of British subjects
to hold land in Siam.^^ The India Office and the Colonial
(3)Office were secretly consulted about the bargain. ' J The 
India Office expressed the view that as far as exclusively
(1) F.O. 371/331, Note on Paget's letter dated April 27, 1907.
(2) F.O. 371/331, Memorandum concerning Strobel1s proposal 
regarding the cession to Great Britain of Kelantan,
Trengganu and Kedah and in regard to jurisdiction over
British subjects in Siam, May 28, 1907*
(3) Before the views of both offices were obtained, Sir Edward 
Grey cabled to Paget directing him not to make any sugg­
estions himself but to let the Siamese first broach the 
subject. Mr. Langley, the Under-Secretary of State, made 
the following note on this telegram: "It was fortunate 
that Mr. Paget was warned against allowing the Siamese 
Government to think the proposal emanated from us. They 
would have credited His Majesty's Government with designs 
which they have not had, and which would have militated 
against its acceptance." Paget accordingly informed 
Strobel of this, and the latter agreed to inform the Siamese 
Government, if negotiations were opened, that the idea of
a cession of territory was entirely his own. However, 
Strobel preferred to wait, since he had only recently 
suggested to the Siamese Government the cession of 
Battambang, Sisophon and Siemreap to France.
In July, 1907, however, it was rumoured in the Siamese 
Legation in London and in the Foreign Ministry in Bangkok
Gontd. overleaf
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Indian interests were concerned, the abandonment of extra-
t w
territoriality appeared inadequate as a concession. But in
view of the larger interests at stake, it was willing to
(a )
consent to the negotiations. ' The Colonial Office also
agreed to the opening of the negotiations but it thought that
(o')more territory should be given to England, ' It should be 
remembered that three years earlier, when the news of the 
Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904 reached the Straits Settlements, 
Sir John Anderson wrote to Lord Elgin, the Colonial Secretary,
Gont. from overleaf
that negotiations regarding possible surrender of British juris 
diction were in progress. Strobel was much annoyed. He wrote 
to Paget, who was then in London on sick leave, warning him 
not to give any indication to the Siamese Legation especially 
with regard to cession of territory. Again in November of 
this same year the London Daily hail printed the news that 
negotiations between England and Siam had been going on for 
months. To avoid any misunderstanding with King Chulalongkorn, 
Paget had the following contradiction published in the local 
press of November' 19, 1907. "There have been rumours regarding 
an arrangement between Great Britain and Siam in reference to 
extraterritoriality, but we are authorised to state that up to 
this time there have been no negotiations on this subject 
between the two Governments.n F.O. 422/61, Grey-Paget, hay 1, 
1907. F.O. 571/331, P.O. Note. May 4, 1907. F.O. 628/28/314, 
Paget-Grey, May 4, 1907. F.O. 571/331, Tel., Campbell-Beckett, 
November 15, 1907. F.O. 422/61, Beckett-Grey, November 20, 
1907. Bangkok Times, November 19, 1907.
(1) F.O. 571/331, I.O.-F.O., August 14, 1907.
(2) F.O. 422/62, C.O.-P.O., August 1907, undated.
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suggesting that England should insist on Siam's surrendering
(s\ )
her claims to all the northern Malay States, y So this time
Sir John Anderson made an even stronger demand, writing to
Charles Lucas that;
... If it was impossible to obtain the whole 
area south of latitude seven, an effort should 
be made to secure Legeh, Rahman, Pattani,
Perlis and Setul, the latter two being 
dependencies of Kedah.(2)
In the meanwhile both Paget and Strobel were busy negot­
iating the bargain. While Paget was in London on sick leave 
in July 1907, Strobel wrote him a private letter summarising 
his proposals and making four other suggestions. Pirst, the 
Federated Malay States Government should pay back to Siam 
loans amounting to about £300,000 contracted by the Siamese
(7>\
Malay States. J Second, the British Government should make
(i\.)
a declaration in favour of higher import duties into Siam. '
(1) C.O. 273/330, Anderson-Elgin, March 27, 1907*
(2) C.O. 273/330, Anderson-Elgin, August 31, 1907*
(3) The indebtedness to the Siamese Government of Perlis,
Kedah and Kelantan: Kedah 2,600,000 dollars, Perlis
380,000, Kelantan 150,000; total 3,130,000.
P.O. 4-22/62, Williamson-Paget, February, 1908.
(4-) By the Treaty of 1855, aud confirmed by Sir Henry Parke's 
Treaty of May 15, 1856, import duties could not exceed 
3 per cent. Siam asked that this percentage be increased. 
Although formal statements were not made, it was estimated 
that the revised duty would be seven and a half per cent. 
The Times, May 19, 1906.
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Third, the abandoned Malay Peninsula Railway talks should
be reopened in the light of the Siamese Government's pro­
fitposalv 'and fourth, the Secret Convention of 1897 should be 
abrogated, as it was a hindrance to commercial liberty. A 
stipulation providing against strategic positions and the 
establishment of coaling stations by other Powers could be
(o')made in substitution. '
At the end of April, 1907, the Foreign Office, the India
Office and the Colonial Office all agreed to open negotiations
but they imposed certain conditions. These were the right to
hold land; an undertaking on public works similar to Article
( 3)VII of the 1904 Franco-Siamese Treaty 'and a stipulation
against the acquisition of territory in the Peninsula by
foreign Powers for strategic purposes. But the question of
the cession of more territory should be dropped. ' Lord
Llgin thought it was unwise to put forward any demands which
were likely to be considered excessive or unreasonable as the
(51Siamese might take fright and abandon the whole affair.
(1) See Chapter III.
(2) F.O. 371/351, Strobel-Paget, July 1, 1907.
(3) Siam gave the French Government the right to be 
consulted on public works in its sphere of influence.
(4) F.O. 371/331, F.O. Memorandum, May 28, 1907.
(5) C.O. 273/331, C.O. Mote, August 31, 1907.
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Campbell of the Foreign Office saw the situation in the same
light. He noted:
A glance at the map will show the large 
extent of the three provinces offered by 
Strobel. To ask for more territory 
would have a bad look.O)
However, in order to meet the spirit of the wishes of the
Colonial Office officials in the Straits Settlements, Beckett,
the British Consul in Bangkok, was cautioned by the Foreign
Office against saying anything which might stand in the way
of including, at a later stage in the negotiations, other
(?)
Malay-speaking States. J
When asked whether the Siamese Government was ready 
for talks, Strobel anticipated difficulty, in the absence
(7)\
of the King, in approaching the Siamese Ministers. He 
decided to sound out Prince Damrong first. The Prince was
(1) F.O. 371/331, F.O. Note on Paget's letter of April 27, 1907
(2) F.O. 371/331, Note on C.O.'s letter of September 6 , 1907, 
F.O. 422/61, Paget-Beckett, September 10, 1907.
(3) For the second time during his reign the King made a trip 
to Europe. The reason for the journey was the King's ill 
health and it had been stated that His Majesty's visit was 
confined to undergoing a cure at San Remo, but subsequently 
the King indicated that he would be glad to visit, in a 
private and unofficial capacity, those Courts where he
had been shown courtesy and kindness during his former 
stay in Europe. The King left Bangkok on March 27 and 
proceeded direct to San Remo. Then he visited France, 
England, Germany, Sweden and Norway, returning to Germany 
to complete the cure at Hamburg. He left Europe in 
October reaching Bangkok on November 17, 1907. Collected 
from despatches in F.O. 372/80. King Chulalongkorn,
Klai ban, (Far From Home), (Bangkok, 1954-).
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(A )
discouraging. ' Strobel therefore proposed to await the
return of the King from Europe when he felt he could probably
use his personal influence to secure the King's consent, as
(2)he had done with the French Treaty. '
On November 17, 1907, the King returned. Six days later
Strobel outlined the general purpose of the approaches which
he had made to Paget. The King did not, as he feared might
be possible, adopt an unsympathetic attitude regarding the
cession of Kelantan and Trengganu, but he did not commit
himself as to the cession of Kedah or to the idea that the
Federated Malay States Government should control the construc­
ts 'S')tion of the Railways. J
In December, 1907, Paget returned to Bangkok and shortly 
afterwards the formal discussions between him and Strobel
(1) Strobel complained in a private letter to Beckett that 
though he had not expected an altogether sympathetic 
attitude from the Prince, he was not prepared for such a 
cold reception. However, he was not surprised. In his 
opinion, Prince Damrong was the sort of man who wanted the 
credit of initiating everything but shirked responsibility 
unless he was certain of the King’s attitude. F.O. 422/61, 
Beckett-Paget, September 13, 1907.
(2) F.O. 371/331, Private, Strobel-Paget, September 14, 1907* 
F.O. 371/331, Beckett-Paget, September 17, 1907.
(3) F.O. 628/28/514, Beckett-Langley, Private, November 27, 
1907.
Strobel said that much depended on Prince Damrong*s 
attitude regarding the railway and regarding also the 
question of the cession of Kedah. The King was likely 
to seek the advice of the Prince who, as a Minister of 
Interior, was responsible for both issues.
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began. ‘These negotiations were under four headings:
1. The cession of territory to Great Britain.
2. The abrogation of the Secret Convention of 1897*
3. The abandonment of British extraterritoriality 
in Siam.
4. Arrangements for the construction of the Malay 
Peninsula Railway.
The cession of territory.
It was to Strobel’s suggestion for a cession of 
Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah that the negotiations concerning 
territorial cessions owed their origin. A series of talks 
over existing problems between England and Siam had been 
proceeding for years without any appreciable progress, and, 
failing the introduction of some such quid pro quo as a terri­
torial cession, the balance of advantage would be too pre­
ponderantly in favour of Siam to admit of any hope of success­
ful bargaining. To this extent, therefore, the cession of 
territory deserved a prominent position.
The question arises: why did Siam want to give up these
three Malay States? In fact it was Strobel who on his own 
initiative first advocated the cession. To him, these remote 
states were a source of weakness, danger and annoyance rather 
than of profit. Kelantan and Trengganu had never formed an 
integral part of Siam. In spite of the King's policy of 
strengthening Siam's administrative control by appointing Royal
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(1)Commissioners to station in Kelantan and Trengganu' ' from
1894 onwards and by his own extensive tours of the peninsula
(2)in the 1890's, J the Court of Siam could not trust the 
Sultans' loyalty. This uneasy situation coincided with the 
wish of the British Government to expand British influence in 
the north of the Peninsula. The Siamese came to realise that 
the appointment of a Siamese Adviser of British nationality 
to Kelantan in 1902 revealed British ambitions to incorporate 
the state into British Malaya. Evidence was apparent in 
Sir Frank Swettenham's close connection with the Sultan which 
caused smouldering irritation between the latter and the 
Siamese Government. For example, in October, 1903, Swettenham 
went to Kelantan to persuade the Sultan to turn against Siam.
He laid down four primary conditions: first, Kelantan should
come under British rule; second, the Sultan was to send the 
Bunga Mas to the British Government once in every three years; 
third, the British Government agreed to leave the administration
(1) In 1894 Phraya Tipakosa was appointed High Commissioner 
in Kelantan and Trengganu, F.M. Section 1-2 concerning 
the Pahang Rebellion, the King1s advice to Phraya 
Tipakosa on the occasion of the letter's taking office 
in Kelantan and Trengganu, 1894. Before 1892 Phraya 
Tipakosa had been appointed High Commissioner to Puket.
He had the duty to report on events in Kelantan and 
Trengganu to Bangkok. Darnrong Rajanubhab, Tesapiban, 
(Bangkok, i960), pp. 102-105.
(2) Darnrong Rajanubhab, Kan Sadet Phraratchasamnuen Prapat 
Laem Malayu 107.. 108, 116, 119, (Royal Tours of the Malay 
Peninsula in 1888, 1889, 1697, 1900), (Bangkok, 1925),
Foreword, p . 1.
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of the State in the hands of the Sultan; and, lastly,
England would allow the Sultan to govern the State in 
accordance with Malay religion and customs. But the Sultan 
was opposed to British intervention in the internal affairs 
of the State as had taken place in Perak and Pahang. The 
talk therefore proved fruitless. However, Swettenham was 
able to persuade the Sultan to fly a white flag in Kelantan
(1)instead of an elephant flag, a symbol of dependency on Siam. y 
Moreover, the Duff Company, established in 1901, was working 
in Kelantan for the sole interest of the British. The 
Company's affairs had been a constant source of trouble and 
anxiety. Considerable friction between Graham, Adviser to 
the Sultan, and the Duff Development Company over the 
Company's administrative rights in their concession brought 
the work of organising and developing the State to a standstill
(1) PM, 7/77, 5555* Luang Thammaraturatorn-Chao Khun 
Tesapiban, October 17, 1903.
PM, 597/8273, Prince Damrong-Prince Devawongse,
Hovember 1, 1903.
(2) At the time of Graham's first arrival in Kelantan in 1903, 
the Duff Development Company possessed many administrative 
rights, had much influence with the Sultan, and played a 
very important part in the affairs of the State. Graham 
evidently considered that to allow the existing conditions 
to continue would decrease his dignity and position as 
Adviser. Instead of trying to come to an amicable arrange­
ment with the Duff Company, he proceeded in an aggressive 
manner to question these rights and tried to excite 
distrust in the Sultan towards the Company. In 1905 a
new Agreement between the Kelantan Government and the 
Company was drawn up abrogating practically all the 
administrative rights held by the Duff Company. But the
Contd. overleaf
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The situation was the same in Trengganu. The Sultan, 
a man of character, as compared with the Sultans of Kedah and 
Kelantan, who had for some time succeeded in baffling any 
attempt to establish Siamese control over his State under the 
1902 Agreement, by his policy of passive resistance, continued 
to adopt similar tactics to thwart Siamese authority. ' At 
the same time the Siamese made no attempt to impose their 
suzerainty.
As regards Kedah, Prince Damrong's important change in
(o)
1897 in transforming it into a Monthonv 'comprising Kedah,
Gontd. from overleaf
situation remained unchanged. The Duff Company complained that 
Graham pursued a continuous policy of unfair interpretation 
of the new Agreement. Representations were made in Bangkok 
by the British Minister regarding Graham's unsatisfactory 
conduct, and it was threatened that unless he adopted a more 
peaceful policy the British Government would insist on his 
removal. In reply, Prince Damrong, the Siamese Minister of 
Interior, stated that if Graham's removal were insisted upon 
he would himself resign. Vide NA, R5, 3/197, "Concerning 
Mr. Duff's Application to Conduct Mining Operations in 
Kelantan."
(1) FM, 7838, Khun Nikornkanprakit-Prince Damrong, October
7, 1903.
(2) In the 1890's King Chulalongkorn introduced a policy of 
administrative centralisation throughout his kingdom. All 
provinces which formerly had been under Krom Mahatthai,
Krom Kalahom, and Krom Tha, were brought under the direct 
control of the Ministry of Interior, established in 1892. 
These provinces were grouped into Monthons or "Circles".
By 1906 there were a total of 18 Monthons, including 
Monthon Saiburi (Kedah). The High Commissioner (Khaluang 
Thesapiban) was appointed by the Ministry for each Monthon 
with full governing authority. In Kedah's case, the 
Sultan of Kedah was appointed the High Commissioner.
Prince Damrong, Tetsapiban, pp. 81-85.
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Perlis and Setul under actual Siamese control accomplished 
no miracles. The administration suffered from a lack of 
trained men and money. A capable official like Phraya Sukhum
(A \
Naivinit, J the High Commissioner of Nskornsittammarat, was
rare, host of the Siamese officials did not speak halay and
hardly understood huslim customs. Hence disagreement often
flared up. hr. Hart, who in 1905 was appointed Siamese
Pinancial Adviser to the Kedah Government, completely failed
(2)to gain any influence or control over the halay officials. 
Prequent complaints were made by hr. Prost, the British Consul
(1) Phraya Sukhum was an example, very rare in Siam, of a 
commoner, unaided by pretensions to Royal or noble descent, 
rising to the highest rank of nobility, that of Chao 
Phraya (he became Chao Phraya YommaraJ in 1909) to which
a commoner could attain. Starting his career as a tutor 
of the Princes, he spent nearly ten years in London 
teaching Siamese to those Princes who continued their 
studies in England. On his return to Siam he was taken 
over by the Minister of the Interior, Prince Damrong, and, 
as Phraya Sukhum, spent ten years as High Commissioner of 
Nakornsitamrnarat. He did much useful work in organising 
the administration of the Malay peninsula provinces, which 
at that time (1901) was by no means satisfactory. He was 
one of the few Ministers of State who was popular with 
his own people as well as with foreigners.
Ruang Tang Chao Phraya Krung Rattanakosin, (The Appointmenti 
of Chao Phrayas during the Bangkok Period), (Bangkok, 1951)■ 
pp. 172 -8. prince Damrong, Prawat Chao Phraya Mahasena 
Prawat Chao Phraya Bodindeje, Prawat Chao Phraya Yommaracj ,
(Biographies of Chao Phraya Mahasena, Chao Phraya 
Bodindeja, and Chao Phraya Yommaraj), (Bangkok, 1961), 
pp. 44-188.
(2) In a private letter to Campbell, Paget wrote: "Strobel 
said to Beckett that Hoops (a medical adviser in Kedah) 
was worth a dozen of Hart and latterly, when talking over 
the cession of Kedah to us, Westengard volunteered the 
remark that the Siamese Government would be glad to get 
rid of Hart 'who is not the same stamp of man that the 
Government of India have been in the habit of sending 
them1." —
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in Kedah, as to corruption among both the executive and
('I')Judicial officials, ' The situation became v;orse with the
(2)death of the Raja Mud a in 1906, ' which was followed immed­
iately by an attempt on the part of the Sultan himself to
resume the reins of government, to put in his own favourites,
( ^and to destroy the influence of the A d v i s e r . T h e  State 
Council, of which Hart was a member, had unanimously elected 
Tunku Ibrahim, the Sultan's eldest son, to become Raja Mud a, 
but the Sultan refused to give his consent on the grounds of 
his intention to abolish the title of Raja Muds and govern 
the country himself. The Siamese Government found much cause 
for dissatisfaction with the Kedah Government. Westengard, 
who visited the State in 1906 and who succeeded Strobel in 
1908, used the expression that Kedah was 'running wild’. 
Undoubtedly, this state of affairs was largely due to the 
somewhat Jealous policy pursued by the Straits Settlements, 
as exemplified in the Swettenham mission, in regard to any 
pronounced interference by Siam in the internal affairs of 
Kedah, and the situation was exploited by the Kedah Government 
to follow their own policy.
(1) F. 0. 571/738, The Annual Report of the year 1908.
(2) At that time the administration was carried on almost 
entirely by the Raja Muda, an exceedingly enlightened 
and intelligent Malay, a younger brother of the Sultan, 
flie Sultan himself was practically useless. Syed Mohammad
and M.G. Knowles, op cit, pp. 10 et sec.
(3) F.O. 371/332, Tel. Paget-Grey, June 7, 1907.
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Thus, in view of Duff's affairs in Kelantan, the unsat­
isfactory condition of Kedah since the Raja Mud a 's death, and 
the uncompromising attitude of the Sultan of Trengganu, Strobel 
would not be sorry to see the Siamese Government being freed 
from the responsibility of administering them. There was so 
much to be done in the heart of Siam that men and money could 
not be spared to rule those outlying possessions with a strong 
hand. Thus he much preferred to see Siam retain only those 
territories over which she exercised effective control. 
V/estengard, after his trip to the Malay Peninsula in 1906,
also supported the idea that Siam should forego her interests
M')m  this territory. y
Strobel convinced the King and his ministers that with 
the cession of these states to England all recurring diffi­
culties and numerous sources of friction would automatically 
disappear. Though the loss of territory would undoubtedly 
be galling to the nation, she must realise that, with the 
Siamese exercising only ineffective control over them, the 
day would inevitably come when Siam would lose all her Malay 
possessions to England without getting any return. Strobel 
reminded the King of the medical doctrine that amputation of 
diseased limbs was often necessary to save the trunk of the 
body from disease. Such amputation was necessary to Siam in
(1) P.O. 422/61, Paget-Grey, April 27, 1907*
order to rid her of those diseased and unhealthy portions of
the kingdom which served no other purpose than to weaken the
(1)rest of the State. J
Strobel did not waste much time in winning the King over 
to his side. Apart from the loss of face, the Siamese hardly 
regretted letting these states go. The words of King Chula- 
longkorn on his visit to these states in 1891 should be 
recalled:
... we have no particular interest in the 
states ... If we lost them to England we 
would miss only 'the Bunga has'. Apart 
from this there would not be any material 
loss. However, it is bad for the prestige 
of the nation. That is why we have to 
strengthen our hold over this part of 
territory ... (2)
And when Strobel presented the matter to the King his
immediate reply was:
As to Kelantan and Trengganu, I feel no 
interest in those States, and you can 
do whatever you like with them.(3)
During the negotiations, the only serious hitches which 
occurred were those concerning the division between the regions
(1) See also Phraya Kaha-Ammattayadhibbodi, Ruanp-; Mahatthai, 
(Interior Administration), (Bangkok, 1952), pp. 134— 156.
(2) King Ghulalongkorn, Royal Tour to the Peninsula in 1890, 
P. 325.
(3) P.O. 628/29/316, Conversation between the King and 
Strobel, November 2J, 1907. The reason for Prince 
Damrong*s discouragement in the first instance was 
probably due to the fear of loss of face, for he always 
adopted the watchword, ’Siam for the Siamese'.
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where Siamese control was indeed effective and those where 
it was probably only nominal. Administrative, ethnological, 
and geographical considerations were applied in places, but 
these were subject to considerations of Siamese dignity. A 
frontier including all the halay-speaking provinces in the 
peninsula, such as Rahman, Legeh and Pattani, was more 
desirable from a Federated Malay States' point of view. It 
had been the dream of Raffles, Braddell, Weld, Swettenham,
Low and others in the Colonial Office that the line of divi­
sion should be drawn so as to bring under British influence the 
predominantly halay and Mohammedan states, leaving to Siam 
those mainly Siamese and Buddhist.
All along, Paget had realised that, although the Siamese 
Government might be anxious in many respects to obtain the 
successful conclusion of these negotiations, there were limits, 
especially in the matter of cession of territory, beyond which 
it would not go. Strobel made two points clear when he first 
broached the subject. Firstly, the cession was based entirely 
on the wish of the Siamese Government to disencumber itself 
of the territory over which it exercised no control. Secondly, 
the division should be made from the standpoint of adminis­
trative rather than any other considerations. Thus he named
only the three states over which Siam had the least effective
(1)control. ' however, in spite of this, Paget had to keep in
(1) F.O. 4-22/62, Paget-Grey, February 7, 1908.
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mind the hope expressed by the Colonial Office officials in
London and in the Federated halay States that more territory
(1)might be ceded. ' In these circumstances the negotiations 
became distinctly delicate. For some time the question 
threatened seriously to impede the negotiations.
During his informal talks with Strobel, Paget firmly 
and insistently kept pushing for more territory. His argument 
was based on the fact that, on a racial basis, not only the 
States of Kelantan, Kedah and Trengganu, but also other 
portions of the halay Peninsula such as Perlis, Setul and 
Pattani would be transferred to England. Perlis and Setul
%
were geographically, ethnically, and culturally a part of
(2)Kedah. y As regards Pattani, the situation was always 
difficult. As has already been mentioned, early in the year 
1902 the Siamese Government found it necessary to arrest and 
deport the Raja of Pattani, who was alleged to be contemplating 
rebellion. From then on there were other indications of
(1) On hearing the news of the cession of territory, Cooks 
of the Foreign Office thought it desirable to acquire 
the whole Peninsula as far as Bangtapan. The Colonial 
Office took a similar view. F.O. 371/351? F.O. note, 
April 27, 1907. F.O. 422/61, Anderson-Elgin, August 
31, 1907.
(2) In 1839 Perlis was separated from Kedah and became an 
individual state.
(1)discontentment with Siamese rule. ' The British Government 
wanted to know whether the Siamese Government would be 
willing to relinquish this trouble-spot.
The request was cold-shouldered by Strobel who well 
understood that the suggestion of the cession of more terri­
tory would meet with a strong reaction from the Siamese. He 
replied boldly:
If that is to be the game, I think we 
had better abandon the negotiations at 
once. I am having sufficient difficulty 
with the King about Kedah and am not 
prepared to go further ....(2)
... there are considerable settlements 
of Siamese in Setul, and it might not be 
possible to include that state.(5) ...
As for Pattani it is out of the question, 
as the Siamese Government will never 
consent to its cession.^ ''
^ --------------------------------
\\ (1) In 1908 Mr. W.A.R. Wood, the British Consul in Songhla, 
reported that every citizen in Pattani disliked Siamese 
rule. Even the Raja, a poor old figurehead set up by 
the Siamese, complained: "You will see that my mouth
cannot speak some things, but in my heart I know what 
people are saying, and how unhappy the peasants of 
Pattani are now." P.O. 628/29/320, Wood-Paget,
September 22, 1907.
(2) P.O. 371/521, Paget-Campbell, Private, Pebruary 28, 1908.
(3) P.O. 422/61, Beckett-Paget, September 13 and 15, 1907.
& Strobel was inclined to think that Setul had stronger
(4) connections with Puket. Sixty per cent of the inhabitant 
were Sam Sam or Siamese who embraced Mohommedanism. But 
Prost, the British Consul in Kedah, protested. Prost 
reported to the Secretary to the High Commissioner of the 
Federated Malay States that the country was originally 
part of the old kingdom of Kedah, and had never had any 
connection with Puket. The people were Mohomrnedan and
Contd. overleaf
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However, in subsequent talks Strobel became more 
reasonable. To Paget's surprise, he calmly gave up Perlis.
The real motive behind this was not known for certain. It 
is probable that Perlis, on political and geographical grounds, 
should go with Kedah.
The refusal to give up Setul and Pattani, though an 
indication of Siamese unwillingness to give up more terri­
tory, did not deter the British negotiator. Early in 1908 
Paget claimed instead the southern part of Rahman and the
Langkawi Islands, leaving to Siam Terutau and small islands
(1)
to the west of Langkawi. '
Gontd. from overleaf
considered themselves Malays and not Siamese. P.O. 422/62, 
Prost-High Commissioner, November 2, 1907*
In October, 1907, the Si^m^Bfe Government introduced changes 
in the political status of Setul by appointing two Siamese 
officials to be a Treasurer and a Judge, sending a gun-boat 
there and placing the State under the direct orders of the 
High Commissioner at Puket. This step undoubtedly created 
the unfavourable impression in the minds of the British 
Government and the Government of the Straits Settlements 
that the Siamese wanted to remove that State from the 
sphere of the negotiations. P.O. 371/522, Beckett-Grey, 
December 15, 1907.
(1) P.O. 628/29/516, Paget-Anderson, March 18, 1908. 
C.O. 273/255, Anderson-Paget, January 27, 1908.
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(1)Surprisingly, Westengard, who succeeded Strobel, welcomed 
the idea. The explanation of this decision rested on one of 
two hypotheses; either that the antagonistic feelings of the 
Siamese died down after Strobelfs death or that the Siamese 
Government was desperately anxious to settle the railway 
question. The Siamese agreed to cede the Langkawi Islands and
Rahman if they could have the railway loan at 34 Per cent
(2)instead of a 4- per cent fixed rate. J
The proposal met with different reactions from Sir John 
Anderson and Paget. The former was extremely pleased with a 
34 per cent interest in return for two more pieces of land.
But, were Langkawi and Rahman worth -J per cent of the Railway 
loan? To balance the reduction of the interest Sir John 
Anderson thought that Legeh, another small state next to 
Kelantan, should also join British Malaya. Paget, on the
other hand, was completely opposed to the proposal. The 
many controversial chapters in the long history of his
(1) Mr. Westengard, an American, took up the position of 
Acting General Adviser to the Siamese Government in 1904-. 
Upon Strobel's death in January, 1908, he became General 
Adviser. The negotiations with England, then in progress, 
became his responsibility. He was able to achieve their 
successful conclusion in 1909. During his ten-years1 
service Westengard1s work was invaluable. He worked not 
only in the political sphere, but was concerned with 
numerous smaller matters. In 1910 Westengard was promoted 
to "Phraya Kalaya Na Maitri" . On his resignation in 1914- 
King Rama VI wrote: "The Siamese will not forget what he 
has contributed to Siam".
(2) F.O. 4-22/62, Paget interviewed Westengard, January 28, 1908.
(3) 0.0. 273/253, Anderson-Paget, January 29, 1908.
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association with the Siamese had already turned him into an 
extremely tough negotiator. Paget did not see the connection 
between the interest on the loan and the cession of Rahman 
and Langkawi. England was giving up so much to Siam but was 
being offered very little in return. By the proposed Treaty, 
England would abandon a stipulation similar to Article VII 
of the French Convention, so that the control of the construc­
tion of the railway by the Federated halay States was denied 
while at the same time the claims for Setul and Pattani were 
dropped. So he felt that England was entitled to ask for 
the lower portion of Rahman and the Langkawi Islands to com­
pensate for the concessions she was making. The railway 
interest should remain at 4- per cent but Anderson should give
(A \
up Legeh^ ' , since Paget believed that to persist in such a 
demand would impede the negotiations.
Paget's insistence yielded results. The Siamese Govern­
ment gave up Langkawi and Rahman without demur. Perhaps the 
renunciation by the British Government of extraterritoriality 
and the payment for the construction of the Railway by the 
Federated halay States Government were worth more than those 
two remote territories. The dark clouds of the dispute lifted
(1) 0.0. 273/253, Paget-Anderson, January 30, 1908 
F.O. 4-22/62, Paget-Grey, January 30, 1908.
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and the light broke through. Paget wrote to Sir Edward Grey
.... the territory we are gaining is 
considerably greater in extent, population 
and wealth, and incomparably more valuable 
than any of the Cambodian Provinces lately 
ceded to Prance .... O )
With the frontiers of the British possessions 
pushed northward as far as Setul on the west 
coast and as far as Sai on the east, and with 
the construction of the railway in progress, 
there is little doubt that the intervening 
wedge made up of Pattani, Legeh and Rahman 
will come very effectually under British 
influence, and will be easily accessible
to British enterprise.(2)
(1) P.O. 422/62,
(2) P.O. 422/63.
/r
Kedah and Perlis 
Lower Rahman 
Kelantan 
Trengganu
Paget-Grey, Pebruary 27, 1908. 
Paget-Grey, Pebruary 27, 1908.
Population
139,000 
4,443 
300,000 
114,895
Square Miles
Total 558,358
Kedah 2,880
Perlis 221
Langkawi 166
Lower Rahman 1,344
Lower Legeh* 544
Kelantan 5,551
Trengganu 4,512
Total 14,988
Vide P.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, May 20, 1908.
* At the suggestion of Anderson, the Kelantan-Legeh boundary 
was altered so as to give to England the lower portion of 
Legeh. In return, the Siamese Government received a small 
corner of North Eastern Kelantan.
P.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, April 2, 1908.
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»
The Abrogation of the Secret Convention
of 1897.
The abrogation of the 1897 Convention was one of the
chief objectives of the negotiations. Strobel regarded the
Convention, with its phraseology regarding concessions, as
affording England so stringent a hold over the Siamese Malay
States that they were rendered practically valueless to Siam.
If such conditions were allowed to continue the day would
inevitably come when Siam would lose all her Malay possessions
to England without getting any return. Certainly if the
Colonial Office continued their argument on racial and
cultural grounds. Prom the point of view of the British
Government also, the Convention, though affording a guarantee
against too rapid a penetration by foreigners into these
(1)States, was a constant source of trouble and anxiety. ' It 
seems therefore probable that the existence of the Convention 
was directly responsible for the suggestions as regards a 
cession of territory, and without the prospect of its abro­
gation no cession would have been suggested.
At the very outset of the negotiations, simultaneously 
with his request for the abrogation of the Convention, Strobel 
himself proposed to make a substitute Agreement of a purely 
political nature, in order to preclude the acquisition by
(1) See Chapter I on the 1Anglo-Siamese Secret Convention 
of 1897~' .
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foreign Powers of any harbour, strategic position or coaling
M')station.v J Paget, striking for the best bargain, urged that, 
in addition to such an agreement, the British Government be 
granted a provision similar to Article VII of the Franco- 
Siamese Convention of 1904, which gave the French Government
the right to be consulted on public works in its sphere of
(2)influence. J To this suggestion Strobel strongly demurred.
In his opinion, Article VII of the said Convention itself was 
not of immediate importance. The prospect of public works in 
the Mekong Valley was not a question which was at all pressing, 
nor would the Siamese Government for some time undertake public 
works there of any magnitude. Its existence would always be 
a restriction upon the undertaking of public works in the 
Mekong Valley. The desire for a modification of the Article 
had become stronger since the Treaty of March 23, 1907. The 
Siamese naturally felt that, having ceded to the French 
Government provinces in which they were interested, they ought 
to be left a free hand in the territory which they retained. 
Unlike the Mekong Valley, the question of public works in the 
Malay Peninsula was of some importance. If Siam, after ceding 
the territory, was still to submit to treaty restrictions in 
controlling and managing the remainder of their territory
(1) F.O. 422/61, Paget-Grey, April 29, 1907.
(2) F.O. 422/61, Paget-Beckett, Tel. September 10, 1907
2 1 0
then intervention in the Peninsula would continue in spite 
of the abrogation of the Secret Convention of 1897* Also the 
negotiations would fail in their whole object. At the same 
time Strobel would be deprived of one of the strongest argument*
on which he relied to induce the King to agree to the pro-
(1>)posal. ' A special Agreement was about to be concluded with 
the British Government regarding the Malay Peninsula Railway, 
and this was the most important of all works likely to be 
undertaken by the Siamese Government. In view of this 
strenuous opposition, the British claim to such a provision 
was dropped.
The Agreement of a purely political character which was
drafted by Paget on Strobel's request was worded, that:
Siam will neither in the Malay Peninsula nor 
in the islands adjacent thereto, nor in the 
territories situated in the immediate neigh­
bourhood of British In5"i3, cede or lease any 
territory of any description directly or 
indirectly to any foreign Government or 
Company to establish or lease any coaling 
station, to construct or own docks, or to 
occupy any harbour in a position likely to 
be prejudicial to British interests from a 
strategical point of view.(2)
While the matter was still only in the proposal stage, 
the sudden death of Strobel occurred in January, 1908. This
(1) P.O. 371/331, Strobel-Paget, September 14, 1907.
F.O. 371/521, Memorandum by Paget, January 25, 1908.
(2) F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, January 1, 1908.
The underlining is the writer's.
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sad circumstance delayed the negotiations for the next 
twelve months. When the talks were resumed again in early 
1909, Paget met with an altogether antagonistic response from 
the Siamese Government. Westengard, the new negotiator, 
raised several objections. First, he argued that the words, 
"territories situated in the immediate neighbourhood of 
British India", would extend the scope of the new Agreement 
to regions never contemplated in the 1897 Convention. 
Furthermore, the expression was vague, and might even be 
construed to cover Bangkok, a contingency which was naturally 
out of the question. Second, he regarded the words "to 
construct or own docks" as implying some measure of commercial 
restriction. Lastly, the phrase "occupy positions" was 
unfavourable, as being too indefinite and liable to mis- 
construction. '
At this stage the Siamese Government was beginning to
(1) The limits mentioned in the 1897 Convention covered the 
whole of the west coast of Siamese iialaya up to the 
British possession of Tenasserim and the whole of the east 
coast up to Bangtapan. North of this limit there were no 
harbours nor islands in any way adaptable as coaling 
j stations. Paget thought that such harbours or islands as
it based, any foreign Power could find an object in leasing
! territory, or could turn any territory inland to account
I as a position of strategical advantage detrimental to
British interests. Under these circumstances there 
appeared to be no ground for insisting on the phrase, 
"territories in the neighbourhood of British India", and 
that the scope of the new Agreement should extend above 
the southern boundary of the Province of Rajburi, which 
was perhaps a more convenient limit than the former one 
of Bangtapan. F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, February 27, 1906.
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show a lack of interest towards the negotiations. There was
already an outcry for the abandonment of the whole treaty.
Any different view on the British part would only endanger
the success of the negotiations. Paget had no option but to
agree to all amendments without delay. Nonetheless, he
succeeded in persuading the Siamese Government to agree to
(1)publish this Agreement. '
In estimating the relative value of the new Agreement as 
against the wording of the abandoned one, both parties got 
the best of the bargain. Siam was relieved of all responsi­
bility for the area covered by the Convention. To England, 
the new Declaration, being public, was a warning against 
pacific penetration. The much-vexed, question of concessions 
was set at rest, for the British Government had no longer the 
right of being consulted in granting concessions. As regards 
the northern portion of the peninsula which still remained to 
Siam, it now stood on a different administrative footing well 
under Siamese control. It seemed impossible for Siam to 
allow a foreign Power to establish a footing in those regions.
There was a question raised whether, in preparing a 
draft Convention, the abrogation of the 1897 Convention should 
form one of the documents for publication, or whether it
(1) Grey ordered Paget to obtain the publication of this 
document in return for abandonment of stipulations of 
Article VII of the French Convention. F.O. 371/521, 
Grey-Paget, January 25, 1908.
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d')should be considered confidential. The territory which
Siam was about to cede to England was directly the price 
paid for the abrogation of the Secret Convention, and should 
the abrogation remain secret, a misapprehension might arise 
to the effect that territory was being bartered for juris­
diction and that too little return was gained for the sacri­
fice of territory. On the other hand, the disclosure of the 
Secret Convention through the publication of its abrogation 
might cause criticism of the practice of concluding secret 
treaties, and might lay Siam open to the accusation of enter­
ing into secret engagements with England contrary to her 
Treaty obligations v/ith other foreign Powers. The British 
Government had, after consideration of the several agreements, 
decided that such abrogation should remain confidential. In
its view, publication of the abrogation would tend to produce
( 2.)a more rapid influx of foreigners. J In April, 1908, 
however, the British authorities expressed a willingness to 
change their view, and enquired whether there would be any 
objection on the part of the Siamese Government. Westengard 
personally favoured the idea, for such publication would be a
(1) P.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, January 11, 1908.
(2) F.O. 371/521, Paget-Grey, January 11, 1908. C.O.-F.O.,
January 25, 1908.
(3) F.O. 371/522, Paget-Grey, hay 59 1908. The British 
Government wanted to point to the fact that the territory 
ceded by Siam was the price paid for this abrogation,
and not for jurisdiction.
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complete answer to the incredulous persistency of the German 
and Dutch representatives, and take the wind out of their 
sails in the matter of their request for a quid pro qiSio^ Ee 
was, however, unable to convert the King to his own views 
although all the Ministers were favourably inclined towards 
this being done. The King recoiled from the accusations to 
which he felt he would expose himself, and the irritation that 
would arise not only on the part of Germany and the Netherlands 
but of France also, with whom his relations were then most 
cordial, if a secret Agreement with England were made public.
He evidently looked on complaints as to the insufficiency of 
the quid, pro quo as more temporary and easier to meet, and 
therefore the least disagreeable alternative, for after a 
month's reflection he gave his definite decision against 
p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s  decision was notified to the Foreign 
Office on hay 21, 1909, and the Secret Convention, with the 
instrument of March 10 cancelling it, thus continued to remain 
confidential. Campbell, who saw the seeds of danger in 
secrecy, noted:
I have always been against publication
myself not because of the French, but
(1) The Dutch and German representatives requested for an 
appointment of one adviser either of German or Dutch 
nationality by way of a set-off against what they consi­
dered unfair advantage gained by England, who had secured 
cession of territory as compensation for surrender of 
jurisdiction. F.O. 422/64, Beckett-Grey, April 26, 1909.
(2) F.O. 422/64, Pe^ett-Grey, May 4, 1909.
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because I thought it would enable the 
Germans to make themselves unpleasant to 
Siam on the ground that the Convention 
was a violation of their Federated Malay 
States’ rights. But the position is ■ 
different how as the new Treaty says the 
Secret Convention is abrogated and the 
new Treaty must be published. It is 
therefore difficult to see how publication 
of the Secret Convention can be avoided. O )
Campbell was right. The abandoned Convention made its 
first dramatic appearance in 1910 in the Treaties, Engage­
ments , and Sanads published in Calcutta by the Government of 
India. The Siamese Government was caught by surprise. It 
sent an urgent enquiry to look into this most regrettable
(p\
occurrence. y Sir Edward Grey, astonished and displeased,
pressed for reasons from the India Government. It appeared
(X\
to be due to pure oversight. But everything was too late.
The secrecy was no longer maintained. The British Government 
as well as the Government of India could only greatly deplore
( l v \
the error which had been committed. y m  acknowledging
(1) F.O. 371/736, Campbell's note, May 6 , 1909.
(2) F.O. 422/66, Beckett-Grey, August 10, 1911.
(3) F.O. 422/66, Grey-Beckett, September 6 , 1911*
(4) Grey noted:
I suppose all we can do is to send the 
annexed telegram to Bangkok, though an expression 
of regret will be poor compensation to the 
Siamese Government for what must look to them 
very much like a gross breach of faith on the 
part of His Majesty's Government.
It is a disturbing reflection that over­
sights which might have such grave consequences 
are possible and perhaps we ought to "rub it in” 
to the India Office.
F.O. 371/1222, F.O. Note on India Office's letter 
dated September 2, 1911.
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this expression of regret, Prince Devawongse requested that 
steps should he taken to modify as far as possible the 
erroneous impression which might lead to the belief that the 
1897 Convention was still in force, when it had been can­
celled on the 10th March, 1909.^'" With this request the 
incident closed. Undoubtedly, the publication of -this secret 
document did not give the Siamese Government the same anxiety
which would have been felt had King Chulalongkorn been still
CP')on the throne.v J
The Abandonment of British 
Extraterritoriality in Siam.
By the end of the year 1907 the main principles of the 
scheme to achieve a partial modification of extraterritoriality 
had been only roughly devised. Strobel advanced a proposition 
that England should, in the case of her Asian subjects, make 
at least the same concessions as had been made by Prance 
respecting her Asian subjects. The British had no objection 
but they wanted to obtain very full guarantees for the proper 
administration of the Siamese courts, inasmuch as, since 
British policy v/as to make no distinction between British
(1) P.O. 371/1222, Beckett-Grey, October 28, 1911.
(2) King Chulalongkorn died on October 23, 1910.
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European and Asian subjects, the submission of Asians to
Siamese jurisdiction entailed also the submission of 
(1 ^Europeans. ' Had the French Treaty of 1907 not intervened 
v/ith the distinction it created between Asians registered 
before and after the Treaty, and the provision as to the 
cessation of the International Court system after the intro­
duction of the Siamese codes, the arrangement with England 
would have heen a simple one, namely, that all British 
subjects, European or Asian, should, subject to certain 
safeguards as to the presence of European advisers, come 
under the same jurisdiction throughout Siam as had been 
created for the North by the Chiengmai Treaty of 1883.
Indeed, Strobel considered such an arrangement as fulfilling 
all his expectations. Much did he appreciate as late as 
January of 1908 the justice of the contention that the pro­
posal to submit to the direct jurisdiction of the purely 
Siamese courts British European subjects who might come to 
Siam after the signature of the Treaty was a sweeping change. 
Eventually the solution which satisfied Strobel's and Paget's 
requirements was that all British subjects should be amenable 
to the jurisdiction of the International Court where guarantees 
were provided for the protection of British subjects in view 
of the gradual cessation of the right of withdrawal clause. 
These were, broadly speaking, that in every case to which a
(1) F.O. E22/62, Paget-Grey, January 1, 1908
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British subject was a party there should be a European Judge
on the bench, Europeans should have the right of having their
cases tried in Bangkok, and in every case to which a British
Asian subject was a party there should be one of the European
(1)legal advisers to the Siamese Government in Court, y
However, Strobel did not really gauge Siamese feeling
on this point, for when, subsequent to his death, Westengard
came to take the matter up with the Siamese Government, he
met with strong opposition from the King. His Majesty argued
that Siam had obtained certain rights over foreign subjects
by the French Treaty, and could not agree to accept less
(2)favourable terms from another Power. J Most important of 
all, should all British subjects be amenable only to the
(1) F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, January 1, 1908.
With the expansion of legislation directed by Prince Rabi, 
several European Legal Advisers were engaged to assist the 
judicial administration in Bangkok from 1897 onwards. But 
it was not until the appointment of Mr. J. Stewart Black, 
an Englishman, as Judicial Adviser to the Siamese Govern­
ment in 1904 that any fixed policy of improvement by means 
of European supervision was established. Under Black's 
direction, young English solicitors were engaged for 
definite periods. They were required to make themselves 
familiar with the Siamese language and law, and were 
attached to most of the principal Courts in Bangkok as 
advisers, and were occasionally sent to inspect and 
advise the provincial Courts. By 1907 nine of these 
young Legal Advisers were employed.
Apart from this there were four senior Advisers (including 
the Judicial Adviser). One, a Japanese, sat in the 
Dika Court, and two Belgians in the Appeal Courts.
Ministry of Justice Report, 1907.
(2) F.O. 628/29/326, Paget's Memorandum of an Interview with
Westengard, February 4, 1908.
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International Court, France would at once demand the same 
privilege, a contingency which would entail a backward 
instead of a forward step for Siam. The argument that England 
stood on a different footing from France inasmuch as she 
proposed to submit both British European and Asian subjects 
to the International Court, and eventually to the Siamese 
Courts, proved of no avail. The King remained obdurate. He 
insisted that all British subjects registering after the 
Treaty should come under the ordinary Siamese Courts. To 
overcome the difficulty Paget complied with the King's wish 
by bringing British subjects registered after the Treaty under 
the Siamese Courts so long as Siam applied likewise guarantees 
in the International Court to the Siamese Courts and these 
guarantees should not cease except with the consent of the 
British Government. Thus, the complications which arose in 
early 1908 were those of extending the guarantees and safe­
guards regarding the conduct of the ordinary Siamese Courts.
In February, 1908, the draft Agreement was drawn up. 
Article 6 referred to the question of jurisdiction. It 
stipulated that:
----N
The jurisdiction of the Siamse.s International 
Courts, established by Article 8 of the 
Treaty of 5^d September, 1885, shall, under 
the conditions defined in the Protocol of 
Jurisdiction annexed hereto, be extended to 
all British subjects in Siam registered at 
the British Consulates before the date of 
the present Treaty.
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This system shall come to an end, and the 
Jurisdiction of the International Courts 
shall be transferred to the ordinary 
Siamese Courts after the promulgation 
and the coming into force of the Siamese 
codes, namely, the Penal Code, the Civil 
and Commercial Codes, the Codes of Proce­
dure, and the Law of Organization of Courts.
All other British subjects in Siam shall 
be subject to the Jurisdiction of the 
ordinary Siamese Courts.O)
Briefly, the Judicial Article provided for the exercise 
of Jurisdiction over British subjects by two different sets 
of tribunals:
1. Those registered prior to the date of the Treaty would 
come under the Jurisdiction of the International Court in 
which the guarantees would be:
(a) The presence of the Consul with the right of removal 
which, however, gradually disappeared with the promulgation 
codes, then being drafted.
(1) P.O. 422/62, The Draft Treaty of 1908.
(2) The nucleus of a Code Commission was formed by the 
appointment of M. Padoux in 1904 as Legislative Adviser. 
In September, 1908, the new Siamese Penal Code came into 
force. This codification caught the attention of the 
Ministry of Justice from 1897 when Dr. M. Schlesser, a 
Belgian, was first engaged in the work. When he left 
the service in 1902, he took the draft Penal Code to 
Europe where he amended it and brought it up to date.
It was returned to the Ministry of Justice in 1904. At 
this time M. Padoux was appointed Legislative Adviser and 
attached to the Ministry. The work of re-drafting the 
Code began early in 1904. M. Schlesser's draft was used 
as a frame-work. Pinally a substantially new Code was 
completed in December 1905. In December 1906, the King 
appointed a Commission of Revision to decide finally on
Contd. overleaf
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(b) For Europeans, a European Judge on the bench.
(c) For Asians, the presence on the bench of one of 
the European legal advisers of the Siamese Government.
2. Those registered subsequently to the conclusion of the 
Treaty would fall under the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
Siamese Courts in which the guarantees would be:
(a) The presence of one of the British Consular officers 
in Court, if desired, but without the power of removing cases.
(b) For Europeans a European Judge on the bench.
(c) For Asians, the presence on the bench of one of
(1)the European legal advisers to the Siamese Government.
Contd. from overleaf
the adoption of the Draft. The members of this Commission 
were Prince Damrong, Prince Devawongse, Prince Naret, and 
Prince Rabi.
During the year 1907 the revision of details was 
carried on by M. Padoux and the Judicial Adviser, Black, 
the latter being responsible for the actual wording of 
the English text. Ii. Padoux made at the same time a 
complete translation into French, so that the publication 
of the Code would, when enacted, be made simultaneously 
in Siamese, English and French.
Vide Ruang Kong Chao Phraya Kahitorn, p. 71*
(1) These arrangements presumably followed the lead given by 
France. The transition of a French Asian subject from his 
position to the eventual condition of submission to full
jurisdiction was by three stages:
1. From the French Consular Court to the International 
Court, with the right of removal, and appeal to the 
Siamese Appellate Tribunal in Bangkok, whose members 
included at least two European Judges.
2. The right of ’removal' from the International Court
ceased as each new code was published in respect of
all cases coming within the scope of that particular
code. Appeals still remained as under the first stage.
Contd. overleaf
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Europeans would have, in addition to the above-mentioned 
guarantees, whether they fell under the jurisdiction of the 
International or the Siamese Courts, the right of having 
their cases tried in Bangkok, if they were defendants or 
accused, or of having the European Judge of the Court of 
First Instance in Bangkok sent to the locality where the 
case was to be tried.
If, then, these two sets of guarantees be compared, the 
only difference would be found in the fact that in the Inter­
national Court the Consul would possess the right of removal, 
while this was not the case in the ordinary Siamese Courts. 
Circumstances would, however, render this distinction 
practically of no effect, for it was scarcely conceivable 
that, with a European Judge on the bench, the British Consuls 
would feel themselves justified in withdrawing a case to 
their own Court. Therefore the International Court would in 
actual practice be nothing more than a Siamese Court for the 
trial of cases in which British subjects were concerned. It 
would be one and the same in composition and in every other 
respect, merely changing its name according to the case that 
was up for trial.
Contd. from overleaf
3. When all the codes were published, French Asian
subjects passed from the International Court to the 
purely Siamese Courts, both as regards Courts of
First Instance and of Appeal.
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It should be remembered, in addition to this, that the 
appeal lay to the same Courts of Appeal as well as from the 
Siamese Courts as from the International Court, namely, to 
the Appellate Court in Bangkok, in the composition of which 
there would be two European Judges. Thence appeals went to 
the Dika Court, or King's Court, in which a private assurance 
was given that there would likewise he two European Judges, ' 
and finally there remained as a last resort, should circum­
stances warrant the step, the possibility of diplomatic 
intervention.
With such safeguards as these the situation appeared as 
substantial as any British subject could hope for.
The British officials took a favourable view of the 
principles of the Draft Treaty. During a three-month talk 
prior to signature there were minor alterations suggested by 
both the Siamese and British Governments. Nonetheless, 
nothing significantly affected the main theme in principle.
(1) Later the F.O. commented that, "... it is a pity we 
cannot get Siam to promise the two English Judges in 
the Dika Court more formally ..." F.O. 371/7359 Note 
on Paget's Telegram dated January 22, 1909.
Arrangements for the Construction of 
The Malay Peninsula Railway.
When the cession of territory was offered to England in 
April, 1907, the talks concerning the railways were already
in progress. The settlement was then still remote and largely
#•
depended on the extent to which the Siamese Government was 
prepared to push forward its railway policy and to fall in 
with the wishes and views of the Federated Malay States. The 
proposal for the construction of the Railway on non-political 
lines, made by Strobel, gave rise to the expectation of some 
British officials in Bangkok that the actual construction of 
the railway might be left in the hands of the Federated Malay 
States railway authorities. However Strobel denied such a 
possibility since it was impossible for him to obtain the 
consent of the Siamese Government. True, in return for the 
loan of the money, the Federated Malay States should have the 
right to make certain stipulations regarding the personnel 
of construction, but beyond this they could not go. Subsequent 
negotiations showed that Strobel was right regarding the 
sentiments of the Siamese Government. The tempting offer of 
° loan of money at the low rate of per cent which Sir John
derson proposed to the Siamese Government if it would hand 
over the actual construction of the railway to the Federated 
1 Malay States Government was rejected. The Siamese seemed to 
prefer to pay the higher rate of 4 per cent to such an 
alternative.
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In July, 1907, Strobel brought the railways question up
(1)for discussion together with the territorial cession, ' but 
it was not until the third week of January, 1908, that formal 
talks took place. Strobel had died the previous week but 
the controversies which lasted from 1906 did not blow over 
with his death. The Federated Malay States still failed to 
persuade the Siamese Government to comply with their wishes. 
The usual complications arose over the extent of the control 
of the Federated Malay States Government on the line. In 
Sir John Anderson's view, the minimum the Federated Malay 
States could demand was to ask the Siamese Government to 
submit all plans and surveys to them, thus giving the lender
the right of inspection and the right of consultation as to
(2)
the construction personnel. J But the Siamese would suffer
no expression such as "approve of plans or consult regarding
( 3)plans" which conveyed any idea of veto or control. "  Such 
a thought was both wounding to the Siamese amour-propre and 
aroused Siamese apprehensions as to the possibility of the 
railway becoming the means of increasing British influence
(1) F.O. 571/331, Strobel-Paget, July 1, 1907-
(2) G.O. 273/253, Anderson-Paget, January 18, 1908.
(5) F.O. -4-22/62, Memorandum by Paget regarding an interview 
with Westengard on January 28, 1908.
in the Siamese ha lay States at the expense of Siamese
d ' )influenced J Sir John Anderson was discontented. He worked
up an argument that,
the proposition of Siam that we should advance 
money to the extent of several millions 
sterling, taking charge as security of the 
railway, over construction of which we have 
no supervision or control, is not business.
If money squandered we are helpless, and if 
we refuse money to complete, security is 
only a worthless railway ending in a i r . (2)
Nevertheless, Paget failed to win the Siamese over to his side.
In February, 1908, an agreement between the Royal 
Railway Department of Siam and the Federated Malay States 
Government was drafted, its main principles being embodied 
in Articles 9, 10 and 11. Article 9 secured the establishment 
of a separate department for construction and control until 
construction was completed. Thereafter the lines constructed 
would be under the control of a separate Siamese Director- 
General until the loan was paid off. ' ' Article 10 regulated
(1) F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, January 30, 1908.
With the Junction of the railways, the Siamese apprehended 
the possibility of a very heavy influx of foreigners, 
i.e. Chinese, into the mining districts of the Siamese 
Malay States. They were much perturbed by the idea of 
such a possibility since they considered their admini­
stration would not be strong enough to cope with the 
circumstances, and they feared they might be hustled out 
of more territory. F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, March 24, 1908
(2) F.O. 422/62, Anderson-Paget, January 29, 1908.
(3) This was the point upon which the British Government
insisted when the project of the Malay Peninsula Railway 
first started.
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the relations between borrower and lender in respect of
showing surveys, plans, specifications, and the examination
of books and estimates. ' Under paragraph 11 the Siamese
Government agreed that the principal engineers should be
British. To the draft Agreement a letter from Westengard to
Paget was also attached in which the statement appeared that
the line was intended for through-traffic between Bangkok
amd Singapore or, in other words, that it would connect with
( o )
the Federated Malay States' railway system.v ' This draft 
agreement was, however, not considered by Sir John Anderson 
and the Manager of the Federated Malay States Railway as 
sufficiently precise. ' To them, no provision was made,
(1) The Siamese Government refused to pledge itself on paper 
to the effect that it would 'consult1 the Federated Malay 
States. The wording was:
"The borrower should keep such books and accounts as 
shall be necessary to show the amount expended by him from 
time to time out of the sums received by him from the 
lender under this Agreement. These books and accounts 
shall be open to inspection by the lender at all reasonable 
times, so that he may satisfy himself that the moneys 
advanced by him have been applied to the purpose for which 
they were loaned.
The Railway Department of the Federated Malay States 
shall be at liberty to inspect the plans, showing the 
road along which the railway is proposed to be constructed, 
the sections, specifications, and estimates of the cost 
of the railway, and the number and locality of its sidings, 
stations, level crossings, goods sheds, signal stations, 
and other works, from time to time, as the survey and 
preparation of working drawing proceeds."
(2) F.O. 4-22/62, Paget-Grey, February 27, 1908.
(3) Beckett went to Singapore to discuss the matter with
Anderson.
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and no assurance given regarding the ultimate Junction of 
the Siamese with the Federated Malay States Railway system 
and the Siamese Government was not sufficiently hound to 
spend the money loaned by the Federated Malay States exclusi­
vely on the trunk line, in the construction of which only the 
latter was interested. J Sir John Anderson considered it 
necessary to add a clause to secure three points, namely, the 
linking up of the Siamese and the Federated Malay States 
systems on the Kelantan frontier, the systematic and continuous 
construction of the trunk line, and that the whole of the 
money loaned should be devoted primarily to the construction
(o')of the trunk line. '
Westengard agreed with Sir John Anderson. He hurriedly
proposed a clause to be added to the Railway Agreement. It
was phrased in these terms:
It is the intention of each of the parties 
hereto to construct within the territory 
of Siam and of the Federated Malay States 
respectively a trunk line for through 
traffic between Bangkok and Singapore.
Each party shall proceed with the con­
struction of his portion of the line 
systematically and continuously, subject 
naturally to unforeseen difficulties of 
supply of labour, cost of materials, etc., 
which may intervene. The Junction shall 
be made at the boundary between Kelantan 
and Legeh. The borrower depends upon the 
proceeds of their loan as a fund out of
(1) G.O. 275/253, Anderson-Crewe, April 18, 1908.
(2) G.O. 273/255, Anderson-Crewe, April 18, 1908. 
F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, April 9, 1908.
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which to build his portion of said trunk 
line, and it is his intention to devote 
said funds primarily to the construction 
of the trunk line. According to the 
borrower’s estimates said proceeds 
appear to be more than sufficient for 
the purposes of the trunk line, but he 
cannot guarantee that in fact they will 
prove so.
Nothing in this Agreement shall give 
either party the right to control or 
interfere with the work of construction 
or operation of the line of the other 
party.
Westengard considered that this clause secured, first a 
Junction between the Federated Malay States and Siamese lines. 
Second, the region in which the Junction should be made was 
approximately fixed. Third, indefinite postponement of the 
"linking up" was precluded by the provision that the line 
should be systematically and continuously constructed. And 
fourth, expenditure of money borrowed from the Federated Malay 
States for purposes other than the construction of the trunk 
line was guarded against. '
This additional clause was strenuously resisted by the 
Siamese Government, especially by the King, whose opposition 
to the Agreement was becoming more and more pronounced. His
Majesty would go no further than he had done in the Agreement
(2)as originally drawn up. J The King once stated that, if it 
were not for his great confidence in Strobel's and Westengard's
(1) F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, March 24, 1908.
(2) F.O. 628/29/316, Paget-Anderson, April 2, 1908.
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opinions and abilities, he would have put his foot down about 
the railway negotiations long ago. J Siam was already 
sufficiently bound by the stipulations regarding control and 
the employment of British engineers. His Majesty also feared
that it might give the British something of a hold over the
(2)Siamese Government. ' As westengard put it,
The Siamese are now terrified of the 
grip which the loan and the railway 
may give the Federated Malay States 
over them.(5)
It should be remembered that the possibility of the Straits 
Settlements Government's interference in this part of the 
peninsula had been a perpetual bugbear to the Siamese Govern-
(1) A short time previous to the signature of March 10 Treaty 
an inclination was visible on the part of the King to 
mistrust the advice of Prince Damrong who, for so many 
years and in so large a measure, enjoyed the Royal confi­
dence in a manner unique perhaps in the history of Siam.
It may have been because the King considered that Prince 
Damrong, in the course of the treaty negotiations, espec­
ially with regard to Malay Peninsula Agreements, yielded 
too much to Great Britain and protected Siam's interests 
too little. The chief point of attack on Prince Damrong's 
policy was his pet scheme of the Malay Peninsula Railway, 
without which he clearly saw that there could be no sound 
cohesive administration on the Siamese portion of the 
Malay Peninsula. The Grown Prince's Report on his pro­
longed tour in the Malay Peninsula provinces in 1909 
tended to widen rather than to lessen the breach between 
the King and Prince Damrong. The Prince was struck very 
forcibly with the fact that commercial enterprise in 
whatever shape or form in the peninsula was entirely in 
the hands of foreigners, chiefly British and Chinese, to 
the total exclusion of the natives of Siam.
P.0.371/739, Beckett-Grey, July 7, 1909.
King Vajiravudha, Royal Tour to the Malay Peninsula in 1910
(2) P.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, April 9, 1908.
(3) P.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, April 23, 1908.
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ment ever since the Kelantan and Trengganu episode in 1902.
The Siamese, who by nature disliked any written agreements,
thought that if everything had to be set down in black and
white and tied up with fool-proof conditions negotiations and
good relations would be very difficult.
The King’s remonstrance matched Sir John Anderson's
stubbornness. The latter declared:
.... if the Siamese refused to alter the 
draft Agreement to suit our requirements, 
the entire negotiations should be post- 
poned until our requests are complied with. ^
Because,
.... it looks to me as though the railway
would never be built, for there is nothing 
in the present Agreement to oblige the /pN 
Siamese to construct the railway at all.
Anderson knew full well that Siam badly needed the conclusion
of the whole treaty. Every Siamese was extremely anxious to
see the abolition of the extraterritorial rights and the
abrogation of the 1897 Convention root and branch. Thus the
Straits Settlements Government could afford to wait. The
longer it did so the more it would gain.
The negotiations showed no sign of progress. Discussion
went back and forth between the British Representatives and
the Siamese Government. The issue resolved itself into this,
that either both parties had to take the Railway Agreement as
(1) C.O. 273/253, Anderson-Paget, June 18, 1908.
(2) P.O. 371/522, Paget-Westengard, July 6 , 1908
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it stood or abandon it altogether, Paget considered that 
this latter cause would, for many reasons, be regrettable.
The discussion of this project proceeded concurrently with 
important negotiations regarding extraterritoriality, the 
abolition of the Convention of 1897 end the cession of territor; 
The transfer of jurisdiction would terminate many troublesome 
questions regarding the trial of British subjects and regis­
tration would confer on British subjects the right to hold 
land, the abrogation of the 1897 Convention would give relief 
from the much-vexed question regarding concessions to forei­
gners, whilst the cession of Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah 
would add a large area to British Malaya.
In July, 1908, the railway duel was suspended for the 
time being. Paget went on leave to England. On his way, he
stopped in Singapore to clear up an adjustment to the draft
(1)Agreement with Sir John Anderson, 'the great stickler1.
Paget uttered a persuasive plea for immediate consideration.
One reason, he argued, was that once the Siamese signed the 
Treaty they would comply with the building of the Railway. 
Although the Siamese Government refused to pledge itself on 
paper to the effect that it would 'consult' the Federated 
halay States regarding the route to follow, Paget felt that 
in actual practice it would consult them freely on every
(1) F.O. 371/735  ^F.O. Note on C.O.-F.O., February 4, 1909.
233
point of importance. In the end, Sir John Anderson
reluctantly gave approval to Paget. He said:
Well, I am willing to let all the rest 
go just as it is if you can get some 
sort of assurance from the Siamese that 
the railway will be built and will 
commence without undue delay .after 
the signature of the Treaty.
When the discussion was resumed in January, 1909, the negot­
iations entered a new phase. The Siamese proposed that althoug] 
the Railway Agreement was to be signed at the same time as the 
Treaty, no reference should be made to it in the Treaty, nor 
should it be attached, but should be considered quite separa­
tely as a purely private contract between the Siamese Govern­
ment and the Federated Malay States. The Siamese hated the
political character the Agreement was given by association
(2)with the rest of the Treaty. ' Anderson concurred, thus 
making the Siamese attitude towards the Treaty markedly more 
favourable. In January and February, 1909, some more altera­
tions were agreed upon without much ado. First, Article 9 
was changed to read, "It is agreed that, until the completion 
of the construction of the lines to be built under this
(1) F.O* 371/522, Paget-Y/estengard, July 6 , 1908.
^2) In the draft Agreement Article 4- read:
The Federated Malay States will make a loan to the 
Siamese Railway Department of a sum of money for the 
purpose of constructing a railway in the Siamese territory 
in the Malay Peninsula. The terms and conditions of 
this loan are set forth in a separate Agreement bearing 
even date with this Treaty.
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Agreement , the construction, equipment, maintenance and 
operation of those lines shall be kept distinct from that 
of the other railways of the borrowers." The original 
v/or ding was:
It is agreed that a separate Department shall 
be formed for the construction, equipment, 
maintenance, and operation of the railway 
hereinbefore described. The separate 
Department shall remain in existence and 
perform its duties until the completion of 
the lines to be constructed under this 
Agreement. If, thereafter, the separate 
Department ceases to exist, the lines 
constructed hereunder shall be placed under 
the direct control of a Siamese Director-
The change may possibly at first sight appear to alter the 
effect of the Agreement, but in fact, it was of no consequence. 
The words ’separate Department’ were omitted because the 
Siamese thought that they were galling to the prestige of 
the Railway Department. Second, Article 11 which provided 
that the principal engineer should be British was deleted 
from the Agreement and replaced by the same assurance to 
Paget, in a letter from Prince Damrong. A slight difference 
was, however, introduced, inasmuch as the Siamese Government 
stated "the Chief Engineer" should be British, as compared 
with "principal engineers" in the former version. Third, a 
letter from Westengard to Paget regarding the explanation of
General until the money which is to b 
due hereunder shall have been repaid.
(1) F.O. 422/64-, Paget-Grey, January 22, 1909. 
The underlining is the writer’s.
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the Agreement was entirely omitted. ' It was replaced by
Prince Damrong's letter which, in addition to the two points 
already mentioned, contained the following statement:
At the beginning of March, 1909, when the 10th of March, 
the deadline for signature, drew near, financial considerations 
arose which caused the Siamese Government to hesitate in 
signing the Agreement, Prince Damrong put forward a request 
for an additional loan of £500,000 from the Federated Malay 
States for the construction of a branch line from Patalung 
to Trang. "  But Sir John Anderson turned a deaf ear.
However, he compensated with a promise to pay the whole of
(1) Vide F.O. 4-22/62, The Draft Agreement.
(2) F.O. 4-22/64, Paget-Grey, January 22, 1909.
(3) F.O. 4-22/64-, Paget-Grey, February 20, 1909.
Prince Damrong's contention was that from the point of 
view of the Siamese Government, the Patalung-Trang branch 
was of more importance than the line to the Kelantan 
frontier, and that, although fully intending to carry on 
the construction of the main line to the Kelentan frontier 
"continuously", he thought it advisable to announce that 
the Siamese Government also intended simultaneously to 
construct the Patalung-Trang section. Unless this were 
fully understood, His Royal Highness thought a misunder­
standing might easily occur, and the best means of insuring 
an acknowledgement of the Siamese Government's right to 
construct the Patalung-Trang line was to ask the Federated 
Malay States Government to lend the money for its 
construction. F.O. 371/735, Paget-Grey, February 20, 1909*
Construction will be begun as soon as 
financial arrangements are concluded, 
and will carry on continuously to 
connect with t ! e d  Malay States
north-eastern
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the indebtedness of Kedah, Kelantan and Perlis to the
Siamese Government, in two instalments, on July 1 and January 1
respectively. This would give the Siamese Government a sum 
of some £380,000 in hand which it might devote to the con­
struction of the Patalung-Trang line or not according to its
(1)wishes. '
On March 10,1909, the Federated Malay States Government 
and the Siamese Railway Department both entered into the 
Malay Peninsula Railway Agreement whereby the^  Federated Malay 
States Government agreed to lend a sum not exceeding 
£4,000,000 at 4 per cent interest to provide for "the con­
struction, maintenance, equipment and operation of the railway 
of the borrower in the Siamese dominions of the Malay 
Peninsula", to be secured upon the sections of railway as 
they were successively constructed. It was further laid down 
that until the lines to which it related should be fully 
completed, their construction, equipment, maintenance and 
operation should be kept distinct from that of the other 
Siamese lines, that is to say, they should be independent of
the control of the German Director-General of Siamese
(o')
railways. y In a note addressed to Paget simultaneously with 
the signature of the Agreement Prince Devawongse stated the
(1) F.O. 422/64, Paget-Grey, February 20, 1909.
(2) F.O. 422/64, Beckett-Grey, March 31, 1909.
'£aU - .* 7 r e&P™
0£f"
intention of the Siamese Government to use the money primarily
to build the portion of a line for through traffic between
Bangkok and Singapore. Construction would be begun as soon
as financial arrangements were concluded and would be carried
out continuously to connect with the Federated Malay States’
(1)north-eastern system. '
General trends of the negotiations.
The negotiations as a whole were unpopular among the
Siamese Court officials who were mainly the sons and brothers
(2)of the King. ' There were at least two reasons to explain 
this hostile attitude. First, these officials held the opinion 
that by the cession of territory Siam was paying too high a
(1) F.O. 371/736, Prince Devawongse-Paget, March 10, 1909.
(2) To mention only some Siamese Princes who held important 
official positions:
H.R.H. Chao Fa Bhanurangsi Sawangwongse - Minister of War. 
H.R.H. Chao Fa Krom Khun Narisara Nuwattiwongse - Minister 
of Public Works.
H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab - Minister of the Interior 
H.R.H. Prince Devawongse Varoprakar - Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
H.R.H. Prince Krom Khun Sommot Amorabhandu - Private 
Secretary to the King.
H.R.H. Prince Krom Khun Bidyalabh Briddhada - Minister 
of the Royal Household.
H.R.H. Prince Krom Mun Mahisra Rajahrudhai - Minister of 
Finance.
H.R.H. Prince Krom Luang Hares Vorariddhi - Minister of
Local Government and Police.
H.R.H. Prince Rajburi Direkridi - Minister ofmJustice. 
H.R.H. Prince Krom Mun Hakorn Chaisee - Comrnander-in-Chief. 
H.R.H. Prince Abhakara - Deputy Superintendent of the Navy.
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price for the abolition of extraterritoriality. By 1905
most foreign subjects in many parts of Siam, for example, the
.French, Italian and Danish subjects, were already under
Siamese jurisdiction in the so-called International Courts.
So Siam could afford to wait, and every year she did so the
(1)price she paid would become less.' J In fact, Strobel, the
master-mind of the negotiations, repeatedly tried to convince
them that the main object of these long-drawn-out talks was
to achieve for Siam the consolidation of her dominions in the
Malay Peninsula and their protection against future danger.
In his opinion the feebleness of Siamese administration in
the Malay States could easily prove a threat to Siam and the
1897 Convention was 'the most deplorable document' Siam had
ever signed. The bargain, therefore, was that Siam should
sacrifice her Malay States and secure in return the abrogation
of the Convention. Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu and whatever
other territory the British acquired,ves in reality the price
(2)paid by Siam to free herself from the 1897 Convention,' ' a 
payment by which she also consolidated her position, and not 
a payment by which she gained advantage or jurisdiction over
(1) Bangkok Times, March 24, 1908.
(2) Prom the start (September, 1907) Strobel proposed to 
Paget that two separate Conventions should be signed in 
order to make it appear that the cession of extraterrit­
oriality was bought by a cession of Siamese territory.
The two groups of Convention were:
Contd. overleaf
d')British subjects. But such a statement was not sufficiently
convincing. The Siamese officials still believed that the 
loss of territory would inflict a humiliating scar on their 
nation's pride. The second reason was that Strobelfs idea 
of keeping detailed knowledge of the negotiations within a
Contd. from overleaf
Treaty I. (a) Abrogation of 1897 Convention.
(b) Loan by the Federated Malay States 
as a set-off to
(c) Cession of territory.
(d) Guarantees as to construction 
and management of the Malay 
Feninsula Railways.
(e) Guarantees as to coaling stations 
and transfers to other Powers.
Treaty II (a) Abandonment of jurisdiction as a
set-off to
(b) The right to hold land.
(c) Guarantees as to British Judges 
and Advisers.
F.O. 4-05/179* Precis of Correspondence with reference 
to proposed cession of Kedah, Trengganu and Kelantan, 
in exchange for surrender by Great Britain of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in Siam.
(1) F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, April 3, 1908.
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( 1 }very tight circle of counsellorsv 'made other officials who 
were not consulted feel humiliated, so that they became
suspicious and eventually were eager to interfere. The 
situation became worse in the competitive atmosphere of the 
Court of Siam. Each official seemed only too anxious to give 
advice based on sheer ignorance of the details of negotiations 
while following motives of personal interest and ambition. 
Often, the King was inclined to be swayed from his own 
judgement. Fortunately, Strobel was able to overrule the 
biased outbursts and suggestions of the King's entourage; 
and because he held the personal confidence of the King he 
was able both to initiate the negotiations and to keep them 
going.
(1) The negotiations, from 1904 onwards, were almost entirely 
in the hands of the King, Prince Damrong and Strobel.
Even in talks regarding jurisdiction the Minister of 
Justice was not consulted. Strobel thought that to act 
otherwise was to invite a host of irrelevant suggestions 
based on personal views. Still some officials intervened. 
To take just one example, Verney, an English Secretary to 
the Siamese Embassy in London, once a British interpreter 
in Siam, wrote to the King suggesting that the Siamese 
Government would be ill-advised to cede any of its 
territory to England. However, he met with a well-merited 
snub from the King. In a polite letter, the King let 
Verney know that Verney1s advice would be asked only when 
needed and he would best serve the interests of Siam by 
remaining silent.
F.C. 422/64, Paget-Grey, January 15, 1909.
Prince ^ arathip, ’’Tactics of Diplomacy” Saranrom,
(Annual^or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs), (Bangkok,
February 10, 1965), p. 9.
The Foreign Office described Verney as "a wanton Mischief
maker".
F.G. 371/735, Note on Paget's letter dated January 15,1909•
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The sudden death of Strobel on January 15, 1908, 
Jeopardised the promising negotiations which had started 
formally only a month before. J It rendered the solution 
more difficult by opening up opportunities to the King's 
counsellors, whose influence 'Westengard, Strobel's assistant, 
lacked the power to counteract to the same extent as Strobel 
himself. The position of Westengard thus became a most 
difficult one. In picking up the threads of the negotiations 
from the point to which Strobel had carried them, he had to 
contend with new suggestions which tended to weaken the case 
for England as presented by Strobel, and to advance the case 
for Siam. A month after Strobel's death a draft treaty was 
drawn up. J Though there was a mutual understanding that,
(1) Only two days before his death Strobel told Paget that he 
considered these to be the most important negotiations 
Siam had ever undertaken. If he had carried the matter 
to a successful conclusion he would have achieved the 
principal aim of his labours.
P.O. 371/522, Paget-Grey, January 16, 1908.
(2) The contents of the Draft Agreement may be summarised as
follows:-
Pirst, Siam ceded to England the States of Kedah,
Kelantan and Trengganu, with the lower portion of Rahman
and the Langkawi Islands.
Second, the Secret Convention of 1897 was abrogated. This 
document was confidential, and not for publication with
the rest of the Treaty.
Third, in substitution for the 1897 Convention, Siam made 
a declaration to the effect that she would not, within 
certain limits, cede or lease territory, docks or coaling 
stations to any foreign Power or Company.
Contd. overleaf
for the time being, the proposals therein contained should
C'])
be considered as purely tentative, ' and though Paget and
Westengard agreed that it would meet both British and Siamese
(2)requirementsv 'the Siamese Government showed no sign of 
approval. Had the regrettable death of Strobel not taken 
place when it did, there was little doubt that the King, with
Contd. from overleaf
Fourth, British subjects should come under Siamese juris­
diction, while the Siamese Government should furnish 
guarantees to ensure satisfactory administration of justice 
British subjects acquired the right to hold land and all 
other privileges enjoyed by the natives of the country.
Fifth, the Federated Malay States would lend a sum of 
money at 4 per cent for the construction of the Siamese 
Malay Peninsula Railway. The Siamese Government objected 
to the actual construction being undertaken by the Feder­
ated Malay States but they agreed that it should be 
constructed under the supervision of British engineers.
(Subsequently, it was suggested that the text of this 
Article should be omitted entirely and that it should form 
a separate Agreement between the F.M.S. Government and the 
Siamese Railways Department).
Vide, 628/29/316, Note on the Draft Treaty, February 
28, 1908.
(1) Westengard said the Siamese Government was most anxious 
that the draft should be considered merely as an expression 
of the personal views of himself and Paget, and not in any 
way as having received their consent or being binding upon 
them.
F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, May '15, 1908.
(2) In a private letter to Campbell, Paget wrote:
.... I trust it may pass .... more or less as it stands. 
Westengard told me that with every new alteration or 
addition proposed he was experiencing increasing 
difficulty with the Siamese.
F.O. 371/521, Private, Paget-Campbell, February 28, 1908.
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the profound confidence which he placed in him, would have
accepted this draft treaty without demur. But Westengard's
lack of the same powerful influence as Strobel, afforded just
the opportunity for the Siamese officials to perplex the
King with a flood of advice based on self-interest. The King
flatly refused to consider the draft treaty on the grounds
that some of the provisions of the Railway Agreement were
(1)unacceptable. ' But this objection was equally matched by 
Sir John Anderson's firm insistence on his proposal. In spite 
of warnings from Paget that the Siamese threatened to abandon
(O')
the negotiations, 'arguments over the railway issue dragged 
on without any sign of compromise.
(1) See more details in separate headings.
(2) Paget wrote two letters to Sir John Anderson with an 
undertone of warning.
The Siamese are now by no means in love with the proposed 
Treaty; they are constantly being twisted with giving 
away territory to buy jurisdiction which they might 
shortly have had for nothing ....
As a matter of fact I do not see that we are giving up 
anything of great value. With the place crammed with 
European Advisers, with new Codes in force, and with every 
effort being made by the Siamese Government to run things 
on European lines it would be impossible much longer to 
deny them jurisdiction over our subjects. We should be 
obliged to abandon our extraterritoriality and should 
receive nothing in return. As to the abrogation of the 
1897 Convention, I am not sure that it will be as great 
a boon to ourselves as to the Siamese.
P.O. 628/29/316, Paget-Andereon, April 9, 1908.
Paget-Anderson, March 31, 1908.
Contd. overleaf
244
In view of the deadlock Paget decided to postpone the
talks. He left Bangkok for London on July 2, 1908.^^ Before
leaving he gave the Siamese Government to understand that he
would come back to the conference table after the Whitehall
authorities had made further enquiries and had considered
(2)further the various issues. ' This statement annoyed the 
Siamese Government. It thought that the concessions it had 
made were sufficient, and that no more should be necessary 
to close the bargain. The Siamese could not understand why 
the British Government should not  ^at once accept in
their opinion, favourable terms which were offered, and con­
trasted the easy and quick settlement effected with Prance 
with the slow progress made in the negotiations with England. 
Hostility towards the Treaty grew and, during Paget's absence, 
whenever Westengard had occasion to mention any Treaty matters, 
he met with a chilling lack of interest on the part even of
Contd. from overleaf
Campbell also warned Piddles of the Colonial Office
that:
It is rather a blow to us that you insist upon seeing 
the texts of the Siamese Railway and boundary agreements 
before agreeing to authorise Paget to sign.
C.O. 273/253, Campbell-Piddles, February 8, 1909*
(1) P.O. 371/522, Paget-Grey, July 2, 1908.
(2) P.O. 422/64, Paget-Grey, January 15, 1909.
those who, like Prince Damrong and Phraya Si Sahadeb, once 
were warm supporters of the negotiations. The dominant mood 
of the King and his Ministers, and, in fact, of all repres­
entatives of Siamese public opinion was, at the end of 1908, 
one of peevishment and discontent.
Paget, on resuming negotiations in January, 1909,
reported in his despatch to the Foreign Office as follows:
The sentiments of the King and the Siamese 
Government towards the proposed new treaty 
have all along been somewhat divided.
Their amour-propre prompts them ardently 
to desire the abolition of extraterritor­
iality and the abrogation of the 1897 Convention, 
but amour-propre also, on the other hand, makes 
the cession of territory and submission to 
certain of the provisions of the jurisdiction 
protocol and the railway agreement distinctly 
distasteful. Hence the view they take of the 
treaty, at any given moment, depends upon 
which of the several issues has most recently 
been uppermost in their minds.(1)
Paget spoke of attempts made by individuals and the 
local press to encourage the idea, both with the King and his 
Government, that Siam was not getting the best of the bargain. 
He drew attention to the hostile public opinion in Siam, 
which was based mainly on the assumption that, if Siam would 
only wait, the issue of extraterritoriality might of itself 
soon disappear.
Paget faced a more difficult problem. During January 
and February, 1909, amendments began to flow in from the
(1) F.O. 4-22/64-, Paget-Grey, January 15, 1909.
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Siamese Official circles as one new counsellor or another 
thought that he had grasped the full meaning of various 
provisions, and found them to be opposed to his own views of 
Siamese national self-respect. There was a danger that, 
once the process of whittling down the British demands started, 
the whole Treaty would be thrown into the melting-pot. ' It 
was doubtful whether the Treaty would have been signed at all, 
had not Paget, who had returned to Siam with the special object 
of concluding the Treaty, stated frankly his intention of 
leaving on March 10, 1909, whether the Treaty was signed or 
not. With this lever in his hands Westengard's influence 
carried more weight. After much strenuous effort, infinite 
patience and with the use of extraordinary powers of per­
suasion, he finally obtained the King's sanction on the very 
eve of Paget's departure. On March 10, the Treaty was duly 
signed by Paget and Prince Devawongse.
(1) The P.O. Under-Secretary noted:
I realise the danger of not coming to a decision 
as to the terms of the Treaty at once ... the Siamese 
are sure to find various suggestions if they have 
time to make them, and we may conceivably be met 
with a volte-face from the King of Siam if he thinks 
we are still not satisfied with the terms ....
And in a private letter to Fiddles this same person wrote:
.... unless we make haste to conclude the Agreement 
we shall find ourselves confronted with endless
alterations.
P.O. 571/755, Note on C.O.-F.O., February 4, 1909.
0.0. 275/253, Private, Oampbell-Fiddles, February 8, 1909.
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Notification of the Treaty was delayed to the utmost 
limit of the four months allowed, owing chiefly to the question 
raised by Westengard as to the interpretation of the Juris­
diction Article. Discussions on this matter added to the
hostile comments on the Treaty by the London Times which
referred to the "notorious corruption and inefficiency of the
(1)Siamese Courts." J The fact that the wish of the Siamese
Government to defer publication until ratification was anti­
cipated by publication in the House of Commons on June 11, did
(2)not tend to improve Siamese feeling towards the Treaty. J 
Nor did the decision reached by the King in May, that there 
should be no publication of the 1897 Convention, assist in 
satisfying Siamese or foreign public opinion that the cession 
of territory was anything more than a quid pro quo for the 
cession of extraterritoriality. The possibility of the Treaty 
not being ratified like the Franco-Siamese Agreement of 1902, 
seemed ever present in the minds of the Siamese Government.
Thus it was that, when ratification documents were exchanged 
in London on July 9, 1909, Prince Rabi complained bitterly 
that he had no official knowledge from the Siamese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the provisions as to jurisdiction. Apart 
from this, however, the Siamese Government showed every 
inclination to accerjt the Treaty on its true merit.
(1) The Times, (London), July 3, 1909.
(2) The Siamese Foreign Minister believed that it was unusual 
for the 1909 Treaty to have been published before rati­
fication. F.O. 422/64, Beckett-Grey, June 1, 1909.
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With the close of the year 1909, the King and his Ministers 
became more and more convinced that the new Treaty was in 
the best interests of Siam.
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CHAPTER V
THE ANGLO-SIAMESE TREATY OF 1909 
AND ITS AFTERMATH
Nine years of diplomatic talk and strenuous attempts of
the British and Siamese Governments to end misunderstandings
and disagreements between them had resulted in a satisfactory
solution on March 10,1909. On this very day the four raw
wounds, the problem of extraterritoriality, the existence of
the Secret Convention of 1897, the construction of the Malay
Peninsula Railway and the question of Siam's suzerainty over
the four northern Malay States which laid at the heart of
(1)discussions, were healed by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty.
The provisions of the treaty were as follows:
First, the Siamese Government transferred to 
the British Government all rights of 
suzerainty,(w protection, administration 
and control whatsoever, which they possessed 
over the states of Kelantan, Trengganu and 
Perlis.
Secondly, the transfer of these States was
to take place within a month after the
ratification of the treaty;
(1) A joint public announcement in the Press stated that 
the chief objects of the treaty were firstly, to settle 
political questions in the Malay Peninsula, and secondly, 
in view of altered conditions during the past fifty years, 
to change the system of legal jurisdiction over British 
subjects. F.G. 571/755, Paget-Grey, March 10, 1909*
(2) In the first draft of the treaty the King of Siam proposed 
to transfer to England his rights of sovereignty over 
these States, but this was altered on Anderson's suggestion 
to rights of suzerainty , protection, etc.
C.O. 275/255, Anderson-/).0. , April 20, 1909.
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Thirdly, a mixed commission, composed of 
Siamese and British officials and officers,
would he appointed to delimit the new 
frontier;
Fourthly, the British Government undertook 
that the new Government of the Federated 
Malay States should assume the indebtedness 
to the Siamese Government of the ceded 
territories;
Fifthly, the jurisdiction of the Siamese 
International Court established by the 
Treaty of 1885 was to be extended to all 
British subjects in Siam, registered at 
the British Consulate before the date of 
the treaty. The previous system was to 
come to an end, and the jurisdiction of the 
International Courts was to be transferred 
to the ordinary Siamese Courts after the 
promulgation and the coming into force of 
the Siamese codes, namely, the Penal Code, 
the Civil and Commercial Code, the Code of 
Procedure and the law for Organisation of 
Courts. All other British subjects in Siam 
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary Siamese Courts; and
Sixthly, British subjects were to enjoy the 
whole extent of rights and privileges 
enjoyed by the Siamese, notably, the right 
of property and the right of residence and 
travel.
There - were annexes to the Treaty, one being a 
Declaration abrogating the Secret Convention of 1897* In 
addition there was a separate Railway Agreement between the 
Siamese Railway Department and the Federated Malay States
Government for the construction of the Malay Peninsula
(1)Railways.
(1) See Appendix IV.
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The treaty received only slight notice in England both 
in Parliament and in the press. An attempt was made in the 
House of Commons to create an impression that the Sultan of 
Kedah had not been fairly treated. A few questions were asked
C'])but no difficulties arose. J
In the four Northern Malay States news of the signature 
of the treaty caught the Malays by surprise. There was wide­
spread uncertainty and a lack of information. The Sultans 
had never been consulted or even approached with regard to 
the transfer of their allegiance: in fact they were kept very
much in the dark and only heard of the proposed changes through
local rumours and through some articles in the Singapore
(2)papers. J
As early as 1908, when the rumours were in the air, the
(1) On July 21, 1909, Sir William Collins asked in the 
House of Commons whether the Sultan, State Council, 
or people of Kedah had been informed of or consulted 
in regard to the proposed transfer to England of any 
suzerain rights claimed by Siam over Kedah. The 
Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs answered 
that, since the British Government had recognised 
Kedah’s dependence on Siam, England could not have a 
direct communication about the treaty with Kedah.
The British Government had no knowledge of any such 
communications. But if there were any, they should 
be between Kedah and Siam.
Parliamentary Debates, 1909, Vol. 8, Sir William 
Collin's question on July 21, and the Under-Secretary's 
reply.
(2) Penang Gazette and Straits Chronicles, June 2h, 1914.
Sultan of Kedah immediately confirmed with the Foreign Office 
in London that before anything was settled with regard to the 
future administration of his state he would be given an 
opportunity to place the views of his Government before British 
Ministers. Unfortunately, this precaution came too late. The 
next thing the Sultan heard was of the signature of the treaty. 
Kedah felt herself snubbed. Though she was not averse to 
joining her Malay neighbours, she felt that such an arrangement 
should have not been made without her consent. True, as 
Kedah’s creditor, Siam had the right to transfer her debt, 
but Siam had no right to transfer the debtor. J The Sultan 
accused Siam of treating him as a mere pawn or chattel and 
said to Sir George Maxwell, the first British Adviser of 
Kedah:
My country and my people have been sold as 
one sells a bullock, I can forgive the 
buyer who had no obligation9to me, but I 
cannot forgive the seller. '
(1) C.O. 275/255* The proposed Siamese Treaty of 1908. 
Memorandum in connection with the treaty on behalf of the 
Government of the State of Kedah. Arthur G. Adams, 
Penang, M.L.G.S.S., Legal and Confidential Adviser to
the Government of Kedah, September 12, 1908.
(2) The Straits Times, May 16, 1957* Sir George Maxwell, the 
first British Adviser of Kedah, wrote a letter to the 
editor of the Straits Times recalling the words of the 
Sultan of Kedah to him in 1909 when Kedah was transferred
from Siam to Great Britain.
The only thing left for the Sultan to do after 1909 was 
to obtain, if possible, from the British Government some
Contd. overleaf
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This reaction was echoed in Kelantan. From the time
when rumours of a new treaty became rife the Sultan, backed
by Graham, displayed an extremely pro-Siamese policy. He
wrote to King Chulalongkorn protesting against the cession of
his country and sent up the Dato Montri, or Prime Minister,
(1)to Bangkok for this purpose. ' The petition made it clear 
that the Sultan and his Government were much perturbed by 
the rumours of the cession of Kelantan to England. They had 
always been faithful adherents of Siam, and therefore they
would be grateful to Siam if they were not handed over to
(2)England. ; Graham was seriously opposed to the change. He
Contd. from overleaf
guarantee that he and his subjects would not be affected 
injuriously by this treaty which had been made over their 
heads. A question to this effect was put in the House of 
Commons on July 21, 1909, by Sir William Collins. The 
British Government concurred. Penang Gazette and Straits 
Chronicles, June 24, 1914.
In 1923 England promised not to 'transfer or otherwise 
dispose of his rights of suzerainty over Kedah to another 
Power, without the written consent of His Highness the 
Sultan in Council.' The Colonial Problem, a report by 
a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Oxford University Press, 1937), 
p. 87.
(1) F.O. 371/736, Wood-Paget, February 21, 1909.
F.O. 371/521, Paget-Grey, May 27, 1908.
(2) F.O. 422/62, Paget-Grey, May 29, 1908, Wood-Beckett, 
October 3, 1908.
Paget took this protest lightly. He thought that it was 
merely an expression of anxiety by a few office-holders 
who feared the change and the stricter British regime. 
Wood also threw ridicule on the petition. And Campbell 
noted: "He (Wood) is very down on Graham and I dare say
rightly."
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wrote a private letter to Prince Damrong depicting vividly
the Sultan!s grief and anxiety at the prospect of Kelantan
being compelled to change from the lenient rule of Siam to
British control and inquiring whether the suspicion of a
(1)transfer was indeed founded on fact. ' There was no reply 
from the Prince.
As might be expected, the strongest opposition came from 
the Sultan of Trengganu. All along he had jealously opposed 
Siamese encroachment over his State and proved himself ‘a
much harder nut to crack1 than the Sultans of Kedah and
(*>)Kelantan. On hearing that a treaty had been concluded by
which the Siamese Government ceded Trangganu to England, the 
Sultan castigated the Siamese as thieves who were giving away 
what did not belong to them and complained bitterly against 
the British Government for entering into such arrangements 
without consulting him. ' Prom then on, he was thrown into 
a state of fear mingled with anger by the nev/s of the treaty. 
Before the treaty was ratified the Sultan had hurried to send
(1) P.O. 371/756, Paget-Grey, Pebruary 25, 1909.
(2) Paget commented that the reason was probably that the 
Prince felt embarrassed as regards the reply; it would 
be somewhat ungracious for a suzerain state to curtly 
inform a loyal vassal that he was about to be trans­
ferred to another Power. P.O. 4-22/64-, Paget-Grey, 
Pebruary 27, 1909.
(3) P.O. 371/756, Campbell's note on Beckett's letter to 
Grey of April 19, 1909.
(4-) P.O. 4-22/64-, Beckett-Grey, April 19, 1909.
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gratuitous and premature bunga mas to Bangkok to remind Siam 
that what she could cede were certain shadowy suzerain rights 
only. ' At the same time he prudently paid a visit, as 
unusual as it was unexpected, to the Governor of Singapore. 
j A talk with Anderson might have gone far to ease the situation,
for when the treaty was finally carried into effect no fuss
(2)arose in the state. ' All these actions, however, were ignore<
by the King of Siam who would not bother to waste words nor
use coercion with the Sultan. To quote His honesty's words:
The one thing which the Sultan required and 
would always require, was money.... A loan 
of ready cash on reasonable terms would pave 
the way to friendly understanding in the 
future.(3)
Ho matter what the different reactions of the three 
Sultans to the new Treaty, all displayed a similar attitude - 
a grim feeling of loss of pride and dignity. The Malays 
loved freedom and hated foreign rule. Thus, under these 
circumstances, the Malays' resentment went deeper since their 
states and they themselves had been transferred from one rule 
to another behind their backs.
(1) F.O. 422/64, Beckett-Grey, June 22, 1909*
(2) Anderson promised the Sultan that he had no intention of 
interfering with the internal administration. The two 
chief points with which he was concerned were, first, that 
the Sultan should hold no communications with foreign 
Powers except through the High Commissioner. Second, no 
transfer of land should be made, or concessions of land 
given to foreigners, without the consent of the High 
Commissioner. C.O. 273/253, Anderson-Earl of Crewe,
May 27, 1909.
(3) F.O. 422/64, Beckett-Grey, April 26, 1909.
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In contrast to the hard-feeling of the Malays, long-time 
British residents of Malaya wholeheartedly welcomed the treaty
since their v/ish to increase their hold over the Malay
(1")Peninsula was then fulfilled, J Sir John Anderson expressed
his hope that:
I look for a very large development indeed 
of the local trade which.finds its outlet 
at Singapore and Penang,(w
At long last the British authorities in London had found ir­
resistible the temptation to extend British supremacy in the 
northern Malay States. Only seven years earlier Sir Prank 
Swettenham1s insistence on pushing British protection over the
north of the Peninsula had led Lord Curzon to consider him
(5)'a swashbuckler of the most truculent type1. ' J
In Siam the people generally were coldly indifferent to
the treaty. However, there was feeling in Siamese official
circles for the loss of the bartered territories regardless of
(4)the Siamese ill-defined and disputed rights over them.
Beckett reported the following reactions to Grey:
The treaty of 10 March, though viewed with 
indifference by the nation at large, is most 
unpopular with the large majority of Siamese
(1) Straits Budget, April 8, 1909*
(2) 0.0. 275/80, Proceedings of the Legislative Council of
the Straits Settlements, Sir John’s address to the
Legislative Council.
(3) Sir Richard Winstedt, Malaya and Its History, (London,1962),
p. 75*
(4) P.O. 371/983, P.O. Note on Peel’s letter to Grey dated
Pebruary 15, 1909•
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princes who form the palace clique and 
virtually represent public opinion in Siam.
They are chagrined at not being consulted 
during the negotiations, save at the last 
moment. They consider that the bargain 
is all in favour of Great Britain. They 
resent the cession of territory. They say 
that, as usual, Great Britain has secured /^ p 
the substance and left them the shadow.... J
A German daily newspaper published an article describing King
(o')Ghulalongkorn1s dissatisfaction with the treaty. J His 
Majesty was concerned about the cession of territory. He told 
Paget that although his ministers who knew of the Secret Con­
vention of 1897 might acknowledge the transfer of Kedah, 
Kelantan, Trangganu and Perlis as the wisest policy for Siam, 
he feared that the general public v/ould consider it a needless
sacrifice and would form a very uncomplimentary opinion of
(X\
his statesmanship. ''
Also, a strong criticism in Siam prevailed among British 
subjects relative to the jurisdiction clauses embodied in the 
treaty. This antagonistic feeling was due to their natural 
sentiment against the principle of the European British subjects 
being amenable to the Courts of any Asian Power, and especially 
to the idea that, "their extraterritoriality was being bartered 
for a few square miles of territory. J But upon the treaty’s
(1) F.O. 371/739, Beckett-Grey, July 7, 1909.
(2) Vossische Zeitung, June 30, 1909.
(3) F.O. 371/736, Paget-Campbell, May 3, 1909.
(4) F.O. 4-22/62, Paget-Grey, April 3, 1908, May 5, 1908.
258
publication, Beckett called a meeting of all British subjects
in Bangkok, and was apparently successful in allaying completel
(1)all their apprehensions. '
The third party mainly concerned with the treaty was
Germany. With the announcement in the press in Bangkok at the
end of March, 1909, of the suspension of further construction
on the Bangkok-Ghiengmai Northern State Railway, followed by
gradual knowledge of the terms of the treaty, the German
Minister, Herr Von Prollius, became alarmed at what he
(2)doubtless considered a disaster to German influence. ' He 
complained to Westengard of Siam's suddenly unfriendly 
attitude towards Germany, and belittled the quid pro quo 
which Siam gained from England in exchange for valuable
(1) P.O. 4-22/64, Beckett-Grey, April 15, 1909.
See e.g. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1909, Vol. 8 , 
Comments by Earl Percy on July 22 and the Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs' remarks.
(2) At the turn of the twentieth century the policy of Germany 
had been constantly to ingratiate herself with Siam, and to 
adopt the role of an ally on whom Siam might rely when 
harassed by the importunities of England and Prance. In 
pursuance of this policy, German Princes and Austrian 
notabilities were sent to Siam in constant succession. The 
five years between 1904 and 1909 had witnessed the visits 
of Prince Henry of Prussia, Prince Adalbert, two Bavarian 
Princes, the Austrian Ambassador to Japan, Baron Von Call, 
the German Admiral of the China station, and the Prince 
Regent of Brunsv/ick. Added to this, King Chulalongkorn, 
during his trip to Europe in 1907, received most marked 
attention from the German Emperor. On the occasion of 
each visit of a German Prince, moreover, the very highest 
decorations were conferred on certain Siamese Princes and 
others on numerous Siamese officials.
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(1")territory, '
The sentiments of the German subjects in Siam were 
accurately reflected in an article which appeared in the 
Vossische Zeitung and those of German officialdom in an 
article in the Kolnishe Zeitunp:. The former stressed the 
importance to German commerce of the careful preservation of 
Siam as one of the few remaining independent markets capable 
of development. It deplored the incompetence of the German 
Minister as compared with that of his English counterpart.
It sounded an alarm at the decline of German influence as well 
as German interests, especially those connected with the 
important northern railway which were endangered by the British 
treaty, and pictured King Ghulalongkorn as the puppet of 
England, dissatisfied with the treaty, and looking to Germany 
for help at this critical juncture. The Kolnishe Zeitung, 
on the other hand, emphasised more the inadequacy of the 
bargain concluded by Siam, suggested that Germany should 
consider well before she gave up her extraterritorial rights 
out of flattery to Siam, considered that England and Prance
(1) Von Prollius asked Westengard whether Siam was going to 
enter into negotiations with other Powers, and, if so, 
what did she propose to offer Germany in return for juris­
diction? Westengard replied that the Siamese Government 
had never considered that they paid England for the 
jurisdiction arrangement, so they did not envisage paying 
other Powers.
P.O. 571/756, Westengard-Paget, April 20, 1909*
P.O. 4-22/64, Beckett-Grey, April 26, 1909.
(2) The Vossische Zeitunp:, June 56, 1909; and The Kolnische 
Zeitung, October, To, 1909.
260
were dividing the 'Siamese booty' b e t w e e n  them, took the view 
that Germany would never allow her subjects to be given the 
same legal status as Siamese peasants or Chinese coolies, and 
concluded by stating that Siam had to prove that she had 
something left for Germany before the latter could submit her 
subjects to Siamese judicial control.
In actual fact, the British treaty proved disastrous to 
German susceptibilities. First and foremost, because of the 
Malay Peninsula Railway Agreement, it was a severe blow to any 
hopes of a monopoly of railway construction which Germany may 
have entertained since 1891, and on which she had mainly 
depended for political influence. Secondly, by the agreement 
as to a coaling station, it put an end to any further attempts 
by Germany to obtain a political footing in the Peninsula.
And thirdly, by the legal protocol and the provision as to 
European legal advisers, it gave Germany no option but to 
concede extraterritorial jurisdiction for her subjects, who 
were all Europeans on the same terms and subject to the same 
provisions as other Europeans, or to incur the wrath of Siam 
and the risk of her own isolation by holding altogether aloof.
Amidst mixed feelings of sorrow, disappointment, joy, 
indifference and fear from all people concerned, the British 
and the Siamese Governments went on with their task of imple­
menting the treaty's provisions.
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The transfer of Siamese rights over Kedah, Kelantan,
r' j
Trengganu and Perlis pere formally carried out a few days
after the ratification of the treaty. It was at first
Anderson's intention to attend the ceremonies in person,
accompanied by a certain show of force 'on some important 
(1")business'. J But in deference to the wish of the Siamese 
Government, it was agreed that the proceedings should be of 
an entirely simple nature, and the Governor was represented
merely by the officials who were chosen for the posts of
(2)Advisers in the various states. 7 These gentlemen were
met by the Siamese advisers in Kedah, Kelantan, and Perlis,
but in the case of Trengganu by an officer sent specially
(from Bangkok. The transfer of Trengganu took place
on July 14, 1909, and that of Kedah, Perlis, and Kelantan 
on July 15. The proceedings passed off in each case
(1) On hearing a rumour that the Governor of Singapore was 
about to visit Kedah with a guard of honour to take over 
his State, the Sultan referred the matter through his 
lawyers to eminent counsel in London, and was informed 
that he could decline to receive the troops until he 
was told by the Siamese Government that his State had 
been handed over to England. P.O. 422/64, Beckett-Grey, 
September 9, 1909.
(2) P.O. 571/757, Beckett-Grey, July 26, 1909, Prince
Devawongse-Beckett, June 25, 1909- P.O. 422/64,
Beckett-Grey, July 4, 1909•
(5) There was no Adviser in Trengganu because the Sultan 
had not recognised the Siamese-Trengganu Agreement
of 1902.
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(1)without a hitch. J
Prior to the ratification of the 1909 treaty Whitehall 
authorities had discussed the measures necessary to give 
political status to the four Sultanates. The Foreign Office 
suggested annexation as the best solution, mainly on the
grounds that it would stop other foreigners' claims of extra-
(2)territoriality. ' But the Colonial Office raised various 
insurmountable difficulties. The main objections were, first, 
that these States, with the possible exception of Kedah, could 
not be regarded as integral parts of Siam. What Siam had ceded 
amounted to something less than sovereignty. The annexation, 
therefore, was not a result of cession. Secondly, annexation
(1) However, in Kedah and Kelantan friction arose over the 
reactions of Hart and Graham prior to the actual transfers. 
Both these advisers were informed by the Siamese Government 
that their advisership was no longer necessary and they 
could proceed on leave as soon as they wished. Neither 
took the hint and both remained. To the Sultans, they 
showed sympathy and solicitude, to encourage them to make
a protest. Graham remained in Kelantan until the transfer 
but he failed to persuade Anderson to retain his services 
as adviser. However, protests against the cession of 
Kelantan were made. These were confined to somewhat 
inarticulate grumblings against the new boundary, which 
Graham calculated would endanger the successful carrying 
out of the arrangements for the transfer, but in fact no 
serious trouble occurred. In Kedah the situation was even 
more tense and Hart was ordered to return to India on 
June 2G, in spite of his strenuous efforts to remain 
until the transfer. F.O. 371/756, Beckett-Grey, June 30, 
1909. F.O. 405/195, Annual .Report, 1909, by Beckett.
(2) The Colonial Office later described this proposal as 
"nonsense ... No other Foreign Power has worried about 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in these States."
C.O. 273/255? Note on Foreign Office's letter to the 
Colonial Office, Kay 19, 1909*
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meant the deposition of the Sultans. Such a step seemed 
likely to meet with determined resistance. The Sultan of 
Trengganu, for example, was extremely likely to use force 
against annexation. Hostile motives at that time were also 
evident in Kelantan and it was quite natural that the Sultan 
of Trengganu might take the same step as his neighbour. The 
Colonial Office wanted to preserve the status quo ante of the 
States to the limits. Any changes in the administration should 
be gradually and cautiously introduced for it would be 
regrettable if the first consequence of the treaty was the 
despatch of an armed force to impose the new arrangements on 
the people. Even if these difficulties were overcome, the 
problem of providing for the administration of the States, 
including the process of bills through Parliament for funds
to set up the machinery of Government would similarly be
Cl")difficult. J Accordingly, the Colonial Office suggested
t*-
that the territories should eventually follow the system of
the Federated Malay States, the difficulty of foreign rights
of extraterritorial jurisdiction being overcome by the simple
expedient of refusing to grant privileges to foreign consuls,
(2)unless all claims to jurisdiction were waived. ' This
C7))course was accepted by Grey. "'
(1) F.O. 371/736, Campbell's note on Beckett-Grey, April 19, 
1909.
(2) C.O. 275/255, 0.0.-P.O., May 28, 1909.
(3) F.O. 422/64, F.G.-C.O., June 2, 1909.
But in practice these expectations were not fulfilled.
'The Malays in the newly acquired states were antagonistic to
British rule. It was probable that by this time they had not
fully recovered from the harsh treatment accorded them at the
transfer. Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis chose
to stand apart from the Federated Malay States. The new
tinfederated Malay States, as their negative title indicated,
(1)formed a different political entity from the Federation. y 
Under the common leadership of the High Commissioner they 
joined with the Federation and the Straits Settlements to 
constitute British Malaya but they retained their independent 
status. The British officers assigned to each State were 
styled Advisers and not Residents. Under the advisory system 
the Sultan still maintained 'a position of authority in the 
Government1, but he was bound to ask and act upon British
advice in all matters other than those touching the Mohammedan
(2)religion and Malay customs. J
Since the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 was signed without 
consulting the Malay Rulers concerned, England was then left
(1) In 1896 the four States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, 
and Pahang formed the Federation. Under the terms of the 
Treaty a Resident-General was appointed as the agent and 
representative of the British Government. His advice was 
followed in all matters of administration other than those 
touching the religion. Vide, R. Emerson, Malaysia,
A Study of Direct and Indirect Rule, (New York: Macmillan, 
1937), P. 194.
(2) Sir Roland Braddell, The Legal Status of the Malay States, 
(Singapore, Malaya Publishing House, 1931), p. 22.
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with the problem of negotiating separate agreements with them
to gain recognition of British protection. Their legal
assimilation was undertaken by gradual stages. In the year
after the transfer both Kelantan and Trengganu entered into
(s\)
new agreements with the British, J but in the case of 
Trengganu provision was made only for a British Agent.
Article II of the Kelantan treaty stipulated that the Sultan 
"undertakes to follow and give effect to the advice of the 
Adviser, or in his absence, of the Assistant Adviser, in all 
matters of administration other than those touching the 
Mohammedan religion and Malay customs" whereas Article II of 
the Trengganu treaty contained a declaration of the British 
King's desire "to place a British Officer in Trengganu to be 
an agent with functions similar to those of a Consular 
Officer..." Thus, a new Convention was necessary in 1919 to 
complete the process. In accordance with its terms the 
Adviser's advice "must be asked and acted upon in all matters 
affecting the general administration of the country and all 
questions other than those touching the Mohammedan Religion.^ 
The Kedah Agreement was signed in 1923* The Agreement 
provided specifically in the first article that Kedah "shall
(1) The Trengganu Agreement was signed on April 23, and that 
of Kelantan on October 22. F.C. 371/983, C.O.-F.O.,
June 4, 1910. F.O. 422/65, Anderson-Crewe, October 26, 
1910.
(2) Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements Affecting 
the Malay States and Borneo, (London, 1924), p. 114.
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continue to be under the protection of His Britannic Majesty 
who shall exercise the right of suzerainty." By the third 
Article Kedah was given guarantees far beyond what had 
previously been granted. Assurance was given that she would 
not be forced to join in the Federation. England promised not 
to "transfer or otherwise dispose of its rights of suzerainty 
over the State of Kedah to another power and will not merge or 
combine the State of Kedah or her territories with any other 
States or with the Colony of the Straits Settlements without 
the written consent of His Highness the Sultan in Council."v ' 
Perlis was left in the Unfederated Malay States without 
any formal agreement with England until 1929 when she paid off 
the final instalment of the loan to the Federated Malay States 
Government. Then a somewhat embarrassing situation arose when 
the British Adviser, nominally acting only in financial matters 
but actually controlling the general administration of the 
State, found himself without legal standing for his position.
In order to secure his authority and avoid any dispute, a new 
agreement was finally negotiated in 1930 legalising the 
position of the British Adviser. Article V of the Treaty was 
worded:
The Raja of Perlis and his successors will 
receive and provide a suitable residence 
for a British Adviser to advise in all 
matters relating to Malay Custom or 
Mohammedan religion, and will accept 
such advice ....
(1) Braddell, or. cit., p. 29.
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To sum up, constitutionally, the position then was simply 
that Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu as individual States 
retained the same status and the same Constitution as before. 
The only practical change effected under British rule was the 
substitution of English Advisers for the Siamese ones.
host articles of the treaty were implemented without 
difficulty. Under the provision of Article III of the 1909 
Treaty the Anglo-Siamese Boundary Commission was appointed in 
October, three months after the ratification, to make out the 
frontier which had been transferred. Apart from a dispute
C'])over the boundary between Perlis and Setul' ' the work was 
successfully accomplished. And in accordance with Article IV, 
the Federated Malay States Government paid the whole of the 
indebtedness of Kedah, Kelantan and Perlis to the Siamese
(1) The general principle adopted in the delineation of the
frontier of these two States was that of following the main 
watershed between the Perlis River on the one hand and the 
Put oh River on the other. The point in dispute was that 
the Siamese Commissioner took the view that, as it was 
clearly understood that no Setul territory should be handed 
over, they would at a certain portion of the boundary, in 
following strictly the watershed, be surrendering territory 
which had formerly belonged to Setul, the evidence of 
ownership being established by a stone post. They also 
alleged apparently that the adoption of the watershed 
frontier would cut off from Siamese territory part of the 
track connecting Singapore with Setul. On the other hand, 
the British Commissioners contended that this reason was 
not a sufficient one for diverging from the watershed. In 
the end, the English Commissioner complied with the 
Siamese demand in the interests of goodwill.
P.O. 571/1220, C.O.-F.O., January 9, 1911 and 
P.O. Note on it.
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Government, in two instalments, on July 1, 1909, and 
January 1, 1910, making a total of nearly £400,000.^^
A series of difficulties arose from the interpretation 
of Articles V and VI of the treaty. They included the annoy­
ance caused by disputed claims to British nationality, the
(2)unfriendly attitude of Prince Charoon, 'a new Minister of 
Justice, the abrupt dismissal of Black, the Judicial Adviser, 
Siamese reluctance to employ the legal advisers and the 
question of British subjects1 rights to hold land.
Even before the treaty was ratified Beckett and Prince 
Devawongse had already been confronted with a complex problem 
over the establishment of the international courts and court 
procedure. The basis of this dispute lay in Beckett!s opinion 
that the new Regulations, different from the Prench Court 
Regulations of 1907, were required for the English International
(1) P.O. 371/737, Phraya Visuti Kosa-Grey, July 23, 1909*
P.O. 422/65, Phraya Visuti Kosa-Grey, January 22, 1910.
P.O. 371/983, Peel-Grey, April 28, 1910.
Each instalment amounted to £197,64-5* 19 *6d .
(2) The Prince was called from the post of Minister in Paris 
to become Minister of Justice in 1910. Educated at 
Harrow and Trinity, he was more English than Siamese and 
unfortunately was unpopular both with the staff of the 
Ministry of Justice and with his colleagues in the Cabinet. 
Collected from Huang Kone; Chao Phraya Mahitorn.
(1)Courts. J But Prince Devawongse was not in favour of new
Regulations. And the following three months saw the Prince
and Beckett playing an endless game of verbal tennis. Beckett
strongly criticised Prince Devawongse, stating that,
(The Prince) apparently laboured under the 
impression that the only obligations incumbent 
on the Siamese Government in order to carry 
out the provisions of the Protocol of 
Jurisdiction were that he should come to an 
understanding with me as to the selection of 
places ... at which International Courts 
were to be established. He did not appear 
to grasp the importance of the sweeping 
change in jurisdiction, nor what such a 
change implied. Hor did he seem to realise 
that the arrangements made necessary by the 
Treaty differed in any respect from those 
made after the conclusion of the Treaty 
with Prance of March 23rd, 1907.
After exhaustive discussions from mid-March to mid-April, 
1909, Beckett submitted a draft of new Regulations for the 
Courts to Prince Devawongse on April 22nd. Though this draft 
was framed, to quote Beckett's own words, 'with a view to
(1) Beckett claimed that the French Treaty merely provided for 
a transfer of jurisdiction from the French Consular Courts 
to the International Courts of all French Asian subjects 
registered previous to the signature of the Treaty without 
any guarantees as to the constitution of the Courts either 
in the case of such subjects or of those registered sub­
sequently to the date of the Treaty. But the Treaty signed 
with England extended the jurisdiction of the International 
Courts to all British European and Asian subjects regis­
tered prior to March 10, 1909, and laid down very distinct 
conditions for the constitution of the International Courts 
and for the ordinary Siamese Courts in cases in which a 
British-born subject was a plaintiff or defendant, or in 
which Asian subjects were defendants, whether registered 
before or after the signature of the Treaty. P.O. 371/737, 
Beckett-Grey, July 22, 1909•
(2) P.O. 371/737, Beckett-Grey, duly 22, 1909.
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permanency and yet elastic enough to fit in with any changes
* (y\')
of Consuls and Advisers, ' Prince Devawongse strenuously
(2)opposed it. ' He proposed a completely different draft which 
in turn was refused by Beckett on the grounds that "it con­
sisted of nothing more than the French Regulations embodied 
en bloc with certain provisions of our Treaty interlarded and
C 3)often misquoted, whilst other provisions were neglected..." w/ 
Differences of opinion continued during the two full 
months of hay and June. Then a warning came from the British 
Government in early July that they would leave the Treaty 
unratified. Faced with this problem the Prince accepted 
another new draft as drawn up by Beckett. This provided for 
five International Courts of which two were situated in Bangkok 
and one each in Chiengmai, Songkhla and Puket. British distric 
Courts for the trial of evoked cases and for the exercise of 
non-contentious probate jurisdiction were established in 
Bangkok, Chiengmai, Lampang and Songkhla. The Rules of 
Procedure of the Chiengmai International Court would apply to 
all other International Courts and the Rules of Civil and 
Criminal Procedure then in use in the ordinary Siamese Courts
(1) Beckett claimed that in drafting these regulations he took 
into account also the fact that in some places within the 
International Court system there was a Consul but no 
Adviser, in others an Adviser but no Consul, in others
neither Consul nor Adviser.
F.O. 371/737, Beckett-Grey, July 22, 1909.
(2) F.O. 4-22/64, Beckett-Grey, May 31, 1909*
(3) F.O. 371/737, Beckett-Grey, July 22, 1909.
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were substituted throughout.
Another point of contention was the too-rigid interpre­
tation of the jurisdiction clauses by Prince Rabi whose dis­
satisfaction at the territorial loss of his country was acute. 
In every disputed case of nationality Prince Rabi insisted on 
the production of a registration certificate to determine 
whether a British subject should be treated as a pre- or a
d Vpost-registrant.v ' Minor disputes flared up soon after the
(2)coming into force of the treaty. The matter reached its
(1) A great deal of inconvenience was caused by doubtful cases 
in litigation as to the real status of the person claiming 
to be a British subject, and thus entitled to the privi­
leges secured under the terms of the treaty, but unable to 
produce a certificate on the grounds that it had been lost 
or not obtained through sheer neglect.
(2) In Songkhla, Wood, the British Consul, alleged that the 
judges of the International Court there assumed that it 
was within their jurisdiction to determine whether a man 
was a British subject or not. This was in contradiction 
to Article 3 of the Registration of 1899 which laid down 
that the joint committee was authorised to decide the 
nationality of any person claiming to be a British subject.
In Petchaburi, the judge asked the Chief Judge of the 
international court in Bangkok for instructions in dealing 
with three persons, accused of some crime, claiming to be 
British subjects, but without any means of proving their 
. claim. The Judge was ordered to try these persons as 
Siamese subjects in the ordinary way. The British Minister 
objected on the grounds that it was contrary to the stipu­
lations of the treaty of 1909, 9S fhe Judge had virtually 
admitted that they were British subjects, and they con­
sequently were entitled to enjoy the privileges secured 
under Article 5 °f the Treaty and the Siamese Government 
was requested to send instructions to the Judge indicating 
the correct procedure. Instead Prince Rabi remained 
adamant and issued instructions that certificates of 
registration had to be produced in any court.
P.O. 371/983, Peel-Grey, April 7, 1910.
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climax when a case arose in Petchaboon Court against a man 
who claimed to be a Shan British subject but was unable to 
produce a certificate, claiming that it had been lost. An 
instruction was sent from the International Court in Bangkok 
that the accused had to bring evidence within fifteen days to 
prove that his certificate had really been lost; otherwise 
he had to be tried in the ordinary Siamese courts. Crosby, 
the British Vice-Consul in Chiengmai, was opposed to the 
instruction and protested to the chief judge of the internat­
ional court that if the judge of the Petchaboon Court was not 
prepared to admit the accused's nationality one of the two 
following courses should be adopted; either the judge should 
hold a formal inquiry into the man's nationality, and should 
forward the record of such an inquiry with a written opinion 
for the consideration of the British Consular authorities and 
of the international court; or, if this was considered in­
sufficient, then a joint inquiry should take place. However, 
the talks were a failure and the matter became the sole res-
(s] 'N
ponsioility of the British Minister in Bangkok. J
After some discussion, this question of cases of disputed 
nationality was settled by an agreement concluded between 
Prince Devawongse and Peel, the new British Minister, relating 
to the practical judgement of persons and firms claiming 
British nationality. By this agreement the Siamese Government
(1) P.O. 422/65, Peel-Grey, September 13, 1910.
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admitted that the claim to British nationality of an unregis­
tered person was subject to an inquiry of the British Consular 
Officer. In remote districts, where a personal inquiry by a 
British Consular Officer was impossible the judge of the 
Siamese Court should perform the duty. If the decision was 
unacceptable records of such investigations had to be forwarded 
to the British Consular Officer sitting with a nominee of the 
Siamese Government. The definition, for legal purposes, of a 
British firm was also included in the agreement. J Firms were, 
for this purpose, divided into two classes: first, those
registered as limited liability companies, and secondly, 
partnership firms, whether limited or unlimited, in which the 
partners v/ere each individually or personally liable.
The companies defined in the first category, which had 
been registered in the British Empire and had had branches in 
Siam before the treaty of March 10,1909, were considered as 
pre-registered companies and under the jurisdiction of the 
international court. Those which were established after the 
treaty were considered as post-registered companies and under 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary Siamese courts. No certi­
ficates of registration were required for such firms. As 
regards the second category, a registration certificate of a
(1) A difference of opinion also arose in regard to the 
status of a British firm. The Siamese authorities 
rejected a consular certificate of nationality as 
insufficient evidence. F.G. 422/66, Grey-Beckett,
June 17, 1911.
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partner who was a litigant was adduced as proof of his being
of British nationality, and the decision as to whether he was
a pre- or a post-registrant and therefore subject to the
jurisdiction of either the international or the ordinary
Siamese Courts respectively was dependent on the date of that
certificate. If a firm was represented by an agent, that
agent had to produce a certificate of nationality issued by
some competent authority to prove that one of the partners
C'])
was a British subject. '
Nothing was more disheartening to the successful judicial 
arrangements than the resignation, or, more correctly speaking, 
the dismissal of Prince Rabi and the abrupt departure of
(1) Vide, P.O. 371/1221, Disputed Cases of Nationality, 
Annual Report for the year 1910, pp. 2-4-.
Peel reported that after the ratification of the treaty 
Asian British subjects showed the greatest reluctance to 
register themselves. Before the treaty they were liable 
to a fine not exceeding £2 if they failed to register. 
Since this penalty no longer existed, their failure to 
register themselves was very often caused by economic 
reasons to save the expense of the fee, added to the 
fact that they came under Siamese jurisdiction and 
subject to the same taxes and services as the Siamese. 
Wood reported from Songkhla that the British subjects 
there believed that it was best to be unregistered. If 
they registered, they usually did it with extreme 
reluctance. In Setul a number of British subjects went 
so far as to enquire whether it would be possible to 
come to register at night, as they did not consider it 
politic to be seen coming to the office during the day. 
In September 1910, although there were at least 300 
British subjects in Setul, only sixteen registration 
certificates had been issued.
P.O. 4-22/65, Wo00-Beckett, September 22, 1910.
P.O. 4-22/66, Peel-Grey, August 3, 1911*
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( '1 ')Black from the Ministry of Justice, J Prince Gharoon, the 
new Minister, did not have an easy personality and things 
often did not go smoothly in his dealings with the British 
Government. The principal criticism was of Prince Charoon’s 
policy to reduce the employment of foreigners in his depart­
ment as far as possible for he believed that his country should 
be freed from the restrictions of foreign control. His
(1) The circumstances which led to Prince Rabi1 s fall were 
comparatively trifling and arose through the publication 
of a malicious libel reflecting on his moral character by 
one of the members of the Royal Family. In view of the 
difficulties which existed in Siam in bringing any action 
against a Prince, Prince Rabi decided to resign his 
position as Minister of Justice. His Royal Highness 
decided to leave Bangkok. Before his departure he called 
a meeting of the judges and explained to them the circum­
stances which had led to his resignation. There were 
deeply emotional feelings among his subordinates. Under 
the leadership of the chief judge of the international 
court, they drew up a petition representing to the King 
that they could not work without Prince Rabi. The King 
promptly ordered all the judges to return to their duties 
and reproached them for being disloyal towards him. The 
judges were all discreet enough to acknowledge their 
fault. This event was followed by a stormy interview 
between Prince Rabi and his father. The Prince showed so 
much temper that he was simply told to resign. His loss 
was a blow to the Ministry. It was undeniable that during 
his term of office the administration of justice in Siam 
had made considerable strides. Vide, Ruong Kong Chao 
Phraya Mahitorn, pp. 76-79.
During this tragic crisis Black, who was on leave, sent 
a letter to Prince Gharoon, the new Minister of Justice, 
asking for a leave-extension. In a cutting tone Prince 
Gharoon informed Black that his services were no longer 
required, and that he was entitled to take his pension, 
and receive all the compensation due to him owing to 
breach of contract. His dismissal caused no little 
bitterness among British subjects in Siam since his 
presence and advice would have helped considerably in 
preventing any disagreement or encroachment on the rights 
and safeguards provided by the treaty in their interests.
reluctance to employ a Judicial Adviser was not unnatural
3md it was only after long and painful discussions between
Frince Devawongse and Peel that Skinner Turner, formerly
Judge of the British court in Siam, was appointed the Judicial
Adviser as successor to Black and the legal advisers were
Cl')appointed to be attached to the international courts, '
The provision that caused strong feelings of regret among 
the Siamese was that of Article VI under which British 
subjects were placed on the same footing as Siamese in regard 
to the acquisition of land. For years Siam had fought 
vigorously to hold this sacrifice as her trump-card against 
British demands and she gave it up only when the British 
Government agreed to abandon completely extraterritorial 
rights granted to their subjects in Siam. Even then the 
Siamese Government could not accept this with good grace.
During the first two years after the treaty came into force 
heated arguments occurred between the British Minister and 
the Siamese Government. The former alleged that there appeared 
a marked tendency on the part of the Siamese Government to
(1) F.O. 4-22/65, Peel-Grey, October 17, 1910.
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(1)discourage British enterprise in their Malay provinces.
Whenever British subjects applied for concessions, the Siamese 
Court automatically refused. To mention only a few cases: 
early in 1910, Mr. Ross Clunis, a British subject, complained 
to Peel that the Siamese Government had rejected his appli­
cation for exclusive prospecting rights over an area situated
in the Bay of Tarus, on the east coast of Puket Island, because
(2)that area was to be held as a special reserve. '
In Penang, Mr. Laws, a British subject, stated that all 
his applications to take up land for mining purposes in Setul 
had been refused on the grounds that the Siamese Government 
was not yet prepared to open up the province of Setul for
(7)'\
mining or agricultural purposes.
(1) It should be noted here that after the treaty of 1909, 
Prince Damrong’s prestige was much impaired both with 
King Chulalongkorn and his colleagues in the Cabinet, on 
the ground that he had selfishly realised his pet scheme 
of a Malay Peninsula Railway at too excessive a sacrifice 
of other national interests. The Prince felt piqued at 
the position of scapegoat for England into which Prince 
Devawongse had thrown him in the eyes of the King and the 
Cabinet. To this pique and a wish to dispel the impression 
that he was sacrificing national to foreign interests 
doubtless was due to the Prince’s bold attempt to exclude 
foreign capital by the establishment of a reserved zone 
along the southern railway and the introduction throughout 
the peninsula of a policy of unofficial and veiled 
obstruction to foreign enterprise. This event probably 
led to his eventual retirement in 1915•
(2) P.O. 371/985, Wood-Peel, May 4-, 1910.
(3) P.O. 371/1220, Peel-Grey, April 15, 1910
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In October, 1910, Wood reported to the British Consulate 
in Bangkok that he had been shown an official letter from the 
director of the Agricultural and Mining Department in Puket 
which said that the Siamese Government did not intend to permit
any prospecting for minerals, nor to issue mining licences for
Trang, as it was intended to reserve that province for
(1)agriculture. 7
In November, 1911, rumours reached Peel that the Siamese
Government had instructed the authorities in their provinces
in the Malay Peninsula to reserve the land in that region
(2)exclusively for the use of the local people. '
In Pattani the Langkat Oil Company, a British firm,
requested a concession to exploit oil-bearing lands but the 
reply which came from the Siamese Department of Mines clearly 
stated that the Siamese Government was not disposed to grant 
any concessions for oil-bearing land, and if oil were found 
in sufficient quantities, use would be made of it by the 
Government, assisted by its own experts. 7
But the most striking case was that of Mr. Pearson, a 
British subject, who applied for a licence to prospect for 
minerals in Nakornsitammarat. This licence was granted, but 
an endorsement on the document forbade prospecting for a
(1) P.O. 371/983, Wood-Peel, October 24-, 1910.
(2) P.O. 371/14-74-, Peel-Grey, Annual Report, 1911.
&
(5)
279
distance of five miles on each side of the Southern Railway 
line, which was then in process of construction. This 
endorsement was unfortunately overlooked by Pearson and a 
prospector was dispatched by his company to start operations. 
The endorsement was subsequently discovered, and the pros­
pector at once was withdrawn. Efforts were then made by the 
company to induce the Siamese authorities to cancel the clause 
in question, and a fresh application for a new licence was 
made. But a new order was issued by the Siamese Government
debarring British enterprise along a reserved zone of ten
(1)miles wide throughout the whole course of the railway.
Apart from all these arguments, there also existed 
differences over the regulations for purchasing land which 
placed British subjects on a different footing from the 
Siamese. A report from the British Consul in Songkhla said 
that the Siamese were able to secure prospecting and mining 
licences without any formality from the Mining Department in 
Puket while British subjects had to wait until a report had 
been made to Bangkok and instructions received. And legally, 
fifteen days’ notice was required to give time for any third 
party to make a claim to land proposed for sale; when a 
Siamese applied for land, the notice was at once pasted, but 
in the case of a British subject it could not be done until
(1) P.O. 4-22/66, Peel-Grey, August 7, 1911.
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after instructions had been received from Bangkok approving
(1)his application.
Another controversial point was the right to hold land.
At the outset the Siamese Government contended that this right 
applied merely to individuals, and not to companies or 
associations. This point was clearly illustrated in the case 
of a representative of a British missionary society who applied 
for title-deeds to lands belonging to the society, which 
hitherto had been held in the name of a Siamese. He was 
informed by the Siamese Government that they would not object 
to the land being transferred to him in the capacity of 
representative, but it could not be held in the name of a 
society which was a non-resident body.
The formal recognition of ownership of land purchased by
British subjects prior to the treaty also raised another point
of argument. It should be noted that for many years before
the ratification of the treaty of 1909, British subjects,
(2)although technically having no right to hold land, J had 
acquired landed property outside the limits by private
(1) Prince Devawongse stated that this differentiation was 
necessary because rights of foreign subjects under the 
various treaties with Siam were complicated. In certain 
districts some foreigners might have a right to the 
ownership of land while others had not. So the matter 
should be supervised directly from Bangkok.
P.O. 371/1220, Peel-Grey, January 6 , 1911.
(2) Prior to the date of the 1909 treaty British subjects 
in Siam could buy or rent houses, lands, or plantations 
situated anywhere within a distance of twenty-four 
hours' Journey from Bangkok.
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contract, the purchaser being, as a rule, contented with a 
document signed by both parties recording the terms of the 
sale. With the right of property granted to them by the 
treaty, attempts were made by British subjects to obtain 
recognition of their ownership of land from the local authori­
ties. Complaints came up continually since in many cases it
(1)so happened that it was impossible to trace the seller. J
The above-mentioned difficulties had to be discussed and 
resolved. It took nearly two years before all the points 
were settled. By 1911 Prince Devawongse had promised to adopt 
a more favourable attitude to any applications of British 
subjects for land in the Malay Peninsula. Together with this 
promise new regulations on the acquisition of land by foreign 
subjects had been drafted to meet the circumstances. They 
were applied as follows:
To individual persons:
First, in all cases where the person claiming 
to be a British subject could produce a 
certificate of registration in applying for a 
transfer of land, the order for the trans­
mission of the application to the Ministry 
of the Interior would be dispensed with.
Secondly, in cases where the applicant did 
not present a certificate of registration 
the application should be reported to 
Bangkok before any action was taken.
(1) F.O. 4-22/65, Peel-Grey, April 16, 1910.
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To British companies:
First, when the application was received 
the usual notice would be pasted at once.
Secondly, a report of the facts would at 
once be made to Bangkok,
Thirdly, no further action would be taken 
until orders from Bangkok had been received.
The matter of the right of property was also settled by 
the agreement which Peel concluded with the Siamese Government 
with reference to the treatment, in the Courts of Justice, 
of firms claiming British nationality.
One of the effects of the 1909 treaty was the suspension 
of the operation of the Fugitive Offenders' Act enforced by 
Article 7^ of the Siam Order in Council of 1906, which stated 
that Siam was regarded as a British possession. After the 
treaty was ratified a fugitive from justice of British 
nationality could no longer be brought back from Siam. And 
it was feared that if this were known in the Straits Settle­
ments or in Hong Kong there was a possibility th'at Siam might 
become the home of all absconding criminals. To safeguard 
against it the extradition treaty between England and Siam 
for the mutual rendition of fugitive offenders between Siam 
and the Kalay States under British protection was signed on 
Earch 4, 1911* As regards the newly acquired territories,
(1) F.O. 371/1220, Peel-Grey, March 17, 1911.
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the British Government considered that, as they did not 
loossess treaty-making powers on behalf of these States, the 
question should be dealt with by a separate agreement. At 
this point, however, the Siamese Government found it necessary 
to give the formal assurance that they recognised the natives 
of the recently ceded States as coming within the scope of 
the 1899 Registration Agreement and included within this 
admission the natives of the Federated Malay States and Johore, 
as well as the territories under British protection in Asia.v
With regard to the Railway Agreement, though at the start 
it appeared a hesitant gamble, it worked out effectively. 
Gittins, an English engineer, was appointed in August, 1909, 
to the post of ’’controlling engineer” to select a staff of 
engineers and others. Thanks to his skilful foresight, he 
selected them irrespective of nationality, including English,
(1) F.O. 371/1474, Peel-Grey, Annual Report, 1911.
This matter was raised for the first time in 1906, 
remained afterwards in abeyance, and in fact was lost 
sight of during the negotiations which ultimately led 
to the conclusion of the 1909 treaty. The objection to 
the recognition in Siam of the natives of the Federated 
Malay States and Johore as British subjects had previously 
been based on the grounds that they would have the 
privilege of being tried in 3 British court, but this 
objection no longer existed after the 1909 treaty as 
these natives were, with very few exceptions, post- 
registrants and consequently subject to the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary Siamese courts; nor could they be 
eligible for military service, as the Siamese Government 
had adopted the policy that all aliens should be exempt 
from duties connected with the defence forces of the 
country.
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(1}Italian and German, 'thus gaining strong co-operation from 
the Siamese Government since they regarded the matter of 
nationality as of prime importance.
A Royal Proclamation was published on August 1, 1909, 
making provision for the appropriation of land for the
railway and enumerating the points through which it was to
(2)pass. ' The construction started immediately in August on 
the Songkhla-Patalung-Tung Song-Trang section.
The conclusion of the treaty was reflected in a mood of 
optimism among the people of the two countries generally.
The British Government was contented with the newly-ceded 
territories while the sacrifice of judicial rights of 
British subjects was compensated for by the enjoyment of 
rights to own land and by a much-improved legal status of 
Siam. The treaty, on the other hand, raised Siam to a higher 
position among Asian powers. At least the Siamese were proud 
to say that their country had attained her ambition to become,
(1) These Germans were dismissed from the Northern State Rail­
way. On March 29, 1909, there was an official communique 
stating that the Siamese Government had decided for purely 
financial reasons, to take no further loans for the 
purpose of pushing the construction of the Northern 
Railway any further north.
P.O. 422/64, Beckett-Grey, hay 12, 1909.
K2.) The total length of main line was stated to be 600 miles 
for which a branch line of 95 miles had to be built out 
of revenue. In regard to the purchase of materials 
Belgium was most favoured source of supply. Rails, 
fastenings and ballast-wagons were bought from that 
country, while tenders for locomotives were awarded to 
Bngland.
in legal matters, on a par with Japan and European countries. 
And she could congratulate herself that she had brought to 
a conclusion within less than a decade a revision of her treaty 
system by England which Japan had accomplished only after 
laborious negotiations extending over twenty years. The people 
gradually reconciled themselves to the territorial loss, 
though it caused a strong feeling among them at the time.
With the evident desire of the young King, King Vajiravudh, 
who ascended the throne in October, 1910, to maintain very 
friendly relations with England, the country in which he was 
educated and spent so many of his early years, Anglo-Siamese 
relations moved into a more understanding phase.
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APPENDIX I 
The Ghiengmai Treaty of 1883
WHEREAS the relations of Peace, Commerce, and Friendship 
happily subsisting between Great Britain and Siam are regu­
lated by a Treaty bearing date the 18th April, 1855? and a 
Supplementary Agreement dated 13th May, 1856; and, as regards 
the territories of Ghiengmai, Lakon, and Lampoonchi, by a 
special Treaty between the Government of India and the Govern­
ment of His Majesty the King of Siam, bearing date the 14-th 
January, 1874-.
And whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His 
Majesty the King of Siam, with a view to the more effectual 
prevention of crime in the territories of Ghiengmai, Lakon, 
and Lampoonchi, belonging to Siam, and to the promotion of 
commercial intercourse between British Burmah and the terri­
tories aforesaid, have agreed to abrogate the said Treaty 
Special concluded on the 14-th January, 1874-, and to substitute 
therefnr a new Treaty, and have named their respective Pleni­
potentiaries for this purpose, that is to say -
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, impress of India, William Henry Newman, 
Esquire, Her Majesty's Acting Agent and Consul-General in Siam
And His Majesty the King of Siam, Sovereign of Laos, 
Malays, Kareans, etc., his Excellency Ghow Phya Bhanwongse
Maha Kosa Thibodi, Grand Gross of the Most Honourable Order of
the Grown of Siam, Grand Gross of the Most Noble Order of the
Chula Ghom Klao, Grand Officer of the Most Exalted Order of
the White Elephant, Member of the Privy Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs; Phya Charon Raj Maitri, Grand Officer of 
’the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant, Knight Commander 
of the Most Noble Order of the Chula Ghom Klao, Member of the 
Privy Council, Chief Judge of the International Court; and 
Phya Thep Prachun, Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order 
of the Crown of Siam, Knight Commander of the Most Noble Order 
of the Chula Chom Klao, Grand Officer of the Most Exalted 
Order of the White Elephant, Member of the Privy Council, 
Under-Secretary of State of the War Department.
The said Plenipotentiaries, after having communicated to
each other their respective full powers, found in good and
due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following
Articles
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ARTICLE I.
The Treaty between the Government of India and the 
Government of His Majesty the King of Siam, bearing date the 
14th January, 1874, shall be and is hereby abrogated.
ARTICLE II.
The Siamese authorities in Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lam­
poonchi will afford due assistance and protection to British 
subjects carrying on trade or business in any of those 
territories; and the British Government in India will afford 
similar assistance and protection to Siamese subjects from 
Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lampoonchi carrying on trade or business 
in British territory.
ARTICLE III.
British subjects entering Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lampoon­
chi must provide themselves with passports from the Chief 
Commissioner of British Burmah, or such officer as he appoints 
in this behalf, stating their names, calling, and the weapons 
they carry, and description. Such passports must be renewed 
for each journey, and must be shown to the Siamese officers 
at the frontier stations, or in the interior of Chiengmai, 
Lakon, and Lampoonchi on demand. Persons provided with 
passports and not carrying any articles prohibited under the 
Treaty of the 18th April, 1855? ov the Supplementary Agreement 
of the ljth May, 1856, shall be allowed to proceed on their 
journey without interference; persons unprovided with pass­
ports may be turned back to the frontier, but shall not be 
subjected to further interference.
Passports may also be granted by Her Majestyfs Consul- 
General at Bangkok and by Her Majesty's Consul or Vice-Consul 
at Chiengmai, in case of the loss of the original passport or 
of the expiration of the term for which it may have been 
granted, and other analogous cases.
British subjects travelling in the Siamese territory must 
be provided with passports from the Siamese authorities.
Siamese subjects going from Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lam­
poonchi into British Burmah must provide themselves with pass­
ports from the authorities of Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lampoonchi 
respectively, stating their name, calling, description, and 
the weapons they carry. Such passports must be renewed for 
each journey, and must be shown to the British officer at the 
frontier stations or in the interior of British Burmah on 
demand.
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Persons provided with passports and not carrying any 
prohibited article shall be allowed to proceed on their 
Journey without interference. Persons unprovided with pass­
ports may be turned back at the frontier, but shall not be 
subjected to further interference.
ARTICLE IV.
British subjects entering Siamese territory from British 
Burmah must, according to custom and the regulations of the 
country, pay the duties lawfully prescribed on goods liable 
to such duty.
Siamese subjects entering British territory will be 
liable, according to the regulations of the British Government, 
to pay the duties lawfully prescribed on goods liable to such 
duty.
Tables of such duties shall be published for general
information.
ARTICLE V.
His Majesty the King of Siam will cause the Prince of 
Chiengmai to establish and maintain guard stations, under 
proper officers, on the Siamese bank of the Salween River, 
which forms the boundary of Chiengmai belonging to Siam, and 
to maintain a sufficient police force for the prevention of 
murder, robbery, dacoity, and other crimes of violence.
ARTICLE VI.
If any persons accused or convicted of murder, robbery, 
dacoity, or other heinous crime in any of the territories of 
Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lampoonchi escape into British territory, 
the British authorities and police shall use their best 
endeavours to apprehend them. Such persons when apprehended 
shall, if Siamese subjects, or subjects of any third Power, 
according to the extradition law for the time being in force 
in British India, be delivered over to the Siamese authorities 
at Chiengmai; if British subjects, they shall either be 
delivered over to the Siamese authorities, or shall be dealt 
with by the British authorities as the Chief Commissioner of 
British Burmah, or any officer duly authorised by him in 
this behalf, may decide.
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If any persons accused or convicted of murder, robbery, 
dacoity, or other heinous crime in British territory, escape 
into Ghiengmai, Lakon, or Lampoonchi, the Siamese authorities 
and police shall use their best endeavours to apprehend them. 
Such persons when apprehended shall, if British subjects, be 
delivered over to the British authorities, according to the 
Extradition Law for the time being in force in Siam; if 
Siamese subjects, or subjects of any third Power not having 
Treaty relations with Siam, they shall either be delivered 
over to the British authorities, or shall be dealt with by 
the Siamese authorities, as the latter may decide, after 
consultation with the Consul or Vice-Consul,
ARTICLE VII.
The interests of all British subjects coming to Chiengmai, 
Lakon, and Lampoonchi shall be placed under the regulations 
and control of a British Consul or Vice-Consul, who will be 
appointed to reside at Chiengmai, with power to exercise civil 
and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of 
Article II of the Supplementary Agreement of the ljth May,' 
1856, subject to Article VIII of the present Treaty.
ARTICLE VIII.
His Majesty the King•of Siam will appoint a proper person 
or proper persons to be a Commissioner and Judge, or Commis­
sioners and Judges, in Chiengmai for the purposes hereinafter 
mentioned. Such Judge or Judges shall, subject to the limi­
tations and provisions contained in the present Treaty, exercise 
civil and criminal jurisdiction in all cases arising in 
Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lampoonchi, between British subjects, or 
in which British subjects may be parties as complainants, 
accused, plaintiffs or defendants, according to Siamese law; 
provided always, that in all such cases the Consul or Vice- 
Consul shell be entitled to be present at the trial, and to be 
furnished with copies of the proceedings, which, when the 
defendant or accused is a British subject, shall be supplied 
free of charge, and to make any suggestions to the Judge or 
Judges which he may think proper in the interests of justice: 
provided also, that the Consul or Vice-Consul shall have power 
at any time, before Judgment, if he shall think proper in the 
interests of justice, by a written requisition under his hand, 
directed to the Judge or Judge#s, to signify his desire that any 
case in which both parties are British subjects, or in which 
the accused or defendant is a British subject, be transferred 
for adjudication to the British Consular Court at Chiengmai, 
and the case shall thereupon be transferred to such last-
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mentioned Court accordingly, and be disposed of by the Consul 
or Vice-Consul, as provided by Article II of the Supplementary
Agreement of ljth May, 1856.
The Consul or Vice-Consul shall have access, at all 
reasonable times, to any British subject who may be imprisoned 
under a sentence or order of the said Judge or Judges, and, 
if he shall think fit, may require that the prisoner be removed 
to the Consular prison, there to undergo the residue of his 
term of imprisonment.
The Tariff of Court fees shall be published, and shall be 
equally binding on all parties concerned, whether British or
Siamese.
ARTICLE IX.
In civil and criminal cases in which British subjects may 
be parties, and which shall be tried before the said Judge or 
Judges, either party shall be entitled to appeal to Bangkok; 
if a British subject, with the sanction and consent of the 
British Consul or Vice-Consul, and in other cases by leave of 
the presiding Judge or Judges.
In all such cases a transcript of the evidence, together 
with a Report from the presiding Judge or Judges, shall be 
forwarded to Bangkok, and the appeal shall be disposed of 
there by the Siamese authorities and Her Britannic Majesty's 
Consul-General in consultation.
Provided always that in all cases where the defendants or 
accused are Siamese subjects the final decision on appeal shall 
rest with the Siamese authorities; and that in all other cases 
in which British subjects are parties the final decision on 
appeal shall rest with Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General.
Pending the result of the appeal, the Judgment of the 
Court at Chiengmai shall be suspended on such terms and condi­
tions (if any) as shall be agreed upon between the said Judge
or Judges and the Consul or Vice-Consul.
In such cases of appeal, as above set forth, the appeal 
must be entered in the Court of Chiengmai within a month of 
the original verdict, and must be presented at Bangkok within
a reasonable time, to be determined by the Court at Chiengmai, 
failing which the appeal will be thrown out of Court.
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ARTICLE X.
The British authorities in the frontier districts of 
British Burmah, and the Siamese authorities in Chiengmai, 
Lakon, and Lampoonchi, will at all times use their best 
endeavours to procure and furnish such evidence and witnesses 
as may be required for the determination of civil and criminal 
cases pending in the Consular and Siamese Courts at Bangkok 
and in Chiengmai respectively, when the importance of the 
affair may render it necessary.
ARTICLE XI.
British subjects desiring to purchase, cut, or girdle 
timber in the forests of Chiengmai, Lakon, and Lampoonchi 
must enter into a written agreement for a definite period with 
the owner of the forest. The agreement must be executed in 
duplicate, each party retaining a copy, and each copy must 
be sealed by the British Consul or Vice-Consul and a Siamese 
Judge and Commissioner at Chiengmai, appointed under Article 
VIII of this Convention, and be countersigned by a competent 
local authority, and every such agreement shall be duly regi­
stered in the British Consulate and in the Siamese Court at 
Chiengmai. Any British subject cutting or girdling trees in 
a forest without the consent of the owner of the forest 
obtained as aforesaid, or after the expiration of the agreement 
relating to it, shall be liable to pay such compensation to 
the owner of the forest as the British Consular Officer at 
Chiengmai shall adjudge.
Transfers of agreements shall be subject to the same
formalities.
The charges for sealing, countersigning, and registration 
shall be fixed at a moderate scale, and published for general
information.
ARTICLE XII
The Siamese Judges and Commissioners at Chiengmai 
appointed under Article VIII shall, in conjunction with the 
local authorities, endeavour to prevent the owners of forests
from executing agreements with more than one party for the 
same timber or forests, and to prevent any person from 
illegally marking or effacing the marks on timber which has 
been lawfully cut or marked by another person, and they shall 
give such facilities as are in their power to the purchasers 
and fellers of timber to identify their property. Should
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the owners of forests hinder the cutting, girdling, or 
removing of timber under agreements duly executed in accord­
ance with Article XI of this Convention, the Siamese Judges 
and Commissioners of Chiengmai and the local authorities shall 
enforce the agreement, and the owners of such forests acting 
as aforesaid shall be liable to pay such compensation to the 
persons with whom they have entered into such agreements as 
the Siamese Judges and Commissioners at Chiengmai shall 
determine, in accordance with Siamese law*
ARTICLE XIII.
Except 3s and to the extent specially provided, nothing 
in this Treaty shall be taken to affect the provisions of the 
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Her Majesty and the 
Kings of Siam of the 18th April, 1855> and the Agreement
supplementary thereto of the 13th May, 1856.
ARTICLE XIV.
This Treaty has been executed in English and Siamese, 
both versions having the same meaning; but it is hereby 
agreed that in the event of any question arising as to the 
construction thereof, the English text shall be accepted as 
conveying its true meaning and intention.
ARTICLE XV.
This Treaty shall come into operation immediately after 
the exchange of the ratifications thereof, and shall continue 
in force for seven years from that date, unless either of the 
two Contracting Parties shall give notice of their desire that 
it should terminate before that date. In such case, or in the 
event of notice not being given before the expiration of the 
said period of seven years, it shall remain in force until the 
expiration of one year from the day on which either of the 
High Contracting Parties shall have given such notice. The 
High Contracting Parties, however, reserve to themselves the 
power of making, by common consent, any modifications in these 
Articles which experience of their working may show to be 
desirable.
ARTICLE XVI.
This Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications
exchanged at Bangkok as soon as possible.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the same in duplicate, and have affixed thereto their
respective seals.
Done at Bangkok, the third day of September, in the year 
one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three of the Christian 
Era, corresponding to the second day of the waxing moon of 
the tenth month of the year of the Goat, one thousand two 
hundred and forty-five of the Siamese Era.
(L.S.) W.H. NEWMAN
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Annex.
List of heinous crimes appended to the Treaty made 
between Great Britain and Siam with regard to Chiengmai, 
Lakon, and Lampoonchi, this 3rd day of September, 1883, in 
connection with the provisions of Article VT of that Treaty 
with regard to the extradition of offenders
Murder,
Culpable homicide,
Dacoity,
Robbery,
Theft,
Forgery,
Counterfeiting coin or Government stamps, 
Kidnapping,
Rape,
Michief by fire or by any explosive
substance.
(L.S.) W. H. NEWMAN 
(L.S.)
(L.S.)
(L.S.)
Source: j?.0. 69/95*
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A P P E N D IX  I I .
The Secret Convention of 1897.
Her Britannic Majesty having communicated to His Majesty 
the King of Siam the two first Articles of the Declaration 
signed between the Government of Great Britain and Prance on 
the fifteenth day of January, 1896, as giving evidence of 
England and France*s joint solicitude for the security and 
stability of the Kingdom of Siam, His Majesty the King of 
Siam and Her Britannic Majesty, being desirous of making 
further provision for securing the mutual interests of Siam 
and Great Britain, have agreed, etc.
ARTICLE 1.
His Majesty the King of Siam engages not to cede or 
alienate to any other Power any of his rights over any portion 
of the territories or islands lying to the south of Muong 
Bang Tapan.
ARTICLE 2.
Her Britannic Majesty engages on her part to support 
His Majesty the King of Siam in resisting any attempt by a 
third Power to acquire dominion or to establish its influence 
or Protectorate in the territories or islands above mentioned.
ARTICLE 3.
His Britannic Majesty having engaged by the preceding 
article to support His Majesty the King of Siam in resisting 
any attempt by any third Power to acquire dominion or to 
establish influence or Protectrate in any of the territories 
or islands above mentioned, His Majesty the King of Siam 
engages not to grant, cede or let any special privilege or 
advantage whether as regards land or trade within the above 
specified limits either to the Government or to the subjects 
of a third Power without the written consent of the British 
Government.
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(This Convention was cancelled hy the agreement of 
March 10, 1909. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol.* 102, 
pp. 12U-5.)
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* APPENDIX III.
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Siam
relative to the Registration of British Subjects
in Siam. Signed at Bangkok, November 29, 1899*
THE Governments of Her Majesty the Queen of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and 
of His Majesty the King of Siam, recognizing the necessity 
of having a satisfactory arrangement for the registration of 
British subjects in Siam, the Undersigned, Her Britannic 
Majesty's Minister Resident, and His Siamese Majesty's 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, duly authorised to that effect, 
have agreed as follows:-
I.
The registration according to Article V of the Treaty 
of the 18th April, 1855, of British subjects residing in Siam, 
shall comprise the following categories:-
1. All British natural-born or naturalized subjects, other 
than those of Asiatic descent.
2. All children and grandchildren born in Siam of persons 
entitled to be registered under the first category who are 
entitled to the status of British subjects in contemplation
of English law.
Neither great-grandchildren nor illegitimate children 
born in Siam of persons mentioned in the first category are 
entitled to be registered.
5. All persons of Asiatic descent born within the Queen's 
dominions, or naturalized within the United Kingdom, or born 
within the territory of any Prince or State in India under 
the suzerainty of, or in alliance with, the Queen.
Except natives of Upper Burrnah or the British Shan States
who became domiciled in Siam before the 1st January, 1886.
4. All children born in Siam of persons entitled to be
registered under the third category.
No grandchildren born in Siam of persons mentioned in the 
third category are entitled to be registered for protection 
in Siam.
5. The wives and widows of any persons who are entitled to 
be registered under the foregoing categories.
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II.
The lists of such registration shall be open to the 
inspection of a properly-authorized Representative of the
Siamese Government on proper notice being given.
III.
If any question arises as to the right of any person to 
hold a British certificate of registration or as to the 
validity of the certificate itself, a joint inquiry shall be 
held by the British and Siamese authorities, and decided 
according to the conditions laid down in this Agreement, upon 
evidence to be adduced by the holder of the certificate in 
the usual way.
IV.
Should any action, civil or criminal, be pending while 
such inquiry is going on, it shall be determined conjointly 
in what Court the case shall be heard.
V.
If the person in respect of whom the inquiry is held 
come within the conditions for registration laid down in 
Article I, he may, if not yet registered, forthwith be 
registered as a British subject, and provided with a certificat 
of registration at Her Britannic Majesty’s Consulate, otherwise 
he shall be recognized as falling under Siamese jurisdiction, 
and, if already on the lists of Her Britannic Majesty’s 
Consulate, his name shall be erased.
In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed the same 
in duplicate, and have affixed thereto their seals at Bangkok, 
on the 29th day of November, 1899, of the Christian era, 
corresponding to the 118th year of Ratanakosindr.
(Seal) (Signed) GEORGE GREVILLE.
(Seal) (Signed) DEVAWONGSE VAROPRAKAR.
(P.O. 69/262, P.O.-A. Gray, 11 August, 1900. 
Inclosure in No.90.)
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APPENDIZ IV.
ANGLO-SIAMESE TREATY, 1909.
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Greet 
Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the 
seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of Siam, 
being desirous of settling various questions which have arisen 
affecting their respective dominions, have decided to conclude 
a Treaty, and have appointed for this purpose as their 
Plenipotentiaries:
His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ralph Paget, Esq., 
His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, etc;
His Majesty King of Siam, His Royal Highness Prince 
Devawongse Varoprakar, Minister for Poreign Affairs, etc;
who, after having communicated to each other their respective 
full powers, and found them to be in good and due form, have 
agreed upon and concluded the following Articles
ARTICLE 1.
The Siamese Government transfers to the British Government 
all rights of suzerainty, protection, administration, and 
control whatsoever which they possess over the States of 
Kelantan, Tringganu, Kedah, Perlis, and adjacent islands.
The frontiers of these territories are defined by the Boundary 
Protocol annexed hereto.
ARTICLE 2.
The transfer provided for in the preceding Article shall 
take place within thirty days after the ratification of this 
Treaty.
ARTICLE 3.
A mixed Commission, composed of Siamese and British 
officials and officers, shall be appointed within six months 
after the date of ratification of this Treaty, and shall be 
charged with the delimitation of the new frontier. The work 
of the Commission shall be commenced as soon as the season
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permits, and shall be carried out in accordance with the
Boundary Protocol annexed hereto.
Subjects of His Majesty the King of Siamresiding within 
the territory described in Article 1 who desire to preserve 
their Siamese nationality will, during the period of six 
months after the ratification of the present Treaty, be 
allowed to do so if they become domiciled in the Siamese 
dominions. His Britannic Majestyfs Government undertake that 
they shall be at liberty to retain their immovable property 
within the territory described in Article 1.
It is understood that in accordance with the usual custom 
where a change of suzerainty takes place, any Concessions 
within the territories described in Article 1 hereof to 
individuals or Companies, granted by or with the approval of 
the Siamese Government, and recognized by them as still in 
force on the date of the signature of the Treaty, will be 
recognized by the Government of His Britannic Majesty.
ARTICLE 4.
His Britannic Majesty’s Government undertake that the 
Government of the Federated Malay States shall assume the 
indebtedness to the Siamese Government of the territories 
described in Article 1.
ARTICLE 5.
The jurisdiction of the Siamese International Courts, 
established by Article 8 of the Treaty of the 5^h September, 
1683, shall, under the conditions defined in the Jurisdiction 
Protocol annexed hereto, be extended to all British subjects 
in Siam registered at the British Consulates before the date 
of the present Treaty.
This system shall come to an end, and the jurisdiction
of the International Courts shall be transferred to the
ordinary Siamese Courts after the promulgation and the coming 
into force of the Siamese codes, namely, the Penal Code, the 
Civil and Commercial Codes, the Codes of Procedure, and the
Lav/ for organization of Courts.
All other British subjects in Siam shall be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary Siamese Courts under the 
conditions defined in the Jurisdiction Protocol.
ARTICLE 6.
British subjects shall enjoy throughout the whole extent 
of Siam the rights and privileges enjoyed by the natives of 
the country, notably the right of property, the right of 
residence and travel.
They and their property shall be subject to all taxes 
and services, but these shall not be other or higher than the 
taxes and services which are or may be imposed by law on 
Siamese subjects. It is particularly understood that the 
limitation in the Agreement of the 20th September, 1900, by 
which the taxation of land shall not exceed that on similar 
land in Lower Burmah, is hereby removed.
British subjects in Siam shall be exempt from all 
military service, either in the army or navy, and from all 
forced loans or military exactions or contributions.
ARTICLE 7.
The provisions of all Treaties, Agreements, and 
Conventions between Great Britain and Siam, not modified by 
the present Treaty, remain in full force.
ARTICLE 8.
The present Treaty shall be ratified within four months 
from its date.
In v/itness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals.
Done at Bangkok, in duplicate, the 10th day of March, 
in the year 1909.
(Signed) RALPH PAGET.
(Seal)
(Signed) DEVAWONGSE VAROPRAKAR
(Seal)
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Release of 1897 Convention.
(Confidential)
WHEREAS on the 6th day of April, 1897, a Convention was 
signed at Bangkok between the Governments of His Majesty the 
King of Siam and His Majesty the King of Great Britain and
Ireland; and
Whereas the said Convention dealt with certain matters 
affecting a portion of the Malay Peninsula; and
Whereas a Treaty has this day been signed between the two 
Governments, which Treaty also deals with certain matters 
affecting a portion of the Malay Peninsula; and
Whereas in the negotiations preceding the execution of 
said Treaty it was settled that the Convention above mentioned 
should be cancelled, but that such cancellation should be by 
a separate instrument and not in the Treaty itself:
Now, therefore, it is hereby mutually agreed by the 
Government of His Majesty the King of Siam, acting by His 
Royal Highness Prince Devawongse Varoprakar, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and by the Government of His Majesty the 
King of Great Britain and Ireland, acting by Ralph Paget, Esq., 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, that said 
Convention of the 6th April, 1897, shall be, and it hereby is, 
cancelled. The present Agreement shall be as effective as 
though incorporated into said Treaty of this date, notwith­
standing anything contained in said Treaty.
Signed and sealed at Bangkok, in Siam, on this the
ICth day of March, 1909.
(S igne d) RALPH PAGET.
(Seal.)
(Signed) DEVAWONGSE VAROPRAKAR
(Seal.)
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Mr. Paget to Prince Devawongse.
March 10, 1909•
M. le Ministre,
IN view of the position of British possessions in the 
Malay Peninsula and of the contiguity of the Siamese Malay 
provinces with British-protected territory, His Majesty's 
Government are desirous of receiving an assurance that the 
Siamese Government will not permit any danger to arise to 
British interests through the use of any portion of the 
Siamese dominions in the peninsula for military or naval 
purposes by foreign Powers.
His Majesty's Government would therefore request that 
the Siamese Government shall not cede or lease, directly or 
indirectly, to any foreign Government any territory situated 
in the Malay Peninsula south of the southern boundary of the 
Monthon Rajaburi, or in any of the islands adjacent to the 
said territory; also that within the limits above mentioned 
a right to establish or lease any coaling station, to build 
or own any construction or repairing docks, or to occupy 
exclusively any harbours, the occupation of which would be 
likely to be prejudicial to British interests from a strategic 
point of view, shall not be granted to any foreign Government 
or Company.
Since this assurance is desired as a matter of political 
expediency only, the phrase "coaling station" would not be 
held to include such small deposits of coal as may be required
for the purposes of the ordinary shipping engaged in the 
Malay Peninsula coasting trade.
(Signed) RALPH PAGET.
Prince Devawongse to Mr. Paget.
M. le Ministre, Foreign Office, Bangkok,
March 10, 1909.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note 
of this date, in which you express the desire of your Govern­
ment that the Siamese Government shall not cede or lease, 
directly or indirectly, to any foreign Government any territory 
situated in the Malay Peninsula south of the southern boundary 
of the Monthon of Rajaburi or in any of the islands adjacent 
to the said territory; also that within the limits above
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mentioned a right to establish or lease any coaling station, 
to build or own any construction or repairing docks, or to 
occupy exclusively any harbours, the occupation of which would 
be likely to be prejudicial to British interests from a 
strategic point of view, shall not be granted to any foreign 
Government or Company.
In reply, I beg to say that the Siamese Government gives 
its assurance to the above effect, taking note that the phrase 
"coaling station" shall not include such small deposits of 
coal as may be required for the purposes of the ordinary 
shipping engaged in. the Malay Peninsula coasting trade.
I avail, etc.
(Signed) DEVAWONGSE,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Protocol concerning the Jurisdiction applicable 
in the Kingdom of Siam to British Subjects and 
annexed to the Treaty dated March 10, 1909.
SECTION 1. International Courts shall be established 
at such places as may seem desirable in the interests of the 
good administration of justice; the selection of these 
places shall form the subject of an understanding between the 
British Minister at Bangkok and the Siamese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs.
Sec. 2. The jurisdiction of the Internal Courts shall
extend -
1. In civil matters: To all civil and commercial
matters to which British subjects shall be parties.
2. In penal matters: To breaches of law of every kind
whether committed by British subjects or to their injury.
Sec. 5. The right of evocation in the International 
Courts shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 8 of the Treaty of the ^rd September, 1885.
The right of evocation shall cease to be exercised in
all matters coming within the scope of codes or laws regularly 
promulgated as soon as the text of such codes or laws shall 
have been communicated to the British Legation in Bangkok. 
There shall be on understanding between the Ministry for
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Foreign Affairs and the British Legation at Bangkok for the 
disposal of cases pending at the time that the said codes 
and laws are communicated.
Bee. 4. In all cases, whether in the International 
Courts or in the ordinary Siamese Courts in which a British 
subject is defendant or accused, a European legal adviser 
shall sit in the Court of First Instance.
In cases in which a British born or naturalized subject 
not of Asiatic descent may be a party, a European adviser shall 
sit as a Judge in the Court of First Instance, and where such 
British subject is defendant or accused the opinion of the 
adviser shall prevail.
A British subject who is in the position of defendant or 
accused in any case arising in the provinces may apply for a 
change of venue, and should the Court consider such change 
desirable the trial shall take place either at Bangkok or 
before the Judge in whose Court the case would be tried at 
Bangkok. Notice of any such application shall be given to 
the British Consular officer.
Bee. 5. Article 9 of the Treaty of the 3rd September, 
1883, is repealed.
Appeals against the decisions of the International Courts 
of First Instance shall be adjudged by the Siamese Court of 
Appeal at Bangkok. Notice of all such appeals shall be 
communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Consul, who shall have 
the right to give a written opinion upon the case to be 
annexed to the record.
The judgment on appeal from either the International 
Courts or the ordinary Siamese Courts shall bear the signature
of two European Judges.
Sec. 6. An appeal on a question of law shall lie from 
the Court of Appeal at Bangkok to the Supreme or Dika Court.
Sec. 7* No plea of want of jurisdiction based on the 
rules prescribed by the present Treaty shall be advanced in 
any Court after a defence on the main issue has been offered.
Sec. 8. In order to prevent difficulties which may arise 
in future from the transfer of jurisdiction contemplated by
the present Treaty and Protocol, it is agreed -
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(a) All cases in which action shall be taken subsequently 
to the date of the ratification of this Treaty shall be 
entered and decided in the competent International or Siamese 
Court, whether the cause of action arose before or after the
date of ratification.
(b) All cases pending in Kis Britannic Majesty's Courts 
in Siam on the date of the ratification of this Treaty shall 
take their usual course in such Courts and in any Appeal Court 
until such cases have been finally disposed of, and the juris­
diction of His Britannic Majesty's Courts shall remain in full 
force for this purpose.
The execution of the judgment rendered in any such 
pending case shall be carried out by the International Courts.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have
signed the present Protocol and affixed their seals.
Done at Bangkok, in duplicate, the 10th day of March, 1909
(Signed) RALPH PAGET.
(Seal.)
(Signed) DEVAWONGSE VAROPRAKAR.
(Seal.)
u Boundary Protocol annexed to the Treaty dated
March 10, 1909.
THE frontiers between the territories of His Majesty the 
King of Siam and the territory over which his suzerain rights 
have by the present Treaty been transferred to His Majesty 
the King of Great Britain and Ireland are as follows
Commencing from the most seaward point of the northern 
bank of the estuary of the Perlis River and thence north to 
the range of hills which is the watershed between the Perlis 
River on the one side and the Pujoh River on the other; then 
following the watershed formed by the said range of hills until 
it reaches the main watershed or dividing line between those 
rivers which flow into the Gulf of Siam on the one side and 
into the Indian Ocean on the other; following this main 
watershed so as to pass the sources of the Sungei Patani,
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Sungei Telubin, and Sungei Perak, to a point which is the 
source of the Sungei Pergau; then leaving the main watershed 
and going along the watershed separating the waters of the 
Sungei Pergau from the Sungei Telubin, to the hill called 
Bukit Jeli or the source of the main stream of the Sungei 
Golok. Thence the frontier follows the thalweg of the main 
stream of the Sungei Golok to the sea at a place called 
Kuala Tabar.
This line will leave the valleys of the Sungei Patani, 
Sungei Telubin, and Sungei Tanjung Mas and the valley on the 
left or west bank of the Golok to Siam and the whole valley 
of the Perak River and the valley on the right or east bank 
of the Golok to Great Britain.
Subjects of each of the parties may navigate the v/hole 
of the waters of the Sungei Golok and its affluents.
The island known as Pulo Lsngkawi, together with all the
islets south of mid-channel between Terutau and Langkawi and 
all the islands south of Langkawi shall become British.
Terutau and the islets to the north of mid-channel shall remain 
to Siam.
With regard to the islands close to the west coast, those 
lying to the north of the parallel of latitude where the most 
seaward point of the north bank of the estuary of the Perlis 
River touches the sea shall remain to Siam, and those lying to 
the south of that parallel shall become British.
All islands adjacent to the eastern States of Kelantan 
and Tringganu, south of a parallel of latitude drawn from the 
point where the Sungei Golok reaches the coast at a place 
called Kuala Tabar shall be transferred to Great Britain, and 
all islands to the north of that parallel shall remain to Siam.
A rough sketch of the boundary herein described is 
annexed hereto.
2. The above-described boundary shall be regarded as final, 
both by the Government of His Britannic Majesty and that of 
Siam, and they mutually undertake that, so far as the boundary 
effects any alteration of the existing boundaries of any 
State or province, no claim for compensation on the ground of 
any such alteration made by any State or province so affected 
shall be entertained or supported by either.
5. It shall be the duty of the Boundary Commission, provided
lor in Article 3 of the Treaty of this date, to determine and 
eventually mark out the frontier above described.
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If during the operations of delimitation it should appear 
desirable to depart from the frontier as laid down herein, 
such rectification shall not under any circumstances be made 
to the prejudice of the Siamese Government.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Protocol and affixed their seals.
Done at Bangkok, in duplicate, the 10th day of March, 1909
(Signed) RALPH PAGET.
(Seal.)
(Signed) DEVAWONGSE VAROPRAKAR
(Seal.)
Prince Devawongse to Mr. Paget.
Foreign Office, Bangkok,
H. le Ministre, March 10, 1909.
WITH reference to the provision contained in Article 4 
of the Jurisdiction Protocol to the effect that in all cases 
in which a British subject is defendant or accused a European 
adviser shall sit in Court, I would express the hope, on 
behalf of His Majesty's Government, that His Britannic 
Majesty's Government will be prepared in due course to consider 
the question of a modification of or release from this 
guarantee when it shall be no longer needed; and, moreover, 
that in any negotiations in connection with such a modification 
or release the matter may be treated upon its merits alone, 
and not as a consideration for which some other return should 
be expected.
The Siamese Government appreciates that a Treaty like the 
one signed today marks an advance in the administration of 
justice in the kingdom. The conclusion of such a Treaty is 
in itself a sign of progress. It is the intention of the 
Siamese Government to maintain the high standard in the admini­
stration of justice which it has set before it, and towards 
which it has been working for some time.
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In this connection, I take pleasure in acknowledging 
the contribution which Hr. J. Stewart Black has made to this 
work.
I wish also to say that provision will be made for the 
treatment of European prisoners according to the standard 
usual for such prisoners in Burmah and the Straits Settlements.
I avail, etc.
(Signed) DEVAWONGSE,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
hr. Paget to Prince Devawongse.
M. le hinistre, March 10, 1909*
WITH reference to the guarantee contained in the first 
paragraph of Article 4- of the Jurisdiction Protocol, I have 
the honour to state that His Majesty's Government will be 
prepared in due course to consider the question of modification 
of or release from this guarantee when it shall no longer be 
needed. His Majesty's Government are also willing that in any 
negotiations in connection with such a modification or release 
the matter shall be treated upon its merits alone, and not as 
a consideration for which some other return shall be expected.
His Majesty's Government learn with much satisfaction that 
it is the intention of the Siamese Government to maintain the 
high standard in the administration of justice which it has 
set before it, and towards which it has been working for some 
time; and I may assure your Royal Highness that it will be 
the aim of His Majesty's Government in every manner to second 
the efforts of His Siamese Majesty's Government in this 
direction.
I wish also to say that the International Courts referred 
to in section 1 of the Protocol on Jurisdiction annexed to
the Treaty signed today need not necessarily be Courts 
specially organized for this purpose. Provincial ("Monthon") 
Courts or District ("Muang") Courts may constitute Interna­
tional Courts, according as British subjects may be established
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in greater or less number within the jurisdiction of those 
Courts. The fact that an ordinary Court is designated as an 
International Court will have as a consequence the introduction 
into that ordinary Court of all the provisions relating to 
International Courts secured by the Frotocol on Jurisdiction.
REFERRING to our conversations during the negotiation of 
the Treaty signed today, I beg to say that hereafter, when any 
case to which a British subject is a party shall on appeal 
reach the Dika Court, the judgment of that Court shall bear 
the signature of two European Judges.
You have mentioned the question of the nationality of the 
advisers who are to sit in the International Court. You will 
understand the reluctance of the Siamese Government to enter 
into engagements concerning the nationality of the Europeans 
whom it employs. They recognize, however, that in different 
X^ arts of Siam there is a varied distribution of foreign 
subjects who are under the jurisdiction of the International 
Courts, and that it is desirable to keep this in view in 
distributing advisers. For instance, by an examination of such 
facts as are at hand it appears that, as bet ween British and 
French subjects in the interior of Siam, the former are more 
numerous in some sections and the latter in others. I append 
hereto a list, as far as it is practicable to make one.
Now, as I have above hinted, as between Englishmen and 
Frenchmen it would be natural to send the former to sit in 
those sections where British subjects are more numerous and 
the latter in those sections where French subjects are more 
numerous, and it is the intention of the Ministry of Justice 
to follow this plan. At the same time I should not wish you 
to take the above list as one which is to be observed rigidly 
during the period of the existence of the International Courts. 
Population may change in character, the ability or character 
of an individual adviser or other practical reasons may render 
it advisable to make a departure from the arrangement in the 
list, or sometimes to use an adviser of a third nationality.
(Signed) RALPH PAGET.
Mr. Westengard to Mr. Paget.
(Confidential)
Sir,
Office of the General Adviser, Bangkok,
March 10, 1909.
I am, etc.,
(Signed) WESTENGARD
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Approximate Distribution of Advisers by "Monthons" 
British. French.
Payab (excluding Kan). 
Pitsanuloke.
Kakon Sawan.
Bangkok.
Kakon Ghaisee. 
Rajaburi.
Chumpon.
Kakon Sritammarat.
Puket.
Kan.
ietchaboon. 
Ayuthia. 
Bangkok. 
Korat.
Ud on.
Isan.
Pachinburi. 
Ghantaburi.
Kir. Westengard to hr. Paget.
(Confidential)
Office of the General Adviser, Bangkok, 
Sir March 10, 1909.
IN the course of our recent discussions you have referred 
to the expression "European Judge” , used in the second para­
graph of section 1- of the Jurisdiction Protocol, and you have 
asked for a written statement that the Siamese Government 
would employ a British subject in this position.
In reply, I have repeated what I have said on other 
occasions, namely, that the Siamese Government, while not for­
getful of the fact that nationality may play a part in the 
selection of its European officials, is nevertheless very 
reluctant to make any promises of this kind. You will, I am 
sure, agree that the primary motive which should govern in the 
appointment of an official should be his ability and fitness 
for the post he is called upon to occupy, and not his 
nationality.
You have been good enough, in view of these remarks, to
discontinue the discussion of the particular question. I 
would point out that arrangements have been made for taking 
into the Siamese service Judges Skinner-Turner and Buszard.
315
This action you will see is in accordance with what I have 
above expressed to be the attitude of the Siamese Government, 
and I trust you will find in it some evidence that the Siamese 
Government will spontaneously take steps which, as guarantees, 
will be as substantial as written promises unwillingly given.
I am, etc.,
(Signed) JENS I. WESTENGARD.
Mr. Paget to Prince Devawongse.
M. le Ministre, Bangkok, March 10, 1909.
REFERRING to Article of the Treaty we have signed this 
day, I beg to inform you that the Government of the Federated 
Malay States propose the following plan for the payment of 
the indebtedness of the territories therein mentioned:-
That indebtedness today amounts to 3,321,245.965 dollars. 
Converted into a sterling equivalent, this equals 367,478.695^* 
This sum shall carry interest from this date at the rate of 
4 per cent, per annum.
The Government of the Federated Malay States will pay in 
London to the Siamese Government the above sum, with interest, 
in two equal instalments, that is to say, one-half on the 1st 
July, 1909, snd one-half on the 1st January, 1910.
Will you be so good as to let me know whether the fore­
going proposals meet the views of the Siamese Government.
I avail, etc.
(S i gne d) RALPH PAGET.
514
Prince Devawongse to Mr. Paget.
Foreign Office, Bangkok,
M. le Ministre, March 10, 1909.
I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of even 
date herewith, in which you inform me that the Government of 
the Federated Malay States propose to pay the indebtedness 
mentioned in Article 4 of the Treaty we have signed today in
the following manner
The indebtedness which today amounts to 5,521,245.965 
dollars is converted into a sterling equivalent of 587,4*78.695£ 
This sum shall bear interest from this date at the rate of 
4 per cent, per annum.
The Government of the Federated Malay States will pay in 
London to the Siamese Government the above sum, with interest, 
in two equal instalments, that is to say, one-half on the 1st 
July, 1909, and one-half on the 1st January, 1910.
I beg to inform you that the above arrangement is entirely
satisfactory to the Siamese Government.
I avail, etc.
(Signed) DEVAWONGSE VAROPRAKAR.
Railway Agreement.
THIS Agreement made this 10th day of March, 1909, 
between the Government of the Federated Malay States (herein­
after called "the lender") and the Railway Department of the 
Kingdom of Siam (hereinafter called "the borrower").
Witnesseth as follows:-
1. The lender agrees to advance to the borrower a sum of
money not to exceed 4,OGC,OOOE on the terms and for the 
purposes hereinafter mentioned.
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2. The moneys received by the borrower under this Agreement 
shall be devoted to the construction, equipment, maintenance, 
and operation of the railways of the borrower in the Siamese 
dominions of the Malay Peninsula. These objects shall be 
held to include such matters (for example, telegraph and 
telephone lines, terminal wharves, etc.) as are usually 
incident to the construction, equipment, maintenance, and 
operation of railway lines.
3. The above sum shall be paid to the borrower in London in 
partial payments, as demanded by him from time, to time; 
provided, however, that the demands so made may not exceed a 
total of 750>COGS in one year. The lender also reserves the 
privilege of notifying the borrower at any time that in future 
he will require three months’ written notice of any demand 
for such partial payments.
4-. The borrower shall pay interest at the rate of 4 per cent, 
per annum on the moneys actually received by him from time 
to time. Interest shall run on the respective partial pay­
ments from the date they are received by the borrower.
Interest shall be payable at half-yearly intervals, that 
is to say, on the 1st January and the 1st July in each year.
5. Payments of interest and principal shall be made in 
London.
6. The amortization of the loan will be effected within a 
period of forty years, by yearly annuities, according to the 
table attached to this Agreement. The first redemption will 
take place within fifteen years from the date of this
Agreement.
At any time after the expiration of ten years from the 
present date the borrower shall have the right to redeem at 
par all or any part of the principal remaining unpaid. In 
case, however, the borrower intends to anticipate redemption 
by larger payments than those provided for in the Table of 
Amortization, he shall give three months' notice to the lender.
7. For the repayment of the principal and interest due under 
this Agreement, the borrower pledges as security the sections 
of the railway above referred to as those sections are 
successively constructed. If, therefore, at any time the 
borrower fail to pay any sum, whether of principal or interest, 
due by him under this Agreement, and if such default continue
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Tor a period of not less than six months, the lender shall be
at liberty to enter into possession of the sections of the 
railway then completed under this Agreement, and to work the 
same until the default has been made good. The net profits 
obtained by the lender from any such working shall be set off 
against the indebtedness of the borrower.
8. Since the proceeds of this loan are to be used for the 
specific purpose mentioned in section 2 hereof, it is agreed 
that, until the completion of the construction of the lines to 
be built under this Agreement, the construction, equipment, 
maintenance, and operation of those lines shall be kept dis­
tinct from that of the other railways of the borrower.
9. The borrower shall keep such books and accounts as shall 
be necessary to show the amount to be expended by him from 
time to time out of the sums received by him from the lender 
under this Agreement. These books and accounts shall be open 
to inspection by the lender at all reasonable times, so that 
he may satisfy himself that the moneys advanced by him have 
been applied for the purposes for which they were lent.
The Railway Department of the Rederated Malay States 
shall be at liberty to inspect the plans, showing the route 
along which the rail way is proposed to be constructed, the 
sections, specifications, and estimates of the cost of the 
railway, and the number and locality of its sidings, stations, 
level crossings, goods sheds, signal stations, and other works, 
from time to time, as the survey and preparation of the 
working drawings proceeds.
In witness whereof the parties hereto, acting by their 
duly-authorized representatives, have hereunto set their
hands on the day first above mentioned at Bangkok.
(Ror the Railway Department of the Kingdom of Siam,)
(L.S.) DEVAWONGSE VARAPRAKAR.
(Ror the Government of the Rederated Malay States) , 
(L.S.) RALPH PAGET.
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Prince Devawongse to hr. Paget.
Foreign Office, Bangkok,
Lear hr. Paget, March 10, 1909.
REFERRING to the Agreement today made for a loan of 
4,000,Q00£, I am writing this letter to say that it is the 
intention of the Siamese Government to use the money primarily 
to build their portion of a line for through traffic between 
Bangkok and Singapore. Construction will be begun as soon as 
financial arrangements are concluded, and will be carried out 
continuously to connect with the Federated Malay States' 
north-eastern system. The determination of the order in which 
the different sections shall be constructed will rest with the 
Siamese Government, and the connection need not be made until 
the whole line is completed from Petchaburi southward.
During the constriction the Chief Engineer of the railway 
shall be British.
Referring to section 8 of the Agreement, I would add 
that if after the completion of the construction it is desired 
to terminate the distinction mentioned in that section, the 
lines constructed under the Agreement will be placed under 
the direct control of a Siamese Director-General of Railways.
In making the above statements on behalf of the Siamese 
Government it has been my desire to facilitate a clear under­
standing concerning the Agreement; but, in order to obviate 
any misapprehension in the future, I wish to add that nothing 
I have here stated should convey the meaning that the Siamese 
Government could admit any outside interference or control in 
connection with the construction or operation of their line.
I am, etc.,
(Signed) DEVAWONGSE VAROPRAKAR.
Mr. Paget to Prince Devawongse.
h. le Ministre, ^angkoi:,
’ March 10, 1909.
WITH reference to your Royal Highness' letter of even 
date, I beg to state that the various points therein mentioned
have been submitted for the consideration of the Federated 
Malay States, who have expressed their concurrence in your
Royal Highness' statement. I avail etc
I c m  & rf 1 5 "RAT /PI i 7J a r .>m
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Mr. Westengard to Mr. Paget.
Office of the General Adviser, Bangkok 
March 9, 1909*
Bear Mr. Paget,
ALTHOUGH the Agreement for the 4-,00G,000£ railway loan 
signed today is not referred to in the Treaty of this date, 
yet, as you are aware, it has been part of a large negotiation 
which includes the Treaty. I think, therefore, it would be 
well to have something in writing to show the real intention 
of the parties, namely, that the entry into force of the Loan 
Agreement depends upon a condition, and that the condition is 
the ultimate fate of the Treaty. That is to say, if by any 
chance the unlikely event should happen that the Treaty should 
fail of ratification, then the Loan Agreement would also fail. 
On the other hand, if the Treaty is duly ratified, then the 
Railway Agreement comes into force.
Since the Loan Agreement involves a large sum of money, 
it may be of some interest to the Federated Malay States1 
Government to learn the present plans of the Siamese Railway 
Department, particularly as regards finances. Knowledge of 
this kind may be of assistance to the Federated Malay States 
in making their own money arrangements.
There is much preliminary work to be done in the way of 
organization of forces, survey, and staking out of the line, 
and numerous other details. These will take some time, but 
will probably demand only an inconsiderable outlay.
In the meantime, the Siamese Government will receive the 
payment of the indebtedness of the transferred States.
With this money it is intended to begin work on the 
Bandon-Pata lung section, and also on the Patalung-Trang 
section. The sum in question (38G,0G0£, more or less) is a 
considerable one, and since outlay must in the beginning be 
somewhat slow, it is thought that the above amount will cover 
the expenditure of the first and second years. It is there­
fore not likely that it will be necessary to call for any part 
of the 4,00G,0G0£ until the beginning of the third year.
Since, however, this 380,G00£ does not form part of the loan 
money, it is intended that so much of it as has been expended 
on the Bandon-Patalung section (which forms part of the 
through line) will in due time be drawn from the loan money.
In other words, the Siamese Railway Department will for the 
present make advances towards the construction of part of the 
through line, and will at a later time repay itself out of the 
loan money for these advances.
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Any money expended out of the 38G,000£ on the Patalung- 
Trang section will remain as it is, that is to say, money 
expended out of the Siamese Railway Department out of its own
funds and not out of the loan money.
You will therefore see that the Federated Malay States 
v/ill probably have ample time to make their own financial 
arrangements, as it is likely that nearly two years will elapse 
before they will be asked for any money on account of the loan. 
I imagine that this will not be unwelcome nev/s to them.
The above plans are subject to alterations, if found 
necessary for engineering, financial, or other reasons. But 
in such case due information would be given to the Federated 
Malay States so that they can prepare to meet any such changes.
Yours, etc.,
(Signed) JENS I. WESTENGARD.
Mr. Paget to Mr. Westengard.
Bangkok, March 10, 1909.
Dear Mr. Westengard,
IN reply to your letter of yesterday's date, in the first 
portion of which you refer to the connection betv/een the Treaty 
and Railway Agreement, in so far as the latter will be effected 
by the ratification or the non-ratification of the former, I 
beg to state that I am entirely in accord with you as to what 
the intention has been during negotiation, namely, that 
although the Treaty and the Agreement may not form a part of 
the same instrument, and have been separated for the sake of 
expediency and convenience, it was nevertheless understood 
that they should remain interdependent and should stand or 
fall together. Hence, should the Treaty by any chance fail 
to obtain ratification, I am of opinion that the Railway 
Agreement, even though signed, would fail to be binding.
I wish to thank you for the explanations you give me in 
the second portion of your letter concerning the arrangements 
the Siamese Railway Department have in view, especially with 
regard to financing the construction of the Malay Peninsula 
Railway. I will communicate these to the High Commissioner of 
the Federated Malay States without delay.
Yours, etc.,
(Signed) RALPH PAGET.
Source: F.O. 422/64-, Paget-Grey, March 10, 1909.

321
I. MATERIALS IN THE SIAMESE LANGUAGE.
MATERIALS AT THE NATIONAL LIBRARY, DEPARTMENT OP FINE ARTS,
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, BANGKOK, THAILAND.
Manuscripts and Inscriptions Section.
Much of the material in this reference section is 
illuminating, but the documents which have been especially 
helpful are:
Record of the Third Reign (J.S. + 638 = A.D.)
Documents on the Malay States, J.S. 1194, No. 10.
Records of the Fourth Reign
A Draft of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1835* No. 84.
A Letter from King Mongkut to Phraya Sisuriyawongse, 
the Malays in Trengganu, J.S. 1223, No. 110.
Kra Canal, J.S. 1221, No. 113.
King Nongkut's Letter, Sultan Mamud of Pahang,
J.S. 1224, No. 115.
A Letter from King Mongkut to Phraya Sisuriyawongse, 
the Royal Trip, No. 123.
Kins^s Speech, Siam, being a small country, is subject 
to threats, No. 126.
The Appointment of the Officials in the South,
J.S. 1217, No. 130.
A Letter from the First King to the Second King, the 
bombardment of Trengganu, J.S. 1224, No. 324.
322
King Hongkut's Speech, a rumour regarding Siam being 
in danger of losing her independence to England,
No. 473.
The National Archives.
File 3/197 The Duff Concession in Kelantan and the 
affairs of Kelantan.
File 45/197 - 68/197 The Appointment of Advisers in 
Kelantan and Trengganu.
File 6/224 - 8/224 The Malay Peninsula Railway.
File 7/15 - 22/15 Records of the Foreign Affairs
Department. (Krom Tha).
DOCUMENTS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, BANGKOK, THAILAND.
* «
By permission of the Foreign Minister, the writer was 
accorded unrestricted access to all relevant materials at 
the Archives of the Ministry in 1959 before it.was closed 
to researchers after the break-up of Thai - Cambodian 
relations.
Ail these materials are not catalogued and although 
the documents relating to the subject of this thesis are 
few, they are of great historical value. Three categories
of records have been consulted :
(a) The correspondence dealing with the Perak-Rahman
Boundary, 1883-1891.
(b) Papers on the Pahang Rebellion, 1894.
323
(c) Negotiations regarding the Appointment of Advisers
in Kelantan and Trengganu.
Secondary Sources:
AJ-Arun, Songsri, Kan Lerg Sithi Sapap Nog Arnaket (The 
Abolition of Extraterritoriality). Bangkok, 1964.
Buasuwan, Vimol, "Pratet Thai Rerm Plaine Ghom Na Tam Bab 
Arayapratet Nai Samai Dai” (When did Siam's turning- 
point start?). Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Chulalongkorn 
University, Bangkok, 1963.
Bulletin of the Ministry of Interior, Bangkok, 1952.
Ghakra Pranisisilvisudh, Luang. Ekkarat Nai Kan San
(Freedom of Justice). Published in a book to commemorate 
the opening up of the Givil and Griminal Court building. 
Bangkok, 1963.
Chulalongkorn, King. Rayatang Sadet Phraratcha-Damnern 
Prapat Tang Bog Tang Ruea Rob Laem Idalayu R.S. 109. 
(Royal Tour to the Peninsula in 1890), Bangkok, 1952.
Phrapatchahatleka Ruang Sadet Prapat 
Laem Malayu Hue a R.S. 108, 109* 117* 120 Ruam Si Grown,
(Reports on Malayan Trips in 1889, 1890, 1898, 19C1).
Bangkok, 1925.
Introduction to the Laksana Kodmai Arya 
(Criminal Code). Bangkok, 1909.
Elai Ban (Far From Home), Bangkok, 1954-•
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Jodmaihet Phraratchakit Rai Wan Phak 10,
(The Diary, Part 10), Bangkok, 1935•
Jodmaihet Phraratchakit Rai V/an Phak 11, 
(Part 11), Bangkok, 1935.
Jodmaihet Phraratchakit Rai V/an Phak 12. 
(Part 12), Bangkok, 1936.
Damrong Rajamubhab, Prince, Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung 
Rattana-Kosin, Ratchakan Thi 2, (Royal Chronicles of 
the Second Reign of the Bangkok Period), Bangkok, 1916.
and Narisara Nuwattiwongse, Prince.
San Somdet (Princes' Letters), Bangkok, 1961.
Sadaeng Banyai Phongsawadan Syam (Lectures
on the History of Siam), Bangkok, 1949 •
Preface to Luang Udomsombat Document,
Bangkok, 1913.
Prawat Chao Phraya Mahasena, Prawat Chao 
Phraya Bodinde.ja, Prawat Chao Phraya Yommarati (Biogra- 
phies of Chao Phraya Mahasena, Chao Phraya Bodindeja 
and Chao Phraya Yommaraj, Bangkok, 1961.
Kan Sadet Phraratchadamnuen Prapat Laem 
Nalayu 107, 108, 11a, 1194 (Royal Tours of the Malay
Peninsula in 1888, 1889, 1897, 1900), Bangkok, 1925.
Preface to Hungsu Jodmaihet Lae Kirat
London.
Tesapiban, Bangkok, I960.
Department of Publicity. Pratet Thai Ruang Kan Sia Dindaen 
Gkae ffarangset (Siamese Loss of Territory to Prance),
Bangkok, 1940.
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Jodmaihet Luang Udomsombat (Luang Udom Sombat Document), 
Bangkok, 1915•
Kodmai Ratchakan Thi 5 (Lav/s of the Reign of King Rama V) , 
Bangkok, 1909 •
Kodmai fra Sam Duang (The Law of the Three Seals), 5 Vols., 
Bangkok, 1962-1963.
Lailaksana, Satien, and others. Prachum Kodmai Pracham Sok 
Vols. 15, 17, Bangkok, 1935*
Ministry of the Interior. Ruang Kong Changwad Pattani (The 
Story of Pattani), Bangkok, 1962.
Ruang Kong Changwad Setul (The Story 
of Setul), Bangkok, 196>2V
Narathip Phongpraphan, Prince. Prawat Kan Tud Thai (History 
of Siamese Diplomacy), Bangkok, 1958.
Nitisatpaisan, Phraya. Prawatisat Kodmai (History of 
Legislation), Bangkok, 1954.
Phraratchahatleka Phrabat Somdet Phra Chunlachom-Klao
Qhaoyuhua Lae Lai Phrahat Somdet Phra (Letters of King 
Chulalongkorn and Queen Marasi), Bangkok, 1950.
Phraratchaphongsawadan Chabab Phraratchahatleka (Royal 
Chronicles), Bangkok, Vol. I, 1914, Vol. II, 1952.
Prachum Phongsawadan (Collected Chronicles)
Part 2. Phongsawadan Muang (History of) Thalang, Kedah, 
Trengganu, Kelantan, Bangkok, 1914.
Part 5. Phongsawadan Muang Pattani, Songkhla, Chiengmai
Bangkok, 1914.
Part 15. Phongsawadan Muang Patalung. Bangkok, 1920.
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Part 30* Ruang Tamnan Muang (History of) Ranong, (The 
Story of Ranong), Bangkok, 1928.
Part 33* Phongsawadan Muang Songkhla, Nakornsitammarat, 
Patalung, Bangkok, 1933*
Part 73* The Shan Rising Suppression, Part I, Bangkok, 195
Part 78. The Shan Rising Suppression, Part II, Bangkok, 
1962.
Rabi, Prince. Phraratchabanyat Ra.jburi (Rajburi Act), Bangkok, 
1901.
Ratchakitchanubeksa (Court Gazette, Bangkok), Vol. XIX, 
R.S. 11C, Vol. XXV, R.S. 128, Vol. XXVIII, R.S. 130.
Ruang Kong Chao Phraya Hahitorn (The Story of Chao Phraya 
Ma hi torn)", Bangkok, 1956.
Ruang Tang Chao Phraya Krung Rattanakosin (The Appointments 
of Chao Phrayas in the Bangkok Period), Bangkok, 1931*
Saranrom (Annual of the Foreign Ministry, Bangkok), 1965.
Sommot Amorapan, Prince. Jodmaihet Phrabat Somdet Phra 
Chunlachomklao Chadyuhua Sadet Prapat Laem Malayu 
R.S. 109* 117* 119* 124, 128. (Records on King Chula­
longkorn fs Trips to the Malay Peninsula in 1890, 1898, 
1900, 1905, 1909), Bangkok, 1923.
Jodmaihet Phrabat Somdet Phra Chunlach­
omklao Chaoyuhua Sadet Prapat Laem Malayu R.S. 107* 108. 
(Records on King Chulalongkorn1s Trips to the Malay
Peninsula in 1888, 1889), Bangkok, 1923.
Tesapiban (The Ministry of Interior1s Journal) Vol. I 
R.S. 125 (1906/07), Vol. II R.S. 125.
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Tipakorawong, Chao Phraya. Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung 
Rattanakosin Ratchakan Thi ^ (Royal Chronicles of the 
Fourth Reign of the Bangkok Period), 2 Vols., Bangkok,
1961.
Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin 
Ratchakan Thi 3 (Royal Chronicles of the Third Reign of
the Bangkok Period), Bangkok, 1935-
Vichien Khiri, Phraya. Phongsawadan Muang Songkhla (History 
of Songkhla), Bangkok, 1926.... ....
Vichitr Vadakarn, Luang. Ekasan Ruang Kwam Sampan Gkub 
Tangpratet Nai Samai Ayudhya (Documents on Relations 
with Foreign Countries during the Ayudhya Period) , 
Bangkok, 1938.
Kan Sia Dindaen Thai Hai Gkae Farangset 
(The Loss of Territory to FranceT, Bangkok, 1962.
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II. MATERIALS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES.
English MATERIALS AT PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON.
These documents include the Foreign Office Papers, the 
Colonial Office Papers and the Private Papers. They are 
classified as follows:
FOREIGN OFFICE PAPERS.
F.O. 69 Vols. 61 (1875) - 276 (1905).
These are documents on all subjects touching on Siam. 
They are the correspondence between the Foreign Office, the 
British Consulate in Bangkok, the Colonial Office, the India 
Office, the British Legation in Paris, the Siamese Legation 
in London, Minutes of meetings, Memoranda on the affairs of 
Siam, and private correspondence.
Records dated from 1906 onwards are classified under 
F.O. 571. The volume numbers are 131, 132 (1906), 329-533 
(1907), 521-523 (1908), 735-739 (1909), 983-985 (1910),
1223 (1911).
F.O. 628 Files 239 (1896-7),-334- (1911).
Records of this category consist of files of the British 
Legation in Bangkok from 1856 to 1917. These include the 
correspondence then in circulation between the British 
Consular Offices in Siam, the Foreign Office, the Straits 
Settlements Government, the Government of India and the 
Sultans of the Malay States. Most of them are duplicates of
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the records of F.O. 69 and F.O. 371 but there are some 
original documents. In particular, the reports of the 
British Consuls are useful.
F.O. 372 Records of the Treaty Negotiations Vols. 29 (1906), 
80 (1907), 129 (1908), 178 (1909), 232 (1910), 305, 306 (1911)
F.O. 17 (China)
Vols. 1293-1296 under this classification contain the 
correspondence on affairs of Siam in 1896 which is helpful 
to a study of the negotiations leading up to the Anglo- 
Siamese Secret Convention of 1897*
F.O. 800/14-2 (1902-1905)
This volume contains Private Papers of the Iiarquess of 
Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. There is 
interesting information concerning the Anglo-Siamese negot­
iations over the appointment of the Advisers in Kelantan and 
Trengganu in 1902.
Most of the above-mentioned documents are in typed script 
except the hand-written private correspondence and the 
printed texts of the treaties.
Confidential Prints.
F.O. 4-22 (Siam and South-East Asia)
These are records of the dealings of the French in 
Annam and Tonquin, the Affairs of Burma, the Affairs of Siam, 
and concerning British Influence and Policy in the Malay
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Peninsula. The volumes which have been valuable to this
study are:-
30, 31, 34-, 35, 36, 39, 4-0, 4-2, 43, 4-5, 4?, 49, 51, 53,
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66.
P.O. 405 (China)
The Annual Reports of the affairs of Siam are bound 
together with the Reports of the affairs of China and Korea 
in the following volumes
176 (1906), 178 (1907), 195 (1909), 201 (1910),
COLONIAL OFFICE PAPERS.
CiO-JSa
Files of the Colonial Office on the Malay States. The 
interesting records are the correspondence between the 
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office regarding British 
policy in the northern Malay States. In particular, the 
Colonial Office's comments on the Foreign Office despatches 
are valuable.
Vols. 275, 286, 287, 296, 304, 305, 314, 315, 323, 333, 
343, 353, 355 (1901-1909).
0 .0- 275
These are Sessional Papers and Annual Heports of the 
Affairs of the Malay States.
Vols. 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 77, 79, 81, 84, 87 (1901- 
1911).
351
PRIVATE PAPERS
PRO 5C/53 Sstow Papers. PRO $0/29 Granville Papers.
These documents give useful descriptions of the situation 
in the Consular jurisdiction in Siam.
Books:
Bowring, Sir John. The Kingdom and People of Siam, 2 Vols., 
London, 1857.
Braddell, Sir Koland. The Legal Status of the halay States. 
Singapore, 1931.
British and Foreign State Papers, Vols. 97* H I  (1905-1904), 
(1908-1909).
Burney, Captain Henry. The Burney Papers 1822-1849, 5 Vols., 
Bangkok: Printed by order of the Vajiranana National
Library, 1910-1914.
The Colonial Problem. A report by a Study Group of Members 
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